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I.

INTRODUCTION

“Inmates are dying in Florida’s prisons, victims of torture and
brutality.”1 As eloquently stated by the Miami Herald, “inmates are being
killed by people Floridians pay to keep the peace in a charged, stressful
environment.”2 Incredibly, Florida has been characterized in recent years as
ground zero for prison deaths.3 Despite such alarming accusations, formal
criminal charges have never been brought against any of the suspected
Florida prison employees.4 In fact, the situation has become so egregious
that former Department of Corrections head, James McDonough, stated in an
e-mail, “‘I am revolted by what I am hearing, just as I am by what I am not
hearing. . . . [t]hese cases did not end tragically . . . they ended in horrific and
suspicious deaths.’”5 “With the third largest prison system in the country,”
over one hundred thousand inmates are housed in Florida “at a cost of $2.3
billion per year.”6 Recently, in 2014, there are more than five inmates for
every ten thousand Florida residents being housed within the seven privately
run facilities and forty-eight public state run facilities. 7 Despite alleged
reform attempts within the Florida prison system, former Charlotte
Correctional Institute Inmate No. 196374, Joseph Cardenas, described his
experience in the facility by saying, “[y]ou have no rights . . . [i]f they beat
your ass, [they will] hide you [until] [you are] healed. [That is] their world
and you need to accept that.”8
In the wake of serious allegations against the State, the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement has opened investigations into nine inmate
1.
Editorial, Break the Silence, MIAMI HERALD (July 10, 2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article1974845.html.
2.
Id.
3.
Shaun King, Record 346 Inmates Die, Dozens of Guards Fired in Florida
Prisons, DAILY KOS (Jan. 14, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/14/
1357661/-Poisonings-beatings-gassings-Record-346-inmates-die-dozens-of-guards-fired-inFlorida-prisons.
4.
Editorial, Break the Silence, supra note 1.
5.
Id.
6.
Evan Williams, Our Inmates, Our Burden, FLA. WKLY.: FORT MYERS
(June 25, 2014), http://fortmyers.floridaweekly.com/news/2014-06-25/Top_News/OUR_
INMATES_OUR_BURDEN.html.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
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deaths, in addition to the Miami-Dade homicide investigation into the death
of Darren Rainey. 9 Supplementing these investigations, the Florida
Department of Corrections introduced an “online database cataloging all
inmate deaths over the past [fourteen] years.”10 This database catalogues the
three thousand four hundred inmates who have died in the Florida prison
system as well as the roughly one hundred cases that remain under
investigation by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.11
Although a majority of inmate deaths are classified as accidental or
natural—like that of Randall Jordan-Aparo—this is often a mistake.12 In the
case of Aparo, his death was ruled an accident until multiple sources at the
prison forced the case to be reopened, at which point, it was discovered that
he was likely gassed to death by prison guards.13 His fate was sealed when
prison nurses refused to transport him to the hospital to receive life saving
treatment.14 Conditions have become so outrageous in Florida prisons that
convicted murderer, Richard Mair, hung himself in September 2013 leaving
behind a suicide note, “accusing guards of sexually abusing inmates and
forcing black and white inmates to fight each other for the entertainment of
staff.”15 It has even been reported that if an inmate spoke about filing a
complaint, the guards would threaten twenty-four hour cell confinement or
issuance of inmate citations for infractions that were not actually
committed.16
II.
A.

INHUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Matthew Walker

Matthew Walker was an inmate at the Charlotte Correctional
Institution in Punta Gorda, Florida when he was killed on Friday, April 11,
9.
Julie K. Brown, 3 More Florida Inmate Deaths Prompt 3 More
Investigations, MIAMI HERALD (July 9, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/
article1974747.html [hereinafter Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations].
10.
Julie K. Brown, Florida Prison System, Under Fire, Releases Data on
Inmate Deaths, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article2084652.html.
11.
Id.
12.
See id.
13.
Id.
14.
See id.
15.
See Julie K. Brown, Staff at a Miami-Dade Prison Tormented, Abused,
Mentally Ill Inmates, Former Worker Says, MIAMI HERALD (May 19, 2014),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1964709.html
[hereinafter Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates].
16.
Id.
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2014. 17 Officers allegedly handcuffed Matthew Walker and beat him to
death because he would not put away a magazine and a cup that he had in his
cell.18 Even more appalling, Matthew Walker’s brutal murder at the hands of
ten prison employees occurred while he was restrained in handcuffs. 19
Officially, nine officers and a lieutenant were placed on leave pending
investigation after the officers involved allegedly tried to cover up the crime
by blaming Walker’s death on his cellmate. 20 In light of the incident
involving Matthew Walker, former employees of the Charlotte Correctional
Institution came forward to reveal the unsafe conditions of the facility. 21
Incredibly, Joe Facenda—a corrections officer at the facility—stated, “‘I
came home, I [do not] know how many times, dumbfounded at what went on
there . . . other officers telling you when, where, and how you can get away
with roughing up an inmate.’”22
B.

Darren Rainey

Darren Rainey was a fifty-year-old mentally ill inmate who “was
placed in a small, enclosed, scalding-hot shower by guards and left
unattended for more than an hour. He collapsed and died amid the searing
heat, suffering severe burns when he fell [with] his face up atop the drain.”23
Astonishingly, Rainey was placed in the shower “with water temperature
exceeding [one hundred and sixty] degrees as punishment for defecating in
his cell. He died in that shower with his skin peeling off, while he begged
for help . . . .”24 An anonymous correctional officer at the Dade Correctional
17.
Lucas Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with
Guards, NBC 2 (Apr. 18, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25285565/inmatecharlotte-county-correctional-institution-killed-matthew-walker [hereinafter Seiler, Inmate at
Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards].
18.
Lucas Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death, NBC 2
(Apr. 22, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25313044/state-question-cci-staffabout-prisoner-death#.Vd8el7R4FUQ [hereinafter Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About
Prisoner Death].
19.
FDLE Investigating Another Inmate Death at CCI, NBC 2,
http://www.nbc-2.com/story/25590023/fdle-investigating-another-inmate-death-at-charlottecorrectional-institution#.Vd8ckbR4FUQ (last updated May 22, 2014).
20.
Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards,
supra note 17; Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death, supra note 18.
21.
Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison Killed After Confrontation with Guards,
supra note 17.
22.
Id.
23.
Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15.
24.
Nicole Flatow, Florida Inmate Reportedly Gassed to Death, Another
Killed by Scalding Water, THINK PROGRESS (July 11, 2014, 12:07 PM),
http://www.thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/07/11/3458959/florida-gassed-to-death-killed-byscalding-hot-water.
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Institution stated that mental health unit guards repeatedly threaten troublecausing inmates with this shower treatment.25
A medical document regarding Rainey’s death states that he suffered
from a condition referred to as slippage where the skin is so dead that it
shrivels away from the body.26 Florida Department of Corrections Secretary
Michael Crews fired thirty-two guards in the wake of scrutiny given to
inmate deaths across the state of Florida in recent years and specifically to
the death of Rainey. 27 In regards to situations like Walker and Rainey’s,
Howard Simon, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) of Florida stated, “[t]hese revelations that are coming out are not
about incompetence. [They are] about guards killing people and public
officials working feverishly to cover it up.”28 Jerry Cummings, the warden
of the prison in which Rainey was held, is on paid administrative leave,
while the two correctional officers involved in his suspected murder remain
on the job in the facility.29 As of July 9, 2014, Darren Rainey’s family had
still not been provided with an official cause of death.30
Demanding justice for those unable to obtain justice alone, the
Miami Herald has spent more than a year investigating prison abuses within
the Florida Department of Corrections. 31 In particular, the newspaper
reported that, “Rainey’s death nearly three years ago, along with subsequent
stories about rampant inmate abuse as well as a record number of deaths in
Florida’s prisons, has spawned demands for an overhaul of the Florida
Department of Corrections.”32 These demands have yet to be met, but hopes
remain high as individuals like Inspector General Jeffery Beasley fall under
investigation “after four of his subordinates stated under oath this year that
he asked them to sideline cases that would give the agency a black eye.”33

25.
Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15.
26.
Ashley Lopez, Miami Herald: Allegations of Abuse of Mentally-Ill in
Florida Prison, FLA. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (May 21, 2014),
http://www.fcir.org/2014/05/21/miami-herald-allegations-of-abuse-of-mentally-ill-in-floridaprison.
27.
32 Florida Prison Guards Fired Amid Outrage Over Inmate Abuse,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2014, 1:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/21/
florida-prison-system-fir_n_5856354.html.
28.
Id.
29.
Editorial, Break the Silence, supra note 1.
30.
Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9.
31.
Julie K. Brown, Scalding-Shower Death in Dade Prison Prompts Federal
Probe, MIAMI HERALD (May 19, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/
florida-prisons/article21429693.html.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
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ABUSE OF DISABLED PRISONERS

Federal System

The Department of Justice receives more than sixteen hundred
complaints a year from inmates alleging discrimination on the basis of
disability. 34 The most common allegations include “denial of access or
unequal access to the facility’s programs and activities; lack of effective
communication for inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing [as well as] those
who are blind or have low vision; and denial of access to disability-related
medical services and devices.”35 A vast majority of access complaints allege
lack of accessible toilets, showers, and cells, along with steep floors that
prevent disabled inmates from accessing areas like the dining hall or the
library. 36 Prisoners are also detrimentally prevented from participating in
drug treatment programs required for parole eligibility if they are taking
medication to treat mental illness, or they are excluded from obtaining a job,
and thus unable to earn credits towards early release. 37 Effective
communication complaints surround circumstances where prisoners are
denied access to sign language interpreters, books on tape, large print, Braille
reading materials, or extended length for telephone calls when using special
devices to communicate with family.38 Finally, a large number of complaints
are received upon denial of mandatory devices or equipment such as
eyeglasses, hearing aids, wheelchairs, walkers, necessary medical equipment
such as catheters or urine bags, prescribed orthopedic shoes, and necessary
medications like insulin or seizure medication.39
B.

Florida System

The Florida Department of Corrections has systematically generated
an environment of fear and hopelessness among disabled prisoners.40 “For

34.
Justice Project Improves Conditions for People with Disabilities in
Prisons and Jails, DISABILITY RTS. ONLINE NEWS (Aug. 11, 2008), http://www.ada.gov/
newsltr0208.htm.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Justice Project Improves Conditions for People with Disabilities in
Prisons and Jails, supra note 34.
40.
Talila Lewis, Opinion, Other View: Deaf Inmates Need to be Seen and
Heard, SUN SENTINEL, May 1, 2013, at 10A.
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any person who is deaf, prison is a horror.”41 Unfortunately, “[t]he abuse
experienced by deaf prisoners housed in the Florida Department of
Corrections defies imagination.” 42 The Helping Educate to Advance the
Rights of the Deaf (“HEARD”) organization runs the National Deaf and
Deaf-Blind Prisoner Database, and for three years, the organization has been
reporting extreme violence and sexual abuse against these vulnerable
prisoners to the Governor, the Department of Corrections Secretary, the
Office of the Inspector General, and the ADA Coordinator yet to no avail.43
Being that deafness is one of the least understood and most neglected
disabilities in prisons, such prisoners are “totally compromised . . . in the
dangerous, treacherous environment of rape, abuse, and violence that
characterizes most prisons.”44
1.

Elliott “Bud” Yorke

Elliott “Bud” Yorke is a ninety-year-old deaf and non-verbal inmate
at Florida’s Columbia Correctional Institution Annex at Lake City, who was
placed in isolation for his own protection after showing signs of being
assaulted.45 Even in solitary confinement Yorke wrote a letter to a friend
stating,
There are no grab and hold bars on [the] wall to help me up and
down on [the] toilet. They [will not] let my walker stay in my cell
to help, [although] I am [a] solo occupant in this cell while [I am]
in this present hell place. At 13:10 [hours] on June 25, 2014, the
confinement guard has taken my walker wheels. He rode it out
like a scooter with one knee on the seat. It was parked outside my
cell. It has my jar of topical allergy skin salve under [the] seat,
46
and I [can not] walk without a walker!!

Yorke has served close to thirty years in Florida for a sex offense
and has been denied transfer to a prison that teaches American Sign
Language.47 He has, however, been granted transfer to a facility better suited
41.
McCay Vernon, ADA Routinely Violated by Prisons in the Case of Deaf
Prisoners, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, July 2009, at 14, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/
issues/07pln09.pdf.
42.
Lewis, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
43.
Id.
44.
Vernon, supra note 41.
45.
Adelyn Baxter, Ninety Years Old, Deaf, and in the Hole in a Florida
Prison, SOLITARY WATCH (July 10, 2014), http://www.solitarywatch.com/2014/07/10/ninetyyears-old-deaf-hole-florida-prison.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
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for his age and disability, but due to limited availability, transferring is a
lengthy process. 48 Incredibly, Yorke will be forced to remain in solitary
confinement throughout the remainder of the transfer process despite his
vehement objections.49
2.

Richard Jackson

Richard Jackson, an inmate suffering from partial paralysis of his
lower limbs, was denied the use of a wheelchair inside of his cell in Santa
Rosa.50 In lieu of using his wheelchair, Jackson was forced to drag himself
between his bed and the toilet using only his hands and arms to assist him in
navigating the cell.51 Even more astonishing, after filing a discrimination
lawsuit, Jackson lost thirty pounds in one month from being beaten and
having his food withheld as means of retaliation.52 Richard Jackson filed his
second amended complaint with the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida in the Pensacola Division on March 26, 2014,
naming Michael Crews as the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections, Richard Comerford, James White, Dr. Rummel, Marsha Nicols,
Officer Locklear, and Does 1-8 as Defendants.53 The Complaint reiterates
that when Jackson sought relief from the court, he was transferred to another
prison facility where the staff welcomed him by retaliating against him for
seeking justice. 54 Final disposition of this matter is still pending as the
Complaint was filed on March 26, 2014.55
3.

Complaints from Within

George Mallinckrodt was a psychotherapist assigned to the Dade
Correctional Institution Psychiatric Unit from 2008 through 2011. 56 Dr.
Mallinckrodt reported that guards “‘taunted, tormented, abused, beat, and

Id.
Id.
Kathy M. Foster, ACLU of Florida and FJI Defend Disabled Man
FOLLY
NEWS
(Apr.
2,
2014),
Subjected
to
Prison
Abuse,
FOSTER
http://www.fosterfollynews.com/2014/04/02/aclu-of-florida-and-fji-defend-disabled-mansubjected-to-prison-abuse.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Second Amended Complaint at 1, Jackson v. Crews, No. 3:13-CV-00174
(N.D. Fla Mar. 3, 2014).
54.
Id. at 2.
55.
See id. at 1.
56.
Brown, Miami-Dade Prison Abused Inmates, supra note 15.
48.
49.
50.
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tortured chronically mentally ill inmates on a regular basis.’”57 Employees
allege that guards shockingly “made sport of agitating the mentally ill
inmates.” 58 Disability Rights Florida is an organization empowered by
federal law to protect the rights of mentally ill individuals in Florida,
including those confined by the State at Dade Correctional Institution.59 As
such, they have filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Florida Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Sources for
subjecting mentally ill prisoners to abuse and discrimination by correctional
officers. 60 The lawsuit “alleges systematic and regular abuse and
discrimination, including brutality, deprivation of food, and physical and
verbal harassment by Dade C[orrectional] I[nstitution] correctional officers
against inmates with serious mental illness.”61
The Dade Correctional Institution has 176 Transitional Care Unit
beds and twenty Crisis Stabilization Unit beds, with a majority of inmates
residing in solitary confinement conditions. 62 The complaint alleges that
despite actual knowledge of the abuse of inmates in the inpatient mental
health unit, correctional officials—including supervisors—have failed to take
action to stop the abuse of inmates including the scalding hot shower
treatment, physical beatings, deprivation of food, physical harassment, and
verbal harassment. 63 Notwithstanding numerous verbal and written
complaints to prison officials and to the Florida Department of Corrections
Inspector General’s office from former treatment staff as well as inmates—
including the deaths of two inmates on the Dade Correctional Institution
inpatient unit within the past two years—defendant Michael D. Crews failed
to rectify the deplorable behavior.64 Moreover, Wexford supervisory staff at
Dade Correctional Institution not only failed to investigate or report the
allegations of abuse, but they did not even attempt to stop the abuse.65
Specific allegations include a psychological counselor’s termination
in 2011 after he “reported several instances of physical abuse by correctional
officers on inmates in the Dade [Correctional Institutions];” all of which
57.
Id.
58.
Id.; Lopez, supra note 26.
59.
Complaint at 1, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. v. Crews, No. 1:14-CV-23323
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2014).
60.
Id. at 1–2.
61.
Press Release, Disability Rights Fla., Department of Corrections Sued
over Inmate Abuse at the Dade Correctional Institute (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.disabilityrightsflorida.org/newsroom/story/department_of_corrections_sued_over
_inmate_abuse_at_the_dade_correctional_i.
62.
Complaint at 5–6, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323).
63.
Id. at 6–7.
64.
Id. at 7–8.
65.
Id. at 8.
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were ignored.66 The complaint also details the incidents leading up to the
death of Darren Rainey, including the horrific detail that he was found dead
lying in the shower with burns over ninety percent of his body.67 It is further
alleged that despite the number of abuse allegations, none of the inmates
referenced in the grievances were ever interviewed.68 The complaint even
identifies two living inmates, D.G. and M.A.—both suffering from serious
mental illness and a diagnosis of schizophrenia—who were subjected to the
shower treatment, in addition to various other brutal physical attacks.69
Richard Mair is additionally listed within the complaint.70 Mr. Mair
was an inmate at Dade Correctional Institution until he committed suicide on
September 11, 2013 after multiple suicide attempts—including ingestion of
batteries and razor blades—due to his major depressive disorder. 71 After
making several allegations of physical and mental abuse by correctional
staff, Mair left a note in his cell indicating that he committed suicide in part
because of the continual abuse against him by the correctional staff. 72
Incredibly, when the Florida Department of Corrections Inspector General’s
office reopened review of Darren Rainey’s death, it was only on whether the
shower was functioning properly and did not address the wide spread abuse
of mentally ill inmates.73
Counts one and two of the complaint allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Michael D. Crews in his official capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Wexford Health Sources, Inc.74 The Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that reasonable
measures be taken to guarantee the safety of inmates by ensuring humane
conditions of confinement, preventing use of excessive force against inmates,
and ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.75 Finally, count three alleges violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act as well as the Rehabilitation Act.76 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §

66.
Id.
67.
Complaint at 8–9, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323).
68.
Id. at 10.
69.
Id. at 11–12.
70.
Id. at 12.
71.
Id.
72.
Complaint at 12, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323).
73.
Id. at 13–14.
74.
Id. at 2–3, 15–16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
75.
Complaint at 15–16, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76.
Complaint at 18, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b) (2012).
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12131 and § 12132 prohibit disability-based discrimination by any public
entity.77
IV.
A.

REMEDIES FOR PRISONERS

Administrative Remedies

Section 944.331 of the Florida Statutes mandates the creation of an
inmate grievance procedure in the state of Florida. 78 The entirety of the
statute states, “[t]he department shall establish by rule an inmate grievance
procedure that must conform to the Minimum Standards for Inmate
Grievance Procedures as promulgated by the United States Department of
Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The department’s office of general
counsel shall oversee the grievance procedures established by the
department.” 79 Florida has developed such a procedure through Florida
Administrative Code Rule 33-103.80 This procedure is in place to provide
inmates with a channel for the administrative settlement of a claim against
the facility of incarceration.81 The Bureau of Policy Management and Inmate
Appeals not only address such grievances, but the division is also responsible
for developing a standardized grievance plan to be implemented by the
Bureau of Staff Development in training employees.82
Importantly, inmates are required to utilize the informal grievance
process before initiating a formal grievance, except in the case of an
emergency grievance, medical grievance, or grievance alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 83 Inmates are instructed to place
informal grievances in a designated lock box, which will then be distributed
to the staff member in charge of the problem area—after it is logged into the
system, which is then required to provide a response.84 The inmate must
indicate that Form DC6-236 is being used as an informal grievance in order
to meet the requirement of proper filing necessary prior to the submission of
a formal grievance.85 Upon completion of the informal grievance process, an
inmate can file a formal grievance by completing Form DC1-303 Request for

77.
Complaint at 18, Disability Rights Fla., Inc. (No. 1:14-CV-23323); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132.
78.
FLA. STAT. § 944.331 (2014).
79.
Id.
80.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-103.001–.019 (2015).
81.
Id. r. 33-103.001.
82.
Id. r. 33-103.001, .003.
83.
Id. r. 33-103.005.
84.
Id. r. 33-103.005(a)–(b).
85.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 22-103.605(2)(b).
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Administrative Remedy or Appeal and submitting it to the warden.86 If a
formal grievance is found to be an emergency, action to alleviate must be
taken and a formal response must be provided to the inmate within fifteen
calendar days.87 Alternatively, if an emergency is not found, the inmate must
be notified of the non-emergent status within seventy-two hours of receipt.88
In the event that an inmate is not satisfied with the outcome of the grievance
procedure, there is also an appeals process in place that the inmate can
utilize.89
B.

Civil Remedies
1.

Section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes

Section 768.28 of the Florida Statutes addresses waiver of sovereign
immunity in tort actions, stating specifically that, “the state, for itself and for
its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability
for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”90 Importantly,
[t]he state and its agencies and subdivisions shall be liable for tort
claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances, but liability shall not include
punitive damages or interest for the period before judgment.
Neither the state nor its agencies or subdivisions shall be liable to
pay a claim or a judgment by any one person which exceeds the
sum of [two hundred thousand dollars] or any claim or judgment,
or portions thereof, which, when totaled with all other claims or
judgments paid by the state or its agencies or subdivisions arising
out of the same incident or occurrence, exceeds the sum of [three
91
hundred thousand dollars].

This limit on the liability of the Department of Corrections as an
agency or subdivision of the State of Florida allows prison officials to
commit heinous crimes—including brutal murders—against inmates with a
two hundred thousand dollar cap on civil liability in state court.92 This is
utterly outrageous. Heightened financial liability against the Department of
Corrections would likely lead to an increase in accountability and a decrease
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
supra note 18.

Id. r. 33-103.006(1).
Id. r. 33-103.006(3)(a)(3).
Id. r. 33-103.006(3)(a)(4).
Id. r. 33-103.007(1).
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (2014).
Id. § 768.28(5) (emphasis added).
See id. § 768.28; Seiler, State Question CCI Staff About Prisoner Death,
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in inmate brutality at the hands of prison officials. 93 As it stands, it is
possible to seek punitive damages in Florida state courts for the wrongful
death of an animal—for example, a pet rabbit—yet not possible to do the
same in when an inmate is viscously murdered at the hands of a prison
guard.94
2.

Prison Litigation Reform Act 42 U.S.C. § 1997e

Due to caps placed on recoverability based on state sovereign
immunity, civil lawsuits brought against the state or its subdivisions for
actions arising out of publically run prison facilities do not yield just
results. 95 As a result of this injustice, civil lawsuits filed on behalf of
prisoners against state entities regulating incarceration facilities are often
brought under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with limitations pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act.96 Unfortunately, the Prison Litigation Reform Act
makes it seemingly difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits in federal court,
primarily by mandating that all administrative remedies be exhausted, which
includes taking every single step in the particular facility’s grievance
process.97 Pertinently, this statute provides that, “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other
[f]ederal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”98
Additionally, the following physical injury requirement must be satisfied for
a claim to be ripe under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: “No [f]ederal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
93.
See Barnini Chakraborty, Florida Prison System Under Fire Amid
Allegations of Abuse, Fatal Shower Scalding, FOX NEWS (Apr. 9, 2015),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/04/09/florida-prison-system-under-scrutiny-aslawmakers-fight-to-keep-feds-out-and.
94.
See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5); Nathan J. Winograd et al., Damages for
Death or Injury of an Animal, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (Feb. 2001), http://www.aldf.org/
resources/when-your-companion-animal-has-been-harmed/damages-for-death-or-injury-of-ananimal.
95.
See Complaint at 17, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014); infra Section IV.B.
96.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012); see also Complaint at 1–2, Disability Rights
Fla., Inc. v. Crews, No. 1:14-CV-23323 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2014) (bringing a suit against the
Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of mentally ill inmates that
suffered abuse and discrimination).
97.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/asset_upload_file79_25805.pdf (last updated
Nov. 2002).
98.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
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without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual
act—as defined in [§] 2246 of [T]itle 18.”99
Finally, in accord with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, all prisoners must pay the
filing fees in full without exception.100 It is, however, permissible to pay the
filing fee over time in monthly increments taken directly from the prisoner’s
commissary account. 101 Importantly, punitive damages are recoverable
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which is why—despite the detailed
pre-suit requirements—filing suit in federal court is far superior to filing suit
in state court, in terms of remedies.102
C.

Punitive Damages

In addition to the availability of punitive damages in federal court
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the increase in privatization of state
prison facilities has opened the possibility of suits against companies like the
GEO Group. 103 Instances of egregious abusive behavior towards Florida
inmates can be rectified through punitive damages if an inmate is lucky
enough to be housed in a privately operated prison facility.104 For example,
Roy Hyatt was awarded $1.2 Million as a result of the way he was treated at
South Bay Correctional Facility.105 Hyatt was awarded one million dollars
for pain and suffering after being blinded in one eye when another inmate
threw boiling water in his face.106 The incident resulted from private prison
company, GEO Group, allowing inmates in the South Bay Correctional
Facility unfettered access to microwaves in their cellblocks.107

99.
Id. § 1997e(e).
100.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2012); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
supra note 97.
101.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), supra
note 97.
102.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (allowing inmates to file an action for prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law, as long as available
administrative remedies are exhausted); FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (2014) (establishing that
punitive damages shall not be included in the liability of the state and its agencies and
subdivision for tort claims).
103.
See Jane Musgrave, Injured Inmate Awarded 1.2 Million; Prison Firm
Was Wrong to Give Access to Microwave, Jury Says, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 14, 2012, at
B.1.; Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, June
2014, at 13, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/issues/06pln14.corrected2.pdf.
104.
See Musgrave, supra note 103.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
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On August 28, 2007, Roy Hyatt was watching football on television
in the dayroom of his unit at the South Bay Correctional Facility. 108
Following an argument with Hyatt, fellow inmate Rodney Smith used a
microwave to boil a container of water, which he then threw on Hyatt
causing first and second-degree burns to around thirty percent of Hyatt’s
body.109 The incident also resulted in the loss of the use of one of Hyatt’s
eyes.110 Such negligent behavior—arguably far less negligent than murder
committed at the hands of prison employees—warranted a jury finding of
over a million dollars to restore justice to Hyatt.111
V.

WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS

Accountability is maintained in private and public Florida entities
alike through whistleblowers that bring fraud, misconduct, and corruption to
light.112 In addition to the aforementioned horrors that have been exposed in
publicly run incarceration facilities, “[t]ens of thousands of inmates
nationwide are housed in privately run prisons.”113 “The operators of those
facilities—Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), the GEO Group
(“GEO”), and Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”)—are all forprofit entities.”114 Like most for-profit businesses, the private prison industry
needs to turn a profit to satisfy investors. 115 Studies show that such
necessities sometimes lead to cutting corners, over billing, or inadequate
staffing.116 “Each of [these] . . . scenarios are ideal for whistleblowers in . . .
states that have enacted a false claims law.”117
Florida law relating to whistleblower protection is codified in section
448.102 of the Florida Statutes, which governs private whistleblower

108.
Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, supra note 103.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Musgrave, supra note 103, see also Seiler, Inmate at Troubled Prison
Killed After Confrontation with Guards, supra note 17.
112.
Nathan A. Adams IV, Distinguishing Chicken Little from Bona Fide
Whistleblowers, 83 FLA. B. J. 100, 100 (2009).
113.
Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post,
MAHANY & ERTL (Feb. 17, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.mahanyertl.com/mahanyertl/2014/
corrections-corp-america-settles-claims-whistleblower-post; see also Musgrave, supra note
103; Florida Prisoner Awarded $1.2 Million for Burn Injuries, supra note 103.
114.
Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post, supra
note 113.
115.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
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protection and section 112.3187 of the Florida Statutes, which governs
public officers and employees.118
The legislative intent behind section 112.3187 of the Florida Statute
is stated within the statute as,
It is the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or
independent contractors from taking retaliatory action against an
employee who reports to an appropriate agency violations of law
on the part of a public employer or independent contractor that
create a substantial and specific danger to the public’s health,
safety, or welfare. It is further the intent of the Legislature to
prevent agencies or independent contractors from taking retaliatory
action against any person who discloses information to an
appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office,
gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or gross neglect of duty
119
on the part of an agency, public officer, or employee.

“To state a claim under the private Florida Whistleblower Act,” the
employee must prove that the employee,
1) disclosed or threatened to disclose to an agency under oath and
in writing; 2) an activity, policy, or practice of his or her employer;
3) that was in violation of law, rule, or regulation; 4) that the
employer retaliated against his or her because of the disclosure or
threat to disclose; and 5) he or she had given written notice to the
employer of its activity, policy, or practice; 6) thereby giving the
employer reasonable opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or
120
practice.

The most important distinction between the Florida laws regulating
public and private entities is that “a public employee may state a claim under
the act” so long as they believe that the actions of the public employer are
illegal, while a private employee must actually “prove [that the] conduct is
illegal.”121 Furthermore, a private employee is required to give notice under
oath, while a public employee can give notice in any form “as long as [the
notice] is written and signed.”122 Based on the publically known instances of
horrific inmate abuse within Florida prisons, it is clear that public and
118.
(2014).

Compare FLA. STAT. § 448.102 (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 112.3187

119.
FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2).
120.
Adams IV, supra note 112, at 100 (quoting Taylor v. Mem’l Health Sys.,
Inc., 770 So. 2d 752, 753–54 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
121.
See id.
122.
Id.
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privately operated facilities alike are ripe for whistleblowers with the ability
to meet the criteria under either Florida Statute.123
VI.

INVOCATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN FLORIDA
PRISONS

“The [Whistleblower Protection Act] protects federal employees
from retaliation after reporting a wrongdoing.”124 “Whistleblowers may not
be transferred, denied a raise, have their hours reduced, be fired, or be
punished in any other way because they have exercised any right afforded to
them under the law.” 125 “[A] whistleblower must have ‘original source’
information of a fraud involving a government-funded project.”126 Because
of the nature of the relationship between privately operated incarceration
facilities and the federal government, “a private prison facility . . . [can] be
the subject of a federal whistleblower [investigation].” 127 Despite the
presence of legislation to support, if not encourage, those aware of
wrongdoing to come forward, Florida prison employees have nevertheless
been retaliated against.128 John Pisciotta filed suit in 2011 against the Florida
Department of Corrections for “back pay, reinstatement of his job, damages,
and attorney fees” under Florida’s whistleblower act.129 On May 21, 2008,
“[Pisciotta] was one of eight guards involved in the cell extraction of
[inmate] Kelly Bradley” that left “Bradley’s eye . . . hanging from its
socket.”130 Bradley was an inmate at Charlotte Correctional Institution and
“Pisciotta was the only prison employee to report that [fellow] guard,
William . . . Wilson”, was responsible for the catastrophic injuries sustained
by Bradley.131 Pisciotta was not praised for his strength; rather, the Florida
Department of Corrections retaliated against him by falsifying an incident of
abuse.132
123.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187(5), 448.102(1–3); Crystal Shepeard, After
Horrific Death in Florida Prison, Investigator is Denied Whistleblower Protection, CARE2
(July 20, 2014, 11:30 A.M.), http://www.care2.com/causes/after-horrific-death-in-floridaprison-investigator-is-denied-whistleblower-protection.html.
124.
Shepeard, supra note 123.
125.
Id.
126.
Corrections Corp of America Settles Claims — Whistleblower Post, supra
note 113.
127.
Id.
128.
See Former Florida Prison Guard Sues for Reinstatement Under
Whistleblower Act, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 2011, at 34, http://www.prisonlegalnews.org/
media/issues/10pln11.pdf.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
See id.
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Randall Jordan-Aparo

Randall Jordan-Aparo was a Florida inmate who was “gassed to
death in his cell over the course of five hours.”133 “Aparo . . . was serving
[eighteen] months . . . at Franklin Correctional Institution in Carabelle,
Florida [for check fraud].”134 After denying Aparo’s requests for medical
treatment, “he threatened to report [the guards] for [medical] neglect,” at
which point, “they placed him in solitary confinement.”135 He remained in
solitary confinement until he subsequently died five days later after guards
repeatedly sprayed gas into his cell, which led to his ultimate suffocation.136
“In the hours before his death, he pleaded with the guards and . . . prison[]
nurses to take him to the hospital because he [could not] breathe.”137 “When
his body was found, he was coated in yellow residue, his face was pressed up
against the bottom of the steel door and a Bible was next to his head.”138
While investigating common allegations of prison corruption, Florida
Department of Corrections inspector, Aubrey Land, found that Randall
Jordan-Aparo “was the victim of force or discipline made either maliciously
or sadistically for the purpose of causing harm and for retaliation for
threatening to bring a lawsuit.” 139 Land is of the impression that Aparo
“never made it home because they let him [just] lay there and die.”140
B.

Land v. Florida Department of Corrections Complaint

Following the death of Randall Jordan-Aparo, Florida Department of
Corrections inspector Aubrey Land and other colleagues were denied
whistleblower status and faced retaliation as a result of exposing the brutal
death. 141 Despite thirty-five years of experience in the industry, Aubrey
Land was shocked by the events that unfolded involving Aparo. 142 In
addition to the denial of whistleblower protection as a means of retaliation,
Land and his colleagues were the subject of an internal affairs investigation

133.
Flatow, supra note 24; see also Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt
Investigations, supra note 9.
134.
Shepeard, supra note 123.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9.
138.
Id.
139.
Flatow, supra note 24.
140.
Id.
141.
Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9; Shepeard,
supra note 123.
142.
Shepeard, supra note 123.
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based on false and unwarranted allegations. 143 After being denied
whistleblower status, Florida’s Chief Inspector General, Melinda Miguel,
referred them to the State Commission on Human Relations to file a
complaint against their boss, Florida Department of Corrections Inspector
General Jeffery Beasley.144 As a result, Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug
Glisson, and John Ulm filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida against the Florida Department of
Corrections as well as other defendants in their individual capacities.145
Aubrey Land, Doug Glisson, and John Ulm were acting within the
course and scope of their employment while investigating a variety of prison
guard misconduct at Franklin Correctional Institute.146 During the Kassidy
Hill investigation, the Plaintiffs became aware of the aforementioned
situation regarding Randall Jordan-Aparo.147 Throughout their investigation,
the investigators obtained “evidence that inmate Aparo died as a result of
force or discipline made either maliciously or sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm by the [Florida Department of Corrections]
employees in retaliation for Aparo threatening to sue Defendant Florida
Department of Corrections for Florida Department of Correction’s failure to
take Aparo to a hospital for treatment.” 148 Such evidence included
statements from inmates as well as video and audio footage shot on the date
of Aparo’s death showing that he was in extreme physical danger in
conditions that were not properly documented in the 2010 Aparo Death
Investigation; in fact, such conditions were completely falsified within the
report.149 The Complaint additionally alleges “that Lieutenant Austin . . .
caused Sergeant James Hamm to sign a Use of Force Report [that] both
[officers] knew [was] [blatantly] false.”150
Furthermore, this report failed to mention that Aparo suffered from a
rare lung disease that had previously confined him to the infirmary and that
the use of chemical agents leading to Aparo’s death was cruel and unusual
punishment within the confines of the Eighth Amendment.151 In the end,
“[A]paro was left to suffocate in his contaminated cell without medical
intervention for approximately five hours and his death pose indicated his
143.
Id.
144.
Brown, Inmate Deaths Prompt Investigations, supra note 9.
145.
Complaint at 1, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS
(N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014).
146.
Id. at 9.
147.
Id. at 9–10.
148.
Id. at 10.
149.
Id. at 10–13.
150.
Complaint at 11, Land (No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS).
151.
U.S. CONST. amend VIII; Complaint at 11, Land (No. 4:14-CV-00347-wscas).
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mouth and nose were lodged in the small gap in the door of his isolation unit,
attempting to breathe.”152
Based on principles of sovereign immunity granted to the Florida
Department of Corrections as well as the Inspector General of the State of
Florida, the Plaintiffs in this suit solely sought whistleblower protection
including injunctive relief preventing continuance of retaliation in the form
of false and unfounded internal affairs complaints. 153 In terms of the
Complaint against Defendants Beasley, Sumpter, Miguel, and Case, the
Plaintiffs sought “all compensatory damages allowable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983” for retaliation against the Plaintiffs for disclosing “matters of
substantial public concern” in violation of the First Amendment and the
Petition Clause.154
On March 4, 2015, the Northern District Court of Florida granted the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint—as
to Plaintiffs Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug Glisson, John Ulm, and James
Padgett—with prejudice for failure to state a claim under the First
Amendment.155
VII.

CONCLUSION

Lack of criminal prosecution of offending employees, limited civil
liability for prisoners in state courts, and denial of whistleblower protection
serve as the framework for the travesty that is the current Florida prison
system.156
Interestingly, Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections,
Michael D. Crews, issued a Press Release on August 20, 2014, in response to
the media coverage of recent inmate deaths in Florida facilities.157 Secretary
Crews specifically announced the expansion of Crisis Intervention Training
programs that will teach correctional officers the right and wrong ways to
handle inmates suffering from mental illness.158 Perhaps most importantly,
he announced that the Florida Department of Corrections would be
“developing a clear and consistent policy that will outline the initiation of
disciplinary action up to and including dismissal against any employee
152.
Id. at 13.
153.
Id. at 17–18.
154.
Id. at 18–19; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
155.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Land v. Fla. Dep’t
of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347-WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015).
156.
See supra Section IV.B., Part VI.
157.
Press Release, Michael Crews, Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Everything We
Do Is Moving Us Down a Path Toward Safer Facilities and a Safer Florida (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/secretary/press/2014/08-20-Crews.html.
158.
Id.
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whose conduct violates any criminal statute.” 159 Promisingly, a criminal
conviction will not be a condition precedent to enforcement of disciplinary
action. 160 Finally, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement has been
granted full investigative authority on the eighty-two non-natural deaths
currently being investigated by FDOC inspectors.161
While it appears that the Florida Department of Corrections has
developed good intentions in the wake of the media attack highlighting
inmate brutality, planning and implementation are very different concepts.162
For the Florida prison system to rise up out of the ashes, Florida Department
of Corrections insiders must be afforded whistleblower protection.163 Denial
of whistleblower protection to Aubrey Land, David Clark, Doug Glisson, and
John Ulm, in regards to the Randall Jordan-Aparo case, represents the height
of the Florida prison problem.164 In addition to the Plaintiffs listed in the
Land Complaint, a Florida Department of Corrections probation officer was
also denied protection upon report of suspicious aspects of Aparo’s death
before being fired for absenteeism. 165 To ensure unfettered access to the
statistics and details of inmates who die within prison walls from unnatural
causes, the Florida Department of Corrections must do more than issue a
press release.166
As stated by American Civil Liberties Union of Florida
spokesperson Baylor Johnson, “‘[t]he only way to fix the toxic culture in the
Department of Corrections is to hold people responsible for their actions—
including criminal charges for criminal behavior.’”167 Johnson further warns
that any future regulation will only be effective if enforced by “people
committed to rigorous oversight and capable of resisting political
pressure.”168 Perhaps most importantly, as eyewitnesses to the interworking
of the Florida prison system, public and private corrections employees must
be guaranteed protection under the Florida Whistleblower Protection
statutes—to the extent that their conduct qualifies—to create a system of

159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Press Release, Michael Crews, supra note 157.
163.
See Shepeard, supra note 123; supra Part VI.
164.
See Complaint at 7–9, Land v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:14-CV-00347WS-CAS (N.D. Fla. July 7, 2014).
165.
Gary Fineout, Report: Scott’s Top Inspector Told About Cover-Up,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 26, 2014.
166.
See Press Release, Michael Crews, supra note 157.
167.
Chakraborty, supra note 93.
168.
Id.
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accountability free from appalling abuse and violations of fundamental
constitutional rights of Florida inmates.169

169.

See FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187, 448.102 (2014).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of Florida ruled in this survey year on two very
important cases arising from the Supreme Court of the United States’ 2012
opinion in Miller v. Alabama,1 which held unconstitutional the “sentencing
scheme[s] . . . mandat[ing] life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders.”2 A series of Florida intermediate appellate court cases
followed during this survey year, applying the Florida holdings as to Miller.3
The Florida appellate courts continued to rule on a number of issues involving
dependency and termination of parental rights (“TPR”), focusing in large part
on rudimentary violations of procedural due process by the trial courts.4 In the

*
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of
Law. This Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2014 through June 30,
2015. The author thanks research assistants Michael Costello, Andree Quaresima, and Samantha
Scheff and Research and References Services Librarian, Rob Beharriell, for their assistance in
writing this Survey.
1.
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2.
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 960 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2469); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
3.
See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 958; Horsley, 160 So. 3d
at 394, 397.
4.
See Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 566, 569–70
(Fla. 1991); Dep’t of Children & Families v. T.S., 154 So. 3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
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delinquency area, restitution is a common dispositional alternative.5 There, the
appellate courts have on a number of occasions been obligated to reverse trial
court decisions for improperly applying the restitution statute.6
Finally, and most importantly, the decades long shortcomings in the
Florida dependency system—based in significant part on the lack of
representation of children by lawyers, and the failure of Florida’s Guardian ad
Litem (“GAL”) Program to both adequately and properly carry out its statutory
role despite massive funding—have yet again remained a very serious problem
during this survey year.7
II.

DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS

In dependency proceedings, there must be competent and substantial
evidence to form a basis for a finding of dependency.8 Thus, a mother’s
homelessness and unemployment, standing alone, are insufficient to support a
finding of prospective harm or neglect in a situation where the mother has not
previously rejected services offered under Florida law, according to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in E.R. v. Department of Children & Families.9
In N.J. v. Department of Children & Families (In re Interest of
A.W.J.),10 the Second District Court of Appeal reversed a finding of dependency
premised upon a head injury to a child.11 The only individual who testified at
the adjudicatory hearing that the child’s head injury was the result of abuse was
a medical doctor.12 However, first, the doctor was not asked whether she could
provide her opinion within a reasonable degree of medical probability and,
second, the doctor’s opinion of abuse was not substantiated by record evidence
but was simply a subjective opinion, which was thus not legally sufficient to
support the trial court’s adjudication of dependency.13
5.
See L.W. v. State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v.
State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
6.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.437(2) (2014); L.W., 163 So. 3d at 601; A.D., 152 So.
3d at 799; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
7.
See Michael J. Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, 39 NOVA L. REV. 37, 62–
63 (2014) [hereinafter Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale & Louis M.
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35 NOVA L. REV. 305, 310, 329–31 (2011)
[hereinafter Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children]; infra Section V.B.
8.
J.A.B. v. State, 148 So. 3d 151, 151–52 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
9.
143 So. 3d 1131, 1133, 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). See generally
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
10.
143 So. 3d 1109 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
11.
Id. at 1110–11.
12.
Id. at 1111.
13.
Id. at 1111–12.
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In Department of Children & Families v. T.S.,14 the intermediate
appellate court reversed on a more fundamental ground.15 The Department and
the child appealed the dismissal of a petition for dependency and arraignment,
arguing that the trial court had committed a fundamental error violating a
child’s due process rights by dismissing the petition without notice or an
opportunity to be heard.16 Recognizing the basic due process violation
involving notice and an opportunity to be heard, the appellate court reversed.17
Case plans are an important part of dependency proceedings resulting,
as they do, from the implementation of the federal Child Abuse Protection and
Treatment Act, commonly known as CAPTA.18 In M.P. v. Department of
Children & Families,19 the appellate court noted that generic case plans that do
not relate to the individual needs and circumstances of the particular family are
in violation of section 39.603 of the Florida Statutes.20 In the case at bar, there
being no evidence of the father’s use of drugs, a case plan that ordered the
father to submit to random drug screenings as part of the case plan constituted
reversible error.21 A similar result occurred in M.B.W. v. Department of
Children & Families (In re Interest of M.W.).22 In that dependency case, the
Department conceded error in part as tasks were required beyond a parenting
class, which had no relationship to the dependency as to the father.23
The issue of nexus—the tie between a parent’s problem and risk of
danger to the children—has perplexed the Florida dependency courts for almost
twenty-five years since the Supreme Court of Florida decided Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services24 in 1991.25 In E.H. v.
Department of Children & Families,26 the appellate court affirmed the trial court
finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
imminent abuse to a child in a dependency case.27 In E.H., there were incidents
of domestic violence, unemployment with an eviction from the home, and a
mother with a mental health issue that had gone untreated, which was
responsible for her previous child being removed from her care after she heard
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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154 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
42 U.S.C. § 622 (2012).
159 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 343–44; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.603(1)(f) (2014).
M.P., 159 So. 3d at 344.
163 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 1229.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
Id. at 570–71; Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 60–61.
147 So. 3d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 620–21.
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voices encouraging her to shake that child.28 In E.H., the appellate court
established that the mother’s failure to recognize her mood disorder and her lack
of participation in services, along with multiple domestic violence incidents
between the mother and the father where the mother continued to engage in the
relationship with the father despite the parent-involved nature of their
relationship, constituted evidence of a substantial risk of imminent abuse to the
child.29
An important technical procedural issue was before the First District
Court of Appeal in W.W. v. Guardian ad Litem Program.30 The issue was
whether an order entered on a post-dependency motion seeking relief fully
resolving the issues that were raised in the motion is reviewed by appeal rather
than writ.31 Applying a recent amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4) of the Florida
Rules of Appellate Procedure,32 the appellate court concluded that orders
entered on post-dependency motions seeking relief that fully resolve the issues
raised in the motion are to be viewed as final orders under the appellate rule.33
Cases involving immigrant children are becoming more commonplace
in the Florida dependency courts as a result of the influx of such children
nationally.34 In In re Y.V.,35 a private petition for dependency was filed on
behalf of a minor “living in Florida after illegally emigrating alone from
Honduras.”36 The petition was dismissed by the trial court because the harm
relating to the dependency took place outside of Florida, and “the court viewed
the petition as an attempt to circumvent federal immigration law[].”37 The
appellate court reversed, finding that there was jurisdiction and that Florida

28.
Id. at 617.
29.
Id. at 620–21; see also W.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d
1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that substantial evidence of harm to one child
alone was not sufficient evidence to find substantial risk of imminent abuse to another child);
E.M.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that a substantial risk of harm can be met without past acts of harm where a mental
illness is the type that would impact the parent’s “judgment and ability to perform basic daily
caretaking tasks”).
30.
159 So. 3d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
31.
Id.
32.
In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 2014 WL
5714099, at *7–8 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2014) (specifying the amendment to Rule 9.130(a)(4)).
33.
Id.; W.W., 159 So. 3d at 1000–01.
34.
See, e.g., WENDI J. ADELSON, SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS IN
FLORIDA: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CHILD ADVOCATES 5, 7 (2007),
http://media.law.miami.edu/clinics/children-and-youth/pdf/2007/special-immigrant-juvenilemanual-2007.pdf.
35.
160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
36.
Id. at 577.
37.
Id.
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dependency law applies.38 Although the appellate court reversed, it did note
that “the trial court [was] not alone in its misgivings about the use of the
dependency [proceedings] as a conduit to achiev[e] a favorable immigration
status.”39 The appellate court also pointed to two provisions in chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes that applied to this child: abandonment, abuse or neglect by the
parent and having no parent capable of providing supervision and care.40 The
appellate court then noted that the only reason the child was not in imminent
risk of injury was because there is a responsible adult caring for the child on a
voluntary basis.41
Domestic violence can be the source of dependency court jurisdiction.42
Issues of domestic violence can also arise in the context of petitions to protect
and against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30 of the Florida
Statutes.43 In Hair v. Hair,44 the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial
court’s decision with instructions to vacate a final judgment of injunction for
protection.45 The appellate court found that the petitioner did not possess
“sufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic violence or was in
imminent danger [to become] a victim” as provided in the Florida Statutes.46
Specifically, it found that the daughter did not wish to see or interact with her
mother and that was not a basis for the issuance of a domestic violence
restraining order.47
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Under Florida law, the petitioner must prove: first, that there are
statutory grounds for termination of parental rights; second, that termination is
in the “manifest best interest of the child;” and third, that termination is the least
restrictive means to protect the child from serious harm.48 In B.K. v.
Department of Children & Families,49 the appellate court addressed the
application of the three standards in a case in which the father was
38.
Id. at 581.
39.
Id. at 579, 581.
40.
In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 578; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(a), (e) (2014).
41.
In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 579.
42.
See Michael J. Dale, 2007–2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REV.
357, 357 (2009).
43.
FLA. STAT. § 741.30.
44.
159 So. 3d 984 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
45.
Id. at 986.
46.
Id. at 985; see also FLA. STAT. § 741.30.
47.
Hair, 159 So. 3d at 985.
48.
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.806, .810; Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577
So. 2d 565, 570–71 (Fla. 1991).
49.
166 So. 3d 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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incarcerated.50 Under Florida law, the substantive standard regarding
incarceration is that the incarceration be for a significant portion of the child’s
life.51 In B.K., the father was scheduled for release after nearly eight and a half
years of the child’s life.52 Here, the father would be “incarcerated for nearly
fifty percent of [the child’s] minority” at the point the father is to be released
from prison.53 The child had also been in foster care for a period of time, and
“at the time of trial, the child was nearly six years old.”54 On the question of
manifest best interest, the trial court found no bond with the child, no relative
placement and that the child did not know who her father was.55 Finally, the
trial court found and the appellate court agreed based upon clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the best interest of the child.56 Citing that
termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the child, the appellate
court noted that merely sending letters and cards to a child is not enough
because “then it would be difficult indeed to terminate the rights of any parent
incarcerated for a lengthy period of time, regardless of the child’s lack of a real
relationship with her parent. This [would] leave the child without any
[parenting] at all, which would not be in her best interest.”57 The appellate court
thus affirmed.58
On the other hand, in D.S. v. Department of Children & Families,59 the
court reversed a finding of termination of parental rights arising out of a father’s
incarceration.60 In D.S., “[i]n percentage terms, the father’s incarceration
amount[ed] to approximately 27[%] to 33[%] of the children’s minorit[y].”61 In
doing so, the appellate court cited B.C. v. Florida Department of Children &
Families,62 in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that the percentages in
D.S. would “not constitute a substantial portion of the children’s minorit[y].”63
While terminating the parental rights of the father to one of the three children,
50.
Id. at 873.
51.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(d)(1).
52.
B.K., 166 So. 3d at 873.
53.
Id. at 874.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. at 872.
56.
Id. at 872–73. “[T]he State must show by clear and convincing evidence that
reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. . . . [and
that] termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious
harm.” Padgett v. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
57.
B.K., 166 So. 3d at 877.
58.
Id.
59.
164 So. 3d 29 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
60.
Id. at 36.
61.
Id. at 34.
62.
887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004).
63.
Id. at 1054–55; D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34.
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the court did not find termination as to the other two.64 Those children were in a
stable home, not in the custody of the Department, and the father maintained a
close relationship, given the father’s incarceration, with the children.65
Specifically, they knew who their father was and had “regular interaction with
him, [which included] regular phone calls, letters, and visits.”66 At the time of
his release, the children would be eleven and six.67 Because they were with
relatives and still had contact with their father, and there being no evidence of
harm to the children, termination was not the least restrictive means to prevent
harm, and the appellate court reversed.68
Whether termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of
protecting the child from harm, the third question before the trial court in any
termination of parental rights case, was on appeal in two separate cases during
this reporting cycle.69 In A.H. v. Department of Children & Families,70 a parent
appealed termination of her parental rights as to her son on the ground that
termination was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from
harm.71 The State conceded error on this point.72 The appellate court reviewed
the record in which the trial court created a permanent guardianship for the
child.73 However, “there [was] no evidence that the mother’s irregular
contact[s]” caused harm to the child, although there was evidence “that the child
had a strong bond with the permanent guardian and was doing . . . well” there,
the child “also enjoyed his visits with [his] mother and his siblings and [wanted]
to maintain a relationship with them.”74 Under those circumstances, termination
of parental rights was not the least restrictive means of protecting the child from
harm.75 Interestingly, the GAL program apparently did not concede error.76
The GAL program, although the record does not reflect whether the individual
was qualified as an expert, testified that the parents were not “‘bonded to [the
child] at all. . . . Emotionally and mentally it would be devastating to take him

64.
D.S., 164 So. 3d at 34–36.
65.
Id. at 35.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 36.
69.
See C.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 40, 41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014).
70.
144 So. 3d 662 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
71.
Id. at 664.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 664, 666.
74.
Id. at 666.
75.
A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666.
76.
Id. at 665.
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out of his home [with the permanent guardian].’”77 On the basis of this opinion,
“[t]he GAL recommended termination of parental rights [based on] the . . . best
interests of the child so [that] he could receive permanency through adoption.”78
By reversing, the appellate court rejected this lay opinion.79 In fact, contrary to
what occurred in this case, the GAL guidelines state that guardians ad litem
shall not offer expert opinions.80
In C.D. v. Florida Department of Children & Families,81 the appellate
court reversed in part on the basis of the trial court’s misinterpretation of A.H.82
The appellate court held that first, the trial court ruling was in error because it
was at odds with its own factual finding that the children did have a bond with
their parents, and second, the trial court misconstrued age, which the “court held
that TPR [could be] the least restrictive means of protecting a child from harm
despite the fact that there was little or no bond between the child and [the
parent].”83
Here, again, the appellate court rejected the opinion of the GAL who
argued that TPR was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the
children.84 The appellate court held that the GAL’s opinion on appeal was
“diametrically opposed to the position it took below in which it argued that the
children would not be harmed by TPR because their aunt would allow them to
have contact with the [m]other.”85
The interplay of rights of putative fathers and termination of parental
rights based upon abandonment was before the Fourth District in A.S. v.
Department of Children & Families.86 The father, whose paternity was
established approximately a year after the child was born, appealed from a
termination of parental rights adjudication.87 The mother had played a
nonexistent role in the child’s life and termination had been entered against
her.88 The father did not know that he was the parent of the child until a

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
See id. at 666.
See A.H., 144 So. 3d at 664–65; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
FLORIDA
GUARDIAN
AD
LITEM
PROGRAM
STANDARDS
9
(2015),
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Standards_Final_2015.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS].
81.
164 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
82.
Id. at 43–44; see also A.H., 144 So. 3d at 666.
83.
C.D., 164 So. 3d at 43–44.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 44.
86.
162 So. 3d 335, 336–37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
87.
Id. at 337.
88.
Id. at 336.
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paternity test was taken a year after the child was born.89 Even then, he did not
learn that he was the father for another approximately four months.90 Once it
was determined that he was the father, he began taking “steps to begin forming
a relationship with [the child].”91 Despite this, the trial court entered an order
terminating the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment.92 The
appellate court recognized that the definition of parent “does not include . . . an
alleged or prospective parent unless the parental status falls within the terms of
[section] 39.503(1) or [section] 63.062(1).”93 Because the Department of
Children and Families (“DCF”) failed to utilize the proper provisions of chapter
39 of the Florida Statutes to locate the father and because the court could only
consider whether the father abandoned the child once the father’s paternity was
established, the trial court erroneously relied upon the failure to take affirmative
steps to establish paternity prior to that time.94 The appellate court held that the
trial court was not presented with clear and convincing evidence of
abandonment.95 And finally, the appellate court held that the father “was never
offered a case plan despite [the fact that there was] no indication in the record
that he was unable to comply with [it].”96 On these bases, the appellate court
reversed.97
Periodically, cases appear concerning the proper procedures for appeals
in child welfare cases.98 R.W. v. Department of Children & Families99 involved
the question of whether “the trial court erred in denying [a] post-judgment
motion to set aside the surrender” of parental rights for lack of jurisdiction.100
In R.W., an expedited petition was filed by DCF to terminate the mother’s
parental rights to her child where the mother had executed a sworn consent to
surrender those rights.101 However, after receiving the order, the mother filed a
motion claiming “that the judgment was inconsistent with the trial court’s oral
ruling on the mother’s visitation rights pending adoption of the child. The trial
court denied the motion, and the mother thereafter timely filed a notice of
89.
Id. at 337.
90.
Id.
91.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 337.
92.
Id. at 337–38; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), 39.503(1), 63.062(1) (2014).
93.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 338 (first alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
39.01(49)); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 39.503(1), 63.062(1).
94.
FLA. STAT. § 39.803(8); A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339.
95.
A.S., 162 So. 3d at 339.
96.
Id. at 340.
97.
Id.
98.
See, e.g., R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 164 So. 3d 15, 17–18 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
99.
164 So. 3d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
100.
Id. at 16.
101.
Id.
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appeal.”102 However, “[p]rior to filing her initial brief, the mother filed a
motion asking [the appellate] court to ‘relinquish partial jurisdiction [so that] the
trial court’” could consider the mother’s motion for reconsideration.103 The
appellate court viewed the motion as one for relief from judgment and granted
the motion, relinquishing jurisdiction.104 After an evidentiary hearing, “the trial
court . . . entered an order denying the motion for reconsideration.”105 The
mother did not file a notice of appeal challenging that order but instead filed a
status report to the appellate court.106 The appellate court entered the filing and
instructed the mother to have her initial brief filed.107 Because “the mother did
not file a notice of appeal seeking review of the order denying her motion for
reconsideration,” the court on appeal refused to interpret the status report as a
notice of appeal.108 Having “relinquished jurisdiction [for] the trial court to rule
on the motion for reconsideration” in the absence of an appeal from the order on
the motion for relief in judgment, the appellate court had no preserved issue
before it and thus, affirmed the final judgment terminating the mother’s parental
rights.109
IV.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

On March 19, 2015, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two cases
involving application of the Supreme Court of the United States’ opinions in
Graham v. Florida110 and Miller.111 In Graham, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not allow a juvenile
defendant to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for non-homicide
crimes.112 In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that juveniles
are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing based upon
their diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform, and it held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the courts from sentencing juveniles to life in prison
without the possibility of parole in capital cases.113
102.
Id. at 17.
103.
Id.
104.
R.W., 164 So. 3d at 17–18.
105.
Id. at 17.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See id. at 18.
109.
R.W., 164 So. 3d at 18.
110.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
111.
See id. at 82; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2475 (2012); Falcon
v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 956, 959–60, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 394,
405–06, 409 (Fla. 2015).
112.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 82; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
113.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Two Supreme Court of Florida cases followed the Supreme Court of the
United States’ rulings.114 In Falcon v. State,115 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that Miller should be read retroactively.116 In Horsley v. State,117 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the remedy in terms of a sentencing option
in order to comply with Miller does not require revival of the Florida statute
regarding life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.118
The Horsley case involved post-Miller and Graham convictions of
juveniles as adults based upon the Supreme Court of the United States’
conclusion that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that
mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile
offenders.”119 The Supreme Court of Florida rejected the doctrine of statutory
revival, which had been argued by the State.120 The State took the position that
the only possible sentencing options to comply with Miller were life without
parole or the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.121 The Supreme Court
of Florida concluded that the recent change in the Florida Statute was effective
on July 1, 2014, and should apply to those juvenile offenders whose sentences
were for crimes committed prior to July 1, 2014, but after Miller and
Graham.122 The Florida Statute from 2014 governed those who did the killing
and those who did not actually kill or attempt to kill.123 The Legislature then
added a detailed value process in the same statute.124
In Falcon, the Supreme Court of Florida undertook an analysis of
whether Miller should be applied retroactively to juveniles who were convicted
of capital offenses prior to the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in
that case.125 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled that Miller should be given
retroactive effect based upon its retroactivity test set forth in Witt v. State.126
The Court relied upon the principle set out in Witt, finding that Miller
114.

See Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 955, 959, 964; Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394, 397,

408–09.
115.
162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015).
116.
Id. at 956, 963–64; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
117.
160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015).
118.
Id. at 395, 409; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(b)(2)(a) (2014); Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2475.
119.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394 (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 2475; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 82
(2010).
120.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395.
121.
Id.; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
122.
See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 394–95, 406, 408–09.
123.
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1)(b)(1); see also Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 406.
124.
Act effective July 1, 2014, ch. 2014-220, § 7, 2014 Fla. Laws 2869, 2876–77.
125.
Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 955 (Fla. 2015); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
126.
387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980); Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956; see also Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2475.
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constitutes a “development of fundamental significance and therefore, must be
given retroactive effect.”127
The issue of retroactivity under Miller initially was to be before the
Supreme Court of the United States this term in a pair of cases, State v.
Montgomery128 and State v. Toca.129 Although the Supreme Court of the United
States granted a writ of certiorari in both cases, Montgomery was the only case
heard due to the procedural issues that resulted in the dismissal of Toca.130
Montgomery had been in prison for nearly fifty years after a guilty without
capital punishment verdict was returned by the jury.131 This verdict
automatically imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole.132
Montgomery sought collateral relief from the State of Louisiana for his
conviction, arguing that Miller should retroactively apply to his sentence
because of the automatic life sentence without parole that was attached to his
conviction.133 The trial court denied his motion and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied his writ because the court had previously held that Miller did
not retroactively apply.134 However, the Supreme Court of the United States
held in Montgomery that Miller does retroactively apply because the rule
established in Miller was “a new substantive rule of constitutional law.”135 New
substantive rules “alter[] the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes” and must apply retroactively.136 The Court found that although
the rule in Miller was substantive, an individual affected by it is afforded the
procedural opportunity to demonstrate that he or she belongs to the given
protected class.137 Given the Supreme Court holding in Montgomery, the
decision in Falcon, holding that Miller applied retroactively will be upheld.138
This Survey has repeatedly discussed restitution as one of a number of
dispositional alternatives in delinquency cases in addition to commitment,
probation, community service, revocation of driver’s license and attendance at

127.
Falcon, 162 So. 3d at 956 (quoting Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931); see also Miller,
132 S. Ct. at 2475.
128.
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), rev’g 141 So. 3d 264 (La. 2014).
129.
141 So. 3d 265 (La. 2014).
130.
Toca v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (dismissing certiorari).
131.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 725–26.
132.
Id. at 726.
133.
Id. at 726–27.
134.
Id. at 727.
135.
Id. at 732–35.
136.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
353 (2004)).
137.
Id. at 735.
138.
See Montgomery, slip op. at 14; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; Falcon v. State,
162 So. 3d 954, 956 (Fla. 2015).
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school.139 Despite what would appear to be a statute clear on its face, this past
year the appellate courts dealt with seven separate cases involving the
restitution provision provided in section 985.437 of the Florida Statutes.140 In
J.A.B. v. State,141 the child appealed a $460 restitution award.142 “At the
restitution hearing, the victim stated that . . . it would cost between $460 and
$490 to repair the damage to [the] vehicle” while giving no basis for his
opinion.143 No document was introduced demonstrating the actual repair cost.144
Thus, as “the award was not supported by competent [and] substantial
evidence,” the appellate court reversed.145
In K.R. v. State,146 a child appealed from a $479 restitution adjudication
arising out of the theft of an automobile.147 Because the victim simply testified
that the amount “was like [$479] plus like there would be no tax,” and there was
no further evidence, the court on appeal reversed based upon the speculative
amount testified to by the victim.148
In S.M. v. State,149 the juvenile had been ordered to pay $8629 in
restitution arising out of the theft of an automobile.150 The appellate court
affirmed on the grounds that the victim of the automobile expressed an opinion
as to the value of the automobile basing the opinion on information obtained
from a website, such as the Kelley Blue Book.151 However, in so ruling, the
appellate court held that taking judicial notice of an online Kelley Blue Book
evaluation, although it did not occur in this case, would not comply with the
Florida Rules of Evidence.152 The appellate court explained that there needed to
be evidentiary demonstration that the Kelley Blue Book website had the “level

139.
FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law,
supra note 7, at 53.
140.
K.R. v. State, 155 So. 3d 507, 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015); L.W. v.
State, 163 So. 3d 598, 599–601 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); S.M. v. State, 159 So. 3d 966, 967–
68 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015); A.D. v. State, 152 So. 3d 798, 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); C.W. v. State, 150 So. 3d 882, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); J.A.B. v. State, 148 So.
3d 151, 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); M.K. v. State, 143 So. 3d 428, 430 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.437(1)–(2).
141.
148 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
142.
Id. at 151.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 151–52.
146.
155 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
147.
Id. at 508–09.
148.
Id.
149.
159 So. 3d 966 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
150.
Id. at 967.
151.
Id. at 967, 969.
152.
S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967, 969; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.202(12) (2014).
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of accuracy [contradicted] with that of a court-recognized appraiser” or was
“relied upon by a high percentage of car traders.”153
A case involving both the competence of a victim to testify to the value
of stolen goods and the failure of the State to demonstrate that the value of the
stolen goods reached the statutory minimum was before the Fourth District in
M.K. v. State.154 In this delinquency case, the respondent appealed the order
finding him guilty of first-degree petty theft, arguing that there was no
competent evidence of the value of the stolen necklace so that the respondent
could be charged with third-degree grand theft, which required that the property
be “valued at $300 or more [or] . . . less than $5,000.”155 Because the twelveyear-old victim could not provide competent evidence as to the value of the
stolen necklace and that the victim was not competent to testify as to the value
required, the appellate court reversed.156 Specifically, “because the necklace
was a gift, the victim was unable to testify [as] to [the] . . . purchase price or
replacement cost beyond” testifying as to what the victim was told by a parent
based upon research on the Internet.157
Two cases, C.W. v. State158 and L.W. v. State,159 dealt with the question
of whether the court could properly enter an order of restitution in a
delinquency case where the respondent was not present.160 In the C.W. case, the
court ordered $664 in restitution at the rate of $25 per month.161 However, the
respondent was not present and the court failed to find that the child had the
ability to pay.162 Because the child was not present and there was no showing
that the child had waived his presence, the court reversed.163 However, in L.W.,
where the child was ordered to pay $321.61 in $30 monthly installments based
upon a damaged window, the court found at first the child had waived his right
to attend, as the lawyer withdrew his objection based upon the child not being
present.164 However, the trial court failed to make the requisite factual findings
of the child’s or the family’s ability to make payments of $30 per month.165

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

S.M., 159 So. 3d at 967.
143 So. 3d 428, 430–31 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.014(3)(c)(1).
M.K., 143 So. 3d at 431–32.
Id. at 431.
150 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
163 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 599; C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
C.W., 150 So. 3d at 883.
Id.
Id.
L.W., 163 So. 3d at 599–600.
Id. at 601.
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In A.D. v. State,166 the trial court entered a restitution order regarding a
camera even though there was no reference to it “as an item stolen in the grand
theft count contained in [the] . . . petition for delinquency.”167 On that simple
basis, the court held that the trial court lacks the authority to require restitution,
as the only restitution allowable is that of which arises out of the offense
charged as reflected in the information or factual basis for the plea.168
In a delinquency case, it is not unusual for the State to be unable to
serve a respondentalleged delinquentwith a summons to appear.169 In State
v. C.W.,170 the State appealed a trial court final order entered sua sponte,
dismissing the petition in a delinquency case for failure to serve.171 The
appellate court ruled quite simply that the trial court improperly ruled on an
issue that was not before it and that it interfered with the State’s discretion to
bring charges against the child.172 However, oddly, because the State had not
preserved the argument for appeal, the appellate court dismissedalbeit,
writing to emphasize that where no motion to dismiss had been filed by the
child, the trial court was without authority to dismiss the prosecution sua
sponte.173
Discovery is an important matter in delinquency and adult criminal
cases often reaching constitutional dimensions.174 In M.H. v. State,175 a child
appealed from an order that withheld “adjudication of delinquency and
impos[ed] probation for [the] burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and [petty]
theft.”176 The claim on appeal was a discovery violation in which the State
listed the victim of the charged offenses as a Category B witness rather than a
Category A witness under Florida law.177 As a result, the trial court failed to
hold a Richardson Hearing.178 Failure to conduct a hearing under the facts of
the case constituted reversible error.179
The question of a proper search and seizure, in the context of a child
who was not in school and thus a possible truant, was before the Fourth District

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
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152 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 798–99.
See State v. C.W., 166 So. 3d 950, 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
166 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 950.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 773, 777 (Fla. 1971).
151 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.; see also Richardson, 246 So. 2d at 773–77.
M.H., 151 So. 3d at 37.
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in J.R. v. State.180 The child was found guilty of possession of marijuana after
the trial court denied the child’s motion to suppress.181 The police officer had
initially observed the child from the officer’s patrol car on a school day at about
8:15am.182 In reversing the denial of the child’s motion to suppress, the
appellate court held that the officer had begun the stop for truancy without
reasonable grounds to believe that the child was absent from school.183
Florida’s status offense statute does not authorize a police officer to
preemptively detain a child who may be plotting to skip school later.184 The
appellate court thus reversed, upholding the motion to suppress.185
Florida’s method for determining whether a juvenile charged with an
act of delinquency should be held in secure detention is determined on the basis
of something known in Florida as the Risk Assessment Instrument (“RAI”).186
In A.M. v. State,187 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking
release from secure detention because his offense was improperly determined to
be a violent third-degree felony.188 The trial court found that a robbery by
sudden snatching of a cell phone qualified as a violent third-degree felony,
which raised A.M.’s RAI to the level of secure detention.189 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s finding and held that the proper
designation of robbery by snatching under the facts of the case was a nonviolent third degree felony, which would have resulted in a lesser RAI
determination.190 In D.L. v. State,191 a juvenile filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus on the basis that the court incorrectly scored the RAI by double scoring
possession of a firearm and failing to address whether an unrelated felony
charge was concurrently pending against the child.192 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal reversed, finding as it had in other appeals that it is improper to
include three additional points for possession of a firearm where the possession
is already given the maximum ten points for the third degree felony charge
under Florida law.193
180.
149 So. 3d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
181.
Id.
182.
Id.
183.
Id. at 1197–98.
184.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.13(1)(b) (2014).
185.
J.R., 149 So. 3d at 1198.
186.
FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(a).
187.
147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
188.
Id. at 99.
189.
Id. at 99–100.
190.
Id. at 101–02; FLA. STAT. § 812.131.
191.
147 So. 3d 653 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
192.
Id. at 654.
193.
Id. at 655; see also M.W. v. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 15 So. 3d 782, 783–84
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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OTHER MATTERS

Due Process Shortcomings in the Dependency Court

It is clear beyond peradventure that basic due process rights apply in
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.194 Nonetheless, repeated
failures to comply with the basic due process constitutional protections arise in
the dependency court in Florida and, most recently, cases in Miami demonstrate
this shortcoming.195 First, in R.C. v. Department of Children & Family
Services,196 a termination of parental rights case, a parent sought “certiorari
relief from a sua sponte order of the trial court [obligating the mother] to submit
to a pregnancy test.”197 The appellate court quashed the trial court order due to
the complete failure to accord the mother notice and because there was also no
showing of good cause as applied by law.198 In so doing, after quoting at length
from the trial court proceeding and describing it as being “patently obvious
from the record in this case that the trial [court] acted for reasons of its own
rather than any rule of law,” the appellate court concluded by citing to
Alexander Hamilton.199 “As Alexander Hamilton long ago warned us, ‘it can be
of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may
substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature.”200 The appellate court then added “[t]he principle bears an
occasional reiteration, even—and perhaps especially—[with]in our children’s
court. There was no pretense made of following any legislative directives or
intentions in this case.”201
A second Miami case is R.W. v. Department of Children & Families.202
In that case, in a short opinion, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that
the same trial court’s termination of parental rights decision was based upon a
determination that continued involvement of the father in the family relationship
“threaten[ed] the safety or well-being of the child[ren] [regardless] of
194.
FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7,
at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
195.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; A.A. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147
So. 3d 621, 622–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 150
So. 3d 1277, 1279–80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); R.W. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 147
So. 3d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
196.
150 So. 3d 1277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
197.
Id. at 1277.
198.
Id. at 1279–80.
199.
Id.
200.
R.C., 150 So. 3d at 1280 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 452–53
(Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009)).
201.
Id.
202.
147 So. 3d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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services.”203 However, the amended petition did not allege such a statutory
basis but pleaded only abandonment, and thus, the appellate court reversed.204
The third Miami case is A.A. v. Department of Children & Families.205
Here, the appellate court reversed because the mother was denied due process as
a result of the same trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing before
denying her motion for modification.206 In that case, there was a combined
failurefirst, to hold an evidentiary hearing and then, to make a written factual
finding addressing the requisite factors enumerated in the statute.207 Those
failures constituted a basic violation of due process rights.208 These cases
follow on the heels of earlier appellate court rulings reversing the same trial
court in Miami for its failure to comply with basic constitutional principles in
G.W. v. Department of Children & Families209 and F.M. v. State Department of
Children & Families.210
B.
The Ongoing Failure to Provide Counsel for Children in Child Welfare
Cases in Florida and Shortcomings in the GAL Program
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida held in In re D.B.211 that children
are not entitled to counsel in termination of parental rights cases.212 Until July
of 2014, the only way that children received counsel in dependency and
termination of parental rights cases in Florida was through volunteer lawyer
appointments or in several counties legal aid representation.213 Thus, while all
parties to these cases were represented by counsel—DCF, the parents, and the
GAL Program—the only unrepresented party was the child unless a volunteer
attorney or legal aid lawyer took the child’s case.214 The GAL Program’s role,

203.
Id. at 632.
204.
Id.
205.
147 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
206.
Id. at 622, 624.
207.
Id. at 623; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.621(10) (2014).
208.
A.A., 147 So. 3d at 622–23.
209.
92 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
210.
95 So. 3d 378, 381–82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); G.W., 92 So. 3d at 309–
10; see also Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013)
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]. The same trial court was reversed in R.L.R. v.
State, a case in which the trial court had held that chapter 39 somehow preempted the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar on the confidentiality of the lawyer child client relationship. 116 So.
3d 570, 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. ch. 39.
211.
385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
212.
Id. at 91.
213.
Id. at 92.
214.
Id. at 87–88, 92–93.
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as discussed below, is not to represent the child as a lawyer would do but to
represent the child’s best interests.215
During its 2014 session, the Legislature passed a statute authorizing the
expenditure of $5 million to pay for lawyers to act as attorneys ad litem to
represent children before the dependency court in five categories of cases that
are based upon the children’s special needs.216 The serious shortcomings in the
statute are detailed in last year’s survey article, including the ethical issues
relating to the roles of the GAL Program and DCF and their attorneys in
requesting the appointment of and choosing the lawyers for the five categories
of children.217 The problem with the law is exacerbated by the fact that literally
hundreds of other children with serious physical, mental, and educational
problems do not have the right to counsel because they do not fit within the five
categories of the statute as determined by these possibly opposing parties.218
In 2014, the General Counsel for the GAL Program prepared a
document titled Children with Certain Special Needs Attorney Registry that
directly illustrates the underlying problems that arise when applying the 2014
amendment to section 39.01305 of the Florida Statutes.219 First, the document
states that “[t]he appointing court is required to consult with the GAL [Program]
in attempting to locate a pro bono attorney. If a pro bono attorney cannot be
located or a recommendation is not provided with[in] [fifteen] days, the court is
authorized to appoint compensated counsel.”220 A 2011 study demonstrates the
inability of the Florida Bar to provide pro bono lawyers to children in
dependency proceedings,221 thus making it both futile and time consuming to
locate pro bono attorneys and necessitating the use of compensated attorney

215.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Michael J. Dale &
Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Every Child Should Have an Attorney in Child
Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA L. REV. 345, 352–53 (2012) [hereinafter Dale &
Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright].
216.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e); see also Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law,
supra note 7, at 62.
217.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 61–63; see also Dale &
Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330; Dale & Reidenberg, The Kids
Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353.
218.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3)(a)–(e).
219.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; DENNIS MOORE, GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
CHILDREN WITH CERTAIN SPECIAL NEEDS ATTORNEY REGISTRY (2014), available at
http://www.slideplayer.com/slide/4327595.
220.
MOORE, supra note 219.
221.
See UNIV. OF FLA. & FLORIDA’S CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
DEPENDENT CHILDREN: A 2012 REPORT ON FLORIDA’S PATCHWORK SYSTEM 2–4 (2012),
https://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-clinics/centers/legal-rep-of-dep-children-12.pdf
(demonstrating the Bar’s inability to provide a substantial number of pro bono lawyers for
children in dependency cases).
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representation.222 Second, according to the document prepared by the GAL
General Counsel, it is possible to be registered to represent children for a fee in
dependency cases even if the attorney has never actually handled such a case.223
The attorney merely needs to demonstrate one of the following prerequisites set
out in the document: that the attorney has “observed at least thirty hours of
hearings in dependency cases including at least one shelter hearingone
dependency adjudicatory hearing, one judicial review hearing, one hearing
pursuant to rule 8.350 [of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure] and one
termination of parental rights trial.”224 Contrary to this prerequisite, attorneys
for children “must have the requisite skill and competence to represent children
in [these complex] cases that involve, among other matters,” a variety of federal
statutory rights as well as myriad, medical, psychological, educational,
“cultural, racial, moral, and religious issues.”225
A review of the application of the 2014 amendment to section 39.01305
of the Florida Statutes in its first year demonstrates additional ongoing problems
with the law, leaving aside the issues of the attorney qualifications necessary to
handle these cases and the ethical issues of the GAL Program’s role in choosing
the lawyers for children as a separate party in the proceeding.226 First, during
the first fifteen months of operation, only 1236 children were appointed counsel
with an expenditure of $900,000 out of a budget of $5 million, leaving $4.1
million unspent.227 Unfortunately, this data does not distinguish between
volunteer and paid lawyers.228 As explained above, the Florida law requires an
attempt to find volunteers before hiring a lawyer.229 Yet, during the initial
fifteen-month period, more than twenty-eight thousand children were before the
dependency court.230 Second, the appointment of lawyers for children varied
dramatically among the circuits with no correlation to their population.231 In the
222.
See id.
223.
MOORE, supra note 219.
224.
Id.; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350.
225.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 351.
226.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014).
227.
JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.: COUNT BY CIRCUIT AND CASE DESCRIPTION, APPOINTED JULY 1, 2014–SEPTEMBER
21, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on
file with author); JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1, 2014–
SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62.
228.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
COSTS PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
229.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a).
230.
FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:
NOVEMBER 2014 (Dec. 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014].
231.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
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Sixth Circuit—Pasco and Pinellas Counties—with a population of 1.4 million,
there were 254 paid appointments of attorneys ad litem at a cost of $199,000.232
In the Seventeenth Circuit—Broward County—with a population of 1.8
million, there were 37 appointments at a cost of $25,000.233 In the Thirteenth
Circuit—Hillsborough County—with a population of 1.3 million, there were
138 appointments at a cost of $106,000.234 In the Eleventh Circuit—MiamiDade County—with a population of 2.6 million, 130 lawyers were appointed at
a cost of $57,000.235 These statistics do not account for the appointment of pro
bono lawyers who under the 2014 statute are to be assigned first and found by
the GAL Program.236 Nor does it account for the availability of legal aid
lawyers to represent some of these children in some of the circuits.237 However,
the population differences among the circuit courts raises the question of why
the process of paid appointments differs so dramatically from circuit to
circuit.238
The historical role of the GAL Program is also problematic for reasons
unrelated to the 2014 amendment to section 39.010305 of the Florida
Statutes.239 First, data produced during this survey year as well as recent reports
232.

Id.; JUSTICE ADMIN. COMM’N, PAYMENTS ON SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT

TO S. 39.01305, F.S.: COURT APPOINTED BY CIRCUIT AND APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR, JULY 1,

2014–SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES
PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S.] (data on file with author); State & County Quickfacts: Pasco
County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12101.html (last revised
Dec. 2, 2015); State & County Quickfacts: Pinellas County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12103.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015).
233.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
State
&
County
Quickfacts:
Broward
County,
Florida,
CENSUS.GOV,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12011.html (last revised Dec. 2, 2015).
234.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
Total Population in Hillsborough County Zip Codes, TAMPA HILLSBOROUGH ECON. DEV. CORP.,
http://www.tampaedc.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Hillsborough-County-Population-byZIP-Code.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
235.
APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232;
Miami-Dade
County,
SOUTHFLORIDAFINDS.COM,
http://www.southfloridafinds.com/county/miami-dade (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
236.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S.
39.01305, F.S., supra note 227.
237.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232.
238.
See APPOINTMENTS TO CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 227;
ATTORNEY FEES PAID FOR SPECIAL NEEDS CASES PURSUANT TO S. 39.01305, F.S., supra note 232.
239.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for
Children, supra note 7, at 330.
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from the GAL Program demonstrate ongoing serious flaws in the program.240
First, the budget of the GAL Program now exceeds forty-two million dollars not
including federal funds and in-kind services.241 Yet, the GAL Program was
only able to represent approximately 76%242 of the children before the
dependency court in 2014, despite employing more than 145 attorneys,
including an appeals unit.243 It is hard to be certain of the accuracy of these
figures because the Statewide GAL Program—Performance Advocacy
Snapshot—only provides percentages.244 Thus, it would appear that as of June
2015, the court appointed the GAL Program to 84.3% of the children in
dependency proceedings.245 Of the 84.3%, 77.5% had an Active Certified
Volunteer.246 Thus, it would appear that 65.3% of the children before the
dependency court last June had an active certified GAL volunteer.247 One
cannot tell from the GAL website whether the remaining 34.7% of the children
had GAL best interest representation or if they were simply left with nothing.248
A recent announcement from the GAL Program in Palm Beach County seeking
donations stated that it could only represent the best interests of about 800 of
the 1200—66%—children before the dependency court in that Circuit.249 In
240.
See FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT:
MAY 2015 (June 2015) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2015]; GAL
REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230; FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2014 (June 2014) [hereinafter GAL REPRESENTATION
REPORT: MAY 2014]. GAL are the lowest paid state attorneys, and the amount of cases they take
exceeds the American Bar Association’s recommended number, according to a study authorized
and paid for by the GAL Program. FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
ATTORNEY COMPENSATION ANALYSIS 3 (June 30, 2014), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/GAL-Attorney-Compensation-Study-Final-Version.pdf. One might
surmise the study was prepared and paid for to a Florida based company for fundraising purposes.
See id. Significantly, the lawyers at the Offices of Regional Counsel, albeit without a study to
support their problems, are also paid at low salaries with caseloads far exceeding professional
norms. See id. at 15–16.
241.
Justice Administrative Commission: Guardian ad Litem Program, FLA. OFF.
PROGRAM
POL’Y
ANALYSIS
&
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY,
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1016 (last updated June 11, 2015).
242.
GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: NOVEMBER 2014, supra note 230.
243.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in Dependency
Proceedings, supra note 7, at 330.
244.
Statewide Guardian ad Litem Program — Performance Advocacy SnapShot
(PASS), GUARDIANADLITEM.ORG (June 2015), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/GAL-SnapShot-June-2015.pdf.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
See id.
248.
See id.
249.
Michelle Piasecki, Nonprofit to Help Kids in Need Is Restarted, PALM BEACH
POST, Dec. 4, 2014, at N4.
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Broward County, matters appear to be worse.250 A June 2015 report from the
GAL Program stated that the GAL Program was appointed for 82.23% of the
children before the dependency court, and 56.06% of those children received a
volunteer GAL.251 Thus, less than half of the children in Broward County had a
GAL Program representative.252
Second, the GAL Program seems to be confused about its proper role or
continues to choose to misstate it.253 The GAL Program in Florida is under the
supervision of a state agency in the executive branch that is statutorily
authorized to collect and provide information to the court when appointed by
the court as to what in certain limited situations it believes is in the best interest
of the children.254 It does not represent the child as an attorney does, although
its literature at times says it does.255 GAL volunteers and paid staff may not
practice law, as is the case with any other non-lawyer.256 Thus, they may not
provide legal advice to the child, just as the GAL Program lawyers may not,
leaving no confidential relationship between any GAL representative and the
child.257
Third, GALs cannot provide expert opinions to the court, although as
the case law discussed earlier in this survey demonstrates, they have done so.258
The guidelines for the GAL Program, however, are disingenuous in this
regard.259 They state
“[v]olunteers are not being used as experts in a case and will testify
as lay people, however this does not take away the fact that they may
be credentialed and should be permitted to identify themselves as

250.
251.
252.
253.

See GAL REPRESENTATION REPORT: MAY 2015, supra note 240.
Id.
See id.
See Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at

330.
254.
FLA. STAT. § 39.8296 (2014); FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM, IMAGINING THE
FUTURE:
35TH
ANNIVERSARY
1980–2015
7,
15–17
(2015),
http://www.issuu.com/liz338/docs/annual_report-web.
255.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 330.
256.
FLA. STAT. § 61.403(7); see also Volunteer FAQ, FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD
LITEM PROGRAM, http://www.guardianadlitem.org/faq (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
257.
STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, STANDARDS OF OPERATION 15
(2006), http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/StandardsOfOperation.pdf
[hereinafter STANDARDS OF OPERATION]; see also 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM
STANDARDS, supra note 80 at 19.
258.
See A.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 144 So. 3d 662, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014).
259.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 9.
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such [and] . . . [t]he court report should not reiterate their credentials
to bolster their credibility.”260

The simple outstanding question—as any lawyer would immediately
recognize—is: What is the relevance of the credential, if not to add to the
credibility of the witness and thus bolster the witness’ testimony?261
Finally, the confusion in the operation of the GAL Program is only
exacerbated by its articulation of the role of its lawyers.262 Despite calls by this
author in this Article and in other articles for the GAL Program to properly state
the role of its lawyers—to represent the GAL Program—it does not do so.263 It
continues to conflate its role with that of the attorney who actually represents
the legal interest of the child.264 For example, the Dependency Practice
Manual, apparently written by GAL Program special counsel, in the
introduction states that “[i]t is hoped that attorneys will use this manual to
ensure that children are the focus of dependency proceedings, that their voices
are heard, and that their legal interests [are] protected through proactive legal
advocacy.”265 That statement defines the role of a child’s lawyer.266 It does not
define the role of a GAL lawyer whose sole ethical obligation is to represent his
or her client, which is the GAL Program.267 To do otherwise would violate the
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility.268 The GAL guidelines as
redrafted this year only makes matters worse. They refer once again to the
“Child’s Best Interest Attorney” and describe the role as “the attorney employed
by the [department] to protect [the] child’s best interest either in the circuit
dependency courts or the appellate courts. There is no attorney-client
relationship between the CBI attorney and the child; however, representing the
best interest of the child is the sole purpose of their advocacy.”269 This
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
See id.
See id., at 7.
See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note

7, at 324.
264.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 7; FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, DEPENDENCY PRACTICE MANUAL 2 (2014),
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/The_Practice_Manual_Final.pdf;
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331.
265.
FLA. STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE, supra note 257, at 2 (emphasis
added).
266.
See id.
267.
See id.; Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7,
at 331–32.
268.
Dale & Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children, supra note 7, at 331–
32; see also STANDARDS OF OPERATION, supra note 257, at 6, 20.
269.
2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80, at
7.
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statement can only be described as legal nonsense.270 The GAL Program lawyer
represents the GAL Program, a statutory party in a dependency case.271 It is
impossible for a lawyer to represent an idea. The GAL Program literature
describes a form of legal representation that simply does not exist.272
Attempting to apply these GAL guidelines is inconsistent with the law and
defies logic.273
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida decided two major cases this survey
year.274 First, it set forth the procedure for applying the Supreme Court of the
United States holdings in Graham and Miller that rendered life without parole
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who committed capital and non-capital
offenses.275 Second, it held that Miller should apply retroactively.276
The Florida intermediate appellate courts were active in deciding
delinquency matters primarily involving proper application of restitution
standards.277 The appellate courts were also busy implementing the Horsley
decision, which set out the test for how to determine the proper sentence for a
juvenile previously incarcerated for life without parole.278 In the dependency
and TPR areas, the issue of proper application of the nexus problem was once
again before the appellate courts.279 Another common issue involved the
dependency court rights of immigrant children.280 Also, a pattern of failure to
comply with basic due process rights of parents in child welfare cases appears to
be developing in the juvenile court in Miami as this survey and surveys over the
past two years have illustrated.281

270.
See id.
271.
Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 63; Dale & Reidenberg,
The Kids Aren’t Alright, supra note 215, at 353.
272.
See 2015 FLORIDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM STANDARDS, supra note 80,
at 6–7.
273.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(b) (2014).
274.
See Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963–64 (Fla. 2015); Horsley v. State,
160 So. 3d 393, 408–09 (Fla. 2015).
275.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
276.
Horsley, 160 So. 3d. at 408–09; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
277.
See supra Part IV.
278.
See Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 408–09; supra Part IV.
279.
See supra Part III.
280.
See In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 577 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015); supra Part
II.
281.
See Dale, 2014 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 7, at 62; Dale, 2013
Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 210, at 86–87; supra Section V.A.
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Finally, all children in Florida should be entitled to counsel in
dependency and TPR proceedings.282 The 2014 amendment to section 39.01305
of the Florida Statutes, giving some children some lawyers in some cases access
to counsel, is grossly inadequate.283 The GAL Program, with a budget in excess
of forty-two million dollars, consistently and without restraint, mistakes its role
to the detriment of the children.284 The establishment of consistent guidelines
across the board is crucial in providing adequate legal representation that
children not only need, but deserve, in all juvenile proceedings, whether dealing
with delinquency, TPR, or dependency.285

282.
283.
284.
285.

See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305 (2014); supra Section V.B.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3); supra Section V.B.
See supra Section V.B.
See supra Parts II–V.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Florida has long been a hotbed of baseball activity.1 Today, the state
is home to two Major League Baseball (“MLB”) teams, fourteen minor
league teams, fifteen spring training sites, both of the schools that train future
big league umpires, and numerous amateur and youth teams.2 As a result, its
case reporters are filled with baseball opinions that stretch back more than a
century.3 Collectively, these judgments chronicle the significant role that

1.
KEVIN M. MCCARTHY, BASEBALL IN FLORIDA 5 (1996) (tracing Florida’s
baseball roots back to 1874). Although McCarthy’s text remains definitive, useful
examinations of Florida’s baseball history also appear in a number of other works. See, e.g.,
SCOTT BROWN, BASEBALL IN PENSACOLA: AMERICA’S PASTIME & THE CITY OF FIVE FLAGS
(2013); A.M. DE QUESADA JR., BASEBALL IN TAMPA BAY (2000); ALEJANDRO M. DE QUESADA,
SPRING TRAINING IN CLEARWATER: FENCEBUSTERS AND FASTBALLS FROM THE PHILADELPHIA
PHILLIES AND THE CLEARWATER THRESHERS (2007); RODY JOHNSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF
DODGERTOWN: 60 YEARS OF BASEBALL IN VERO BEACH (2008); JEFF LAHURD, SPRING
TRAINING IN SARASOTA, 1924–1960: NEW YORK GIANTS AND BOSTON RED SOX (2006); JOHN
PHILLIPS, A SHORT HISTORY OF MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IN MIAMI AND MIAMI BEACH
(1997); WES SINGLETARY, FLORIDA’S FIRST BIG LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY (2006); RAYMOND SINIBALDI, SPRING TRAINING IN BRADENTON AND SARASOTA
(2013); Joe Connor, Baseball History Rich in Sunshine State, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.nbcsports.com/baseball-history-rich-sunshine-state#page=1.
2.
Batter Up! A Visual History of Baseball in Florida, FLA. MEMORY,
https://www.floridamemory.com/photographiccollection/photo_exhibits/baseball; see also
Amateur & Semi-Pro: Florida, JOHN SKILTON’S BASEBALL-LINKS.COM, http://www.baseballlinks.com/links/Amateur_&_Semi-Pro/Florida; Florida’s Grapefruit League Is Home to
Major
League
Baseball’s
Pre-Season,
FLA.
GRAPEFRUIT
LEAGUE,
http://www.floridagrapefruitleague.com (hover over “Teams”); Team-by-Team Information,
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/team/index.jsp; Teams by Geographical Location, MILB.COM,
http://www.milb.com/milb/info/geographical.jsp Umpire School Information, MLB.COM,
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official_info/umpires/camp/schools.jsp
3.
Lawsuits that did not result in a precedential opinion are not included in
this survey. See, e.g., Nix v. Major League Baseball, No. 3D14–2967, 2015 WL 1930327
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015) (unpublished table decision); Burch v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 33 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished table decision); Young
v. City of Dunedin, 974 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (unpublished table
decision); Bochtler v. Florida Marlins LP, 961 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(unpublished table decision); Ogletree v. Fitzpatrick, 935 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (unpublished table decision); Del Valle v. Major League Baseball, Inc., 901 So. 2d 131
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table decision); S. Fla. Stadium Corp. v. Klein ex
rel. Klein, 789 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (unpublished table decision);
Toronto Blue Jays, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 717 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
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Florida’s bench and bar have played in the development of America’s
national pastime. To make these decisions more accessible, they are briefly
summarized below.
II.

ANTITRUST LAW

In 1922, the Supreme Court of the United States granted MLB
immunity from the nation’s antitrust laws.4 The Eleventh Circuit has applied
this ruling twice—first in a case involving the scheduling of minor league
baseball games,5 and then in a case investigating the proposed elimination of
the Minnesota Twins and Montreal Expos.6 In contrast, the Supreme Court
of Florida has read the exemption as applying only to player contracts.7
Accordingly, the Second District reinstated a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs
claimed that numerous parties had conspired to keep them from buying the
Minnesota Twins and moving them to Florida.8
III.

BANKRUPTCY LAW

Two cases from the Middle District have examined baseball through
the prism of the country’s bankruptcy laws.9 In the former, a group of
creditors objected to the debtor’s proposal to sell his interest in the Fort
Wayne Wizards and use the proceeds to pay his attorneys.10 In affirming the

1998) (unpublished table decision); Chiamparino v. Florida Marlins Baseball Club, 668 So. 2d
605 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Tolar v. Chicago White Sox,
Ltd., 684 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Wiggins v.
City of Plant City, 633 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (unpublished table decision);
Leasefirst v. Baseball Cards Unlimited, Inc., 550 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(unpublished table decision); Pro Baseball Clubs & Sch., Inc. v. Baseball Enters., Inc., 522 So.
2d 390 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (unpublished table decision); Pinkston v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 365 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (unpublished table decision).
4.
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922).
5.
Prof’l Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1085 (11th
Cir. 1982).
6.
Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1179, 1183 (11th Cir.
2003).
7.
Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021,
1025 (Fla. 1994).
8.
Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
9.
Van Buren Indus. Inv’rs v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 341 B.R. 783,
786 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Major Sports Fantasy, Ltd. v. Dowdell (In re Dowdell), 406 B.R. 106,
108–09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
10.
In re Henderson, 341 B.R. at 786–87.
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bankruptcy court, the district court found the debtor’s plan to be a reasonable
one.11
In the latter, the owners of two fantasy baseball camps sold their
businesses.12 Despite a non-competition agreement, they soon opened
several new camps.13 After the purchasers obtained a $241,000 judgment
from a Texas state court, the sellers filed for bankruptcy in Florida and
sought to discharge the judgment.14 Agreeing with the purchasers, the
bankruptcy court held the sellers could only discharge so much of the
judgment as was not attributable to their willful misconduct.15
IV.

CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

In a pro se complaint, a federal prisoner claimed the Tampa Bay
Devil Rays were plotting to kill him when he got out of jail.16 Finding this
allegation to be delusional, the Middle District dismissed the case.17
V.

CONTRACT LAW

In 1949, the City of Miami opened Miami Stadium and hired Florida
Sportservice, Inc. (“Sportservice”) to run the concession stands.18 For the
next five years, the Miami Sun Sox, a Brooklyn Dodgers farm team, called
the field home.19 In 1954, however, the Sun Sox folded.20 Following two
seasons without baseball, Sidney Salomon, Jr., Sportservice’s owner,
purchased the Syracuse Chiefs and moved the team to Florida, where they
became the original Miami Marlins.21
After having the Marlins sign a one-sided concession agreement with
Sportservice, Salomon sold the club to media mogul George B. Storer.22

11.
Id. at 791.
12.
In re Dowdell, 406 B.R. at 110.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 112.
15.
Id. at 115.
16.
Riches v. Schiavo, No. 8:07-CV-1644-T-30TGW, 2007 WL 2729681, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2007).
17.
Id.
18.
Storer v. Fla. Sportservice, Inc., 115 So. 2d 433, 434–35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); SAM ZYGNER, THE FORGOTTEN MARLINS: A TRIBUTE TO THE 1956–1960
ORIGINAL MIAMI MARLINS 325 (2013).
19.
ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 131–32.
20.
Id. at 132.
21.
Storer, 115 So. 2d at 435; ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 14.
22.
Storer, 115 So. 2d at 434–35; ZYGNER, supra note 18, at 64.
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When Storer found out about the sweetheart deal, he moved to set it aside.23
The trial court dismissed his complaint but the Third District reversed.24
A short time later, the City of Miami informed Sportservice it had
decided not to renew its contract.25 Sportservice responded by suing the
City, arguing that the absence of baseball from 1954 to 1956 entitled it to a
two-year extension.26 The Third District rejected this contention because
other events had taken place at Miami Stadium at which Sportservice had
been able to sell concessions.27
Several contract cases have involved the current Miami Marlins.
When the engineering company building the team’s spring training complex
was fired, for example, it sued Brevard County to recover the cost of various
change orders.28 Because the orders were issued orally rather than in writing,
the Supreme Court of Florida found collection on them barred by sovereign
immunity.29
In 1997, the Marlins delighted their fans by winning their first World
Series; as a result, CFI Sales & Marketing, Ltd. (“CFI”) purchased premium
stadium seats and advertising for the 1998 season.30 When the club then held
a fire sale and wound up finishing in last place, CFI, believing it had been
duped, sued for a refund but lost.31 On appeal, the Third District affirmed.32
At a 2008 charity auction, Marlins president David Samson jokingly
announced he was putting the team up for bid.33 The Pomeranz & Landsman
Corporation (“P & L”) immediately offered $10 million.34 When the Marlins
refused to go through with the “sale,” P & L sued.35 After P & L dropped its

23.
Storer, 115 So. 2d at 435–36.
24.
Id. at 434, 438.
25.
Fla. Sportservice, Inc. v. City of Miami, 121 So. 2d 450, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1960).
26.
Id. at 452.
27.
Id.
28.
County of Brevard v. Miorelli Eng’g, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla.
1997).
29.
Id. at 1051.
30.
E-mail from Richard W. Epstein, Esq., attorney for CFI Sales &
Marketing, Ltd., to Professor Robert M. Jarvis (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:47 p.m. EDT) (on file with
the authors).
31.
CFI Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Florida Marlins Baseball, Ltd., 837 So. 2d 423,
423 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
32.
Id.
33.
Complaint at 1–2, Omeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins
Baseball Club, L.P., 143 So. 3d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 12-03405).
34.
Id. at 2.
35.
Jeff Sullivan, Marlins Being Sued by Would-Be Owners, SB NATION (Feb.
22, 2012), http://sbnation.com/2012/2/22/2817036/miami-marlins-sued-action.
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lawsuit, the Marlins moved for attorneys’ fees.36 In issuing a prohibitory
writ, the Fourth District explained the trial court had lost its power to impose
sanctions when the case was dismissed.37
In an action involving considerably less drama, the City of Winter
Haven filed a three-count complaint against the Cleveland Indians over the
team’s failure to pay the City for using its Chain-O-Lakes baseball
complex.38 Agreeing with the Indians, the Middle District held the first
count (breach of contract) necessitated dismissal of the second and third
counts (open account and account stated).39
Two contract cases have involved baseball memorabilia.40 In one of
them, the plaintiff accused an out-of-state defendant of selling him a fake Joe
DiMaggio jersey.41 The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, but the Southern District found the defendant had sufficient
contacts with Florida.42
In the other case, the plaintiff claimed the defendants had issued a
grossly inflated appraisal for a “Hall of Fame Baseball Montage.”43 The trial
court dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the Fourth District reversed.44
VI.

CRIMINAL LAW

Florida’s two earliest reported baseball decisions arose from the
state’s 1905 ban on Sunday baseball.45 In the first, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the newly-enacted law against multiple constitutional
attacks.46 In the second, it set the defendant free after finding that the
complainant, a minister, lacked standing.47

36.
Pomeranz & Landsman Corp. v. Miami Marlins Baseball Club, L.P., 143
So. 3d 1182, 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
37.
Id. at 1183.
38.
City of Winter Haven v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., No. 8:09-CV00190-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 1107670, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009).
39.
Id. at *1–3.
40.
Pathman v. Grey Flannel Auctions, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (S.D.
Fla. 2010); Blumstein v. Sports Immortals, Inc., 67 So. 3d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011).
41.
Pathman, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 1320–21.
42.
Id. at 1321–22, 1324, 1326.
43.
Blumstein, 67 So. 3d at 439.
44.
Id. at 438–39.
45.
See Act of June 5, 1905, 1905 Fla. Laws ch. 5436, § 1. The statute was
repealed in 1969. See Act effective July 1, 1969, ch. 69–87, 1969 Fla. Laws 322.
46.
West v. State, 39 So. 412, 415 (Fla. 1905).
47.
Nickelson v. State ex rel. Blitch, 57 So. 194, 196 (Fla. 1911).
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In a more typical criminal case, a con man created a fictitious
baseball team (the Gainesville All Stars) and convinced a local jeweler to be
its sponsor.48 A jury convicted him of forgery for cashing the jeweler’s
check.49 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.50
In a somewhat similar scheme, Vincent Antonucci, the owner of a
Crystal River souvenir shop called Talkin’ Baseball, swindled Ted Williams,
the legendary Boston Red Sox left fielder and the business’s silent partner.51
When the State of Florida and Williams both went after Antonucci, the trial
judge continued the State’s criminal case to allow Williams’ civil case to
finish first.52 On appeal, the Fifth District found this to be error.53
In another case involving a famous major leaguer, former Detroit
Tigers pitcher Denny McLain had his federal racketeering conviction
overturned by the Eleventh Circuit because the actions of the prosecutor and
the trial judge had denied him a fair trial.54
More recently, a woman convinced a bank that two World Series
baseballs—one signed by the New York Yankees and the other by the
Detroit Tigers—were worth $8 million.55 The jury found her guilty of bank
fraud, but the Northern District threw out the verdict for lack of evidence.56
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ordered it reinstated.57
In two separate incidents, a New York Mets minor league player and
a little league coach were convicted of sexual misconduct.58 The Fourth
District upheld the player’s conviction,59 but the First District reversed the
coach’s conviction because the prosecutors had relied on an improper
theory.60

48.
49.
50.
51.

Green v. State, 76 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1954).
Id.
Id. at 648.
State v. Antonucci, 590 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
BEN BRADLEE, JR., THE KID: THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF TED WILLIAMS 624 (2013).
52.
Antonucci, 590 So. 2d at 999.
53.
Id. at 1000.
54.
United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1459, 1462, 1468 (11th Cir.
1987).
55.
United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1321 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004).
56.
Id. at 1320.
57.
Id. at 1326.
58.
Palmer v. State, 838 So. 2d 579, 579–80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002);
Gonzalez v. State, 745 So. 2d 542, 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
59.
Gonzalez, 745 So. 2d at 543.
60.
Palmer, 838 So. 2d at 579.
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In yet another case, an off-duty police officer at a St. Lucie Mets
game had too much to drink.61 When he was asked to leave, he became
hostile and was taken into custody.62 Following his release, he sued for false
arrest and false imprisonment, but the Southern District dismissed his
complaint.63
VII.

DISABILITY LAW

There are two reported cases involving disabled baseball fans.64 In
the first, the plaintiff sought to force the Florida Marlins to make Pro Player
Stadium more accessible.65 The Southern District dismissed because the
plaintiff’s proposed modifications were not readily achievable.66
In the second, involving similar claims against the St. Lucie Mets at
Tradition Field, the Southern District put off ruling on the team’s motions to
dismiss for lack of standing and mootness until a full record could be
developed.67
VIII.

EDUCATION LAW

The baseball coach at Coconut Creek High School was disciplined
for failing to prevent hazing during a team trip to Orlando.68 On appeal, the
Fourth District reversed the Broward County School Board’s decision
because the coach had been unaware of the players’ activities.69
In four cases, high school baseball players challenged decisions of
the Florida High School Athletic Association.70 In the first, a Hialeah Miami
Lakes High School player who had used up his eligibility and had been

61.
Magielski v. Sheriff of St. Lucie Cty., No. 2:11-CV-14235-KMM, 2012
WL 292285, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2012).
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at *2, *4.
64.
Wein v. St. Lucie Cty., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2006);
Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
65.
Access Now, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
66.
Id. at 1371.
67.
Wein, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1262, 1265.
68.
McMillan v. Broward Cty. Sch. Bd., 834 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
69.
Id.
70.
Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Marazzito, 891 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Lee v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, Inc., 291 So. 2d 636, 638–39
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Coletti v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 23 Fla. L. Weekly
Supp. 38 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015); White v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 9 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 536 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. May 8, 2002).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1

72

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

A SURVEY OF FLORIDA BASEBALL CASES

57

denied a hardship waiver had his case dismissed by the trial court.71 On
appeal, the Third District reversed and held he was entitled to a hearing.72
In the second, four home-schooled players sued after school officials
declared them ineligible to play for the Chattahoochee High Magnet School
baseball team.73 Finding that no rules had been broken, the trial court
ordered them reinstated.74
In the third, a catcher at All Saints Academy in Winter Haven
petitioned for an extra year of eligibility.75 The trial court granted his
request, but the Second District reversed after concluding the record did not
support such an extraordinary remedy.76
In the fourth, a Nova High School player argued that his team’s
regional semi-final game against St. Thomas High School should not have
been called due to rain.77 The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of
standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to state a
cause of action.78 It also found that the umpires had been right to give the
victory to St. Thomas.79
IX.

FAMILY LAW

Just before going on a team trip, Boston Red Sox pitching coach
Dennis Rasmussen signed a note leaving all of his property to his wife Jan
“in the event of death or separation.”80 The couple later divorced.81 Relying
on the note, the trial court ruled that Rasmussen’s individual retirement
account and MLB pension were marital assets.82 The Second District
reversed because the note, being conditional, failed to create a valid gift.83

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Lee, 291 So. 2d at 638.
Id. at 638–39.
White, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 536.
Id.
Marazzito, 891 So. 2d at 654.
Id.
Coletti, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 38.
Id.
Id.
Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 909 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 970–71.

2005).
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GAMBLING LAW

Three cases have involved prosecutions for wagering on baseball.84
In the first, the Southern District ordered cash seized from a bookmaker who
had taken bets on baseball to be returned.85 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
ordered a new trial.86
In the second, the defendants “were found guilty of maintaining a
gambling room.”87 On appeal, the Third District reversed because the
evidence—a bet on one baseball game—was insufficient to support the
charges.88
In the third, the defendants were convicted by the Southern District
of taking bets on baseball games.89 Finding no error, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed their sentences.90
XI.

GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAW

Claiming she had been denied a promotion because of her gender, a
woman baseball umpire sued multiple defendants.91 When she failed to
make timely service, two of the defendants moved for dismissal, which the
Middle District granted.92
In two different lawsuits against the Brevard County School Board,
the Middle District found that the disparities between the boys’ baseball and
girls’ softball programs at various local high schools were so substantial they
violated federal and state law.93

84.
United States v. Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156, 1157 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Frank, 265 F.2d 529, 529–30 (5th Cir. 1959); Cohen v. State, 189 So. 2d 498, 498–
99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
85.
Frank, 265 F.2d at 529–30.
86.
Id. at 531.
87.
Cohen, 189 So. 2d at 498.
88.
Id. at 499.
89.
Sklaroff, 552 F.2d at 1157, 1162.
90.
Id. at 1162.
91.
Cox v. Ariz. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 436, 437
(M.D. Fla. 1993).
92.
Id. at 439.
93.
Landow ex rel. Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cty., 132 F. Supp. 2d 958,
958–59 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cty., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (M.D.
Fla. 1997).
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IMMIGRATION LAW

After successfully smuggling Cuban infielder Yuniesky Betancourt
into the United States and obtaining a $2.8 million contract for him with the
Seattle Mariners, sports agent Gustavo Dominguez decided to try his luck
again with five more Cuban players.94 This time the plan blew up and
Dominguez was convicted by the Southern District of smuggling,
concealing, and transporting unlawful aliens.95 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the smuggling conviction but reversed the other charges for
lack of evidence.96
XIII.

INSURANCE LAW

Following the closure of a baseball card store, one of its investors
agreed to keep its inventory in his home.97 A short time later, the home was
broken into, and the cards were stolen.98 The investor sued his insurer and
was awarded $25,000.99 Considering this amount to be too little, the investor
filed a new action against his agent for failing to provide him with the proper
coverage.100
In the trial court and at the Fourth District, the agent successfully
defended on the ground that the investor’s suit was time-barred.101 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected this contention.102
Nevertheless, it ordered the complaint dismissed due to the investor’s bad
faith in suing the agent.103
A little league coach injured during a game sued both the league and
the City of South Daytona.104 Nutmeg, the City’s insurer, tendered the case
to Continental, the league’s insurer, but it denied liability.105 After the
coach’s claim was dismissed, the City filed a declaratory judgment action
against Continental for attorneys’ fees.106 The trial court ordered Continental
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
Ct. App. 2002).
105.
106.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1057 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1056–57.
Id. at 1056.
Blumberg v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 790 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Blumberg, 790 So. 2d at 1065–66.
Id. at 1066–68.
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. City of South Daytona, 807 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Id.
Id.
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to reimburse the City for both actions.107 On appeal, the Fifth District held
the City was entitled to attorneys’ fees only in the coach’s action.108
When pitcher Alex Fernandez re-injured his shoulder, the Florida
Marlins sought reimbursement from its insurer Lloyd’s of London.109
Having paid out on a previous claim, Lloyd’s denied coverage.110 During
discovery, it sought to learn what the Marlins had been told by a Missouri
lawyer named Michael Whittle.111 The Marlins objected, claiming that
Whittle’s advice was protected by attorney-client privilege.112 The trial court
rejected this contention because Whittle was not admitted in Florida, but the
Third District reversed.113
After prospect Matthew White tore his rotator cuff while pitching for
the 2000 U.S. Olympic team, the Tampa Bay Devil Rays submitted a claim
to the Standard Security Life Insurance Company.114 It refused to pay
because White was able to pitch sporadically during the 2001 season for the
Durham Bulls.115 Finding that numerous unresolved fact issues existed, the
Middle District denied Standard’s summary judgment motion and referred
the Devil Rays’ summary judgment motion to a magistrate judge.116
XIV.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

In two different actions, Little League Baseball, Inc. sued parties
who were using its trademarks.117 In the first, the Middle District ordered the
defendant to stop using the marks.118 In the second, the Southern District
refused to let the defendant depose the league’s president after finding he had

107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 93.
109.
Andrew Cave, Lloyd’s Whacks $7.7M Claim by Baseball Team, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), July 5, 2004, at 25.
110.
Id.
111.
Florida Marlins Baseball Club, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London Subscribing to Policy No. 893/HC/97/9096, 900 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Tampa Bay Devil Rays, LED v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., No.
8:04-CV-1330-T-17MAP, 2006 WL 1119207, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2006).
115.
Id. at *4.
116.
Id. at *4–5.
117.
Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Kaplan, No. 08-60554-CIV, 2009 WL
426277, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2009); Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Daytona Beach Little
League, Inc., No. 76-108, 1977 WL 22777, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 1977).
118.
Daytona Beach Little League, Inc., 1977 WL 22777, at *1.
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no pertinent knowledge and the defendant already had deposed four other
league officials.119
In another case, a songwriter who wrote a ballad about the Fort
Myers Miracle sued the team for playing it at its home games.120 When the
Miracle produced proof it had twice obtained permission to do so, the Middle
District granted the team summary judgment.121 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.122
In a different action, a developer accused various parties of stealing
his idea of having a baseball stadium anchor a mixed-used development
project in Jupiter.123 Finding the concept to be an obvious one, the trial court
dismissed,124 and the Fourth District affirmed.125
In two cases, former MLB players sued others for using their
names.126 In the first, the Southern District dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction a lawsuit filed by the estate of Joe DiMaggio against various San
Francisco officials who had named a park in his honor.127 In the second, the
Fourth District decided the jury hearing Cecil Fielder’s lawsuit against an
interior decorating company had been unduly influenced by Fielder’s
fame.128
XV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

After escaping Cuba and signing a $30 million contract with the
Cincinnati Reds, pitcher Aroldis Chapman found himself sued by four
individuals who claimed they had been tortured by the Cuban government
after Chapman gave false testimony against them to avoid losing his spot on
the Cuban national baseball team.129 Citing the Act of State and political
question doctrines, Chapman moved to dismiss the suit, but the Southern
District found neither defense to be a bar.130

119.
Kaplan, 2009 WL 426277, at *1.
120.
Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 751 (11th Cir. 1997).
121.
Id. at 751–53.
122.
Id. at 754.
123.
Alevizos v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d 8, 10–
11 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
124.
Id. at 11, 13.
125.
Id. at 13.
126.
DiMaggio, LLC v. City & County of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 2d
1359, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Weinstein Design Grp., Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990, 993 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
127.
DiMaggio, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
128.
Weinstein Design Grp., Inc., 884 So. 2d at 995.
129.
Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229, 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
130.
Id. at 1240–42.
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JUDICIAL ETHICS

Broward Circuit Judge John T. Luzzo accepted Florida Marlins
tickets from lawyers who regularly appeared in front of him.131 For this
lapse in judgment, the Judicial Qualifications Commission recommended a
public reprimand, which the Supreme Court of Florida imposed.132
XVII. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
When he was denied overtime, a Sarasota White Sox groundskeeper
sued the team.133 Based on the Fair Labor Standards Act’s “recreational
operator” exemption,134 the Middle District dismissed.135 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.136
In another FLSA case, workers who had helped build the Miami
Marlins’ new stadium sued for wages they claimed they had not received.137
The Southern District dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,138 but
the Eleventh Circuit reversed.139
After officiating a game together at Spoto High School in Riverview,
one umpire filed a report accusing the other umpire of inappropriate
conduct.140 The Umpires Association refused to give the second umpire a
copy of the report but remained willing to hire him for future games.141
Indignant, the second umpire refused to accept any new assignments and
sued the association for embarrassment and loss of income.142 Finding the
plaintiff’s claims to be meritless, the Hillsborough Circuit Court dismissed
them.143
In an action arising out of the Biogenesis steroids scandal, MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig sought testimony from Yuri Sucart, Alex

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 2000).
Id. at 79.
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 592 (11th Cir. 1995).
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3).
Jeffrey, 64 F.3d at 597.
Id. at 592.
Calderon v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 771 F.3d 807, 808–09 (11th Cir.

2014).
138.
Id. at 809.
139.
Id. at 811.
140.
Sousa v. W. Cent. Fla. Umpires Inc., No. 09CA08550, 2010 WL 9606079,
at *1 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Apr. 29, 2010).
141.
Id. at *2.
142.
Id. at *1–2.
143.
Id. at *2.
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Rodriguez’s cousin, and a second man.144 When they moved to quash their
subpoenas, the trial court dismissed for lack of standing.145 On appeal, the
Third District denied for the alternate reason that the petitioners had failed to
prove that the lawsuit was preempted by federal labor law.146
XVIII. LIBEL LAW
In an interview in the Ladies Home Journal, Kelly Ripken, the wife
of Baltimore Orioles shortstop Cal Ripken, implied that a particular woman
was a baseball groupie who wanted to sleep with her husband.147 Taking
offense, the woman sued, but the trial court dismissed.148 On appeal, the
Fourth District affirmed because the comment was “pure opinion.”149
XIX.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW

A student at Braulio Alonso High School in Tampa died from
cardiac arrest during a pre-season baseball workout.150 The jury found that
the doctor who had signed the student’s medical release form was 20%
liable.151 On appeal, the Second District reversed because the student’s
estate failed to establish that the doctor’s actions were a proximate cause of
death.152
XX.

MUNICIPAL FINANCE LAW

In 1966, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled the City of Deerfield
Beach could not build a spring training facility for the Pittsburgh Pirates.153
Thirty-five years later, with public sentiment regarding such projects having

144.
Sucart v. Office of the Comm’r, 129 So. 3d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2013).
145.
Id. at 1114.
146.
Id. at 1113–14.
147.
Morse v. Ripken, 707 So. 2d 921, 921–22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
148.
Id. at 921.
149.
Id. at 921, 923.
150.
Shartz v. Miulli, 127 So. 3d 613, 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review
denied, 148 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 2014).
151.
Id. at 616, 618.
152.
Id. at 618–19, 621. Prior to trial, the family’s lawsuit against various
school officials was dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. Miulli v. Fla. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 998 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
153.
Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 7–8, 12 (Fla. 1966).
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shifted, it held the City of Clearwater could build a spring training facility for
the Philadelphia Phillies.154
When it appeared that Orlando might get an MLB expansion team,
Orange County pledged to build a new stadium using a 1% tourist tax.155 In
response, a group of hotels filed a lawsuit.156 The trial court dismissed their
action as premature, but the Fifth District reversed.157 The matter became
moot after the franchise was awarded to Tampa Bay.158
A decade later, the City of Miami agreed to build a new stadium for
the Florida Marlins.159 Two taxpayers sought but were denied a temporary
injunction prohibiting the City from selling the bonds needed to pay for the
project.160 In dismissing their appeal as moot, the Third District pointed out
that their failure to request an emergency stay had resulted in the bonds being
issued.161
XXI.

OPEN GOVERNMENT LAW

In a case involving St. Petersburg’s failure to land the Chicago
White Sox as a tenant for its new stadium, the Second District ordered the
City to share its records with the public.162 But in a subsequent case
involving the relocation of the Baltimore Orioles’ spring training home from
Fort Lauderdale to Sarasota, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that
Sarasota had not violated any laws by conducting negotiations in private.163

154.
Roper v. City of Clearwater, 796 So. 2d 1159, 1159–60, 1164 (Fla. 2001).
155.
Tamar 7600, Inc. v. Orange Cty., 686 So. 2d 790, 790 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
156.
Id. at 791.
157.
Id. at 791, 793.
158.
Id. at 790, 793; DE QUESADA JR., supra note 1, at 128.
159.
Solares v. City of Miami, 23 So. 3d 227, 227–28 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
160.
Id. at 228.
161.
Id. This decision followed the earlier dismissal of a similar lawsuit
championed by automobile magnate Norman Braman. See Braman v. Miami-Dade Cty., 18
So. 3d 1259, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
162.
Times Publ’g Co. v. City of St. Petersburg, 558 So. 2d 487, 490–91, 495
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). See generally BOB ANDELMAN, STADIUM FOR RENT: TAMPA
BAY’S QUEST FOR MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1993).
163.
Sarasota Citizens for Responsible Gov’t v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d
755, 758, 766 (Fla. 2010).
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XXII. PERSONAL INJURY LAW
In an early case, a Pensacola boy chasing a baseball was seriously
injured when he ran into the street and was hit by a car.164 The jury found for
the youngster, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed due to his
contributory negligence.165 In a much more recent case, the Middle District
held that a van carrying a baseball team was not responsible for a bicyclist’s
injuries.166
In most of Florida’s personal injury baseball cases, the plaintiff
either has been a spectator or a bystander.167 Sometimes, however, the
plaintiff has been a player. For example, when a batter was injured because
the helmet he was wearing failed to protect him, he sued its out-of-state
manufacturer.168 Although the trial court twice found the defendant
amenable to suit in Florida, the First District reversed both times.169

164.
Magee v. Friedricksen, 109 So. 197, 197 (Fla. 1926) (en banc).
165.
Id.
166.
Donaldson v. United States, No. 6:09-CV-1049-ORL-28GJK, 2011 WL
1988803, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2011).
167.
See, e.g., Baker v. Major League Baseball Props., Inc., No.
3:08CV114/MCR, 2009 WL 1098482, at *1, *4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009) (Florida fan injured
at World Baseball Classic in San Diego had to sue in California); Woodford v. City of St.
Petersburg, 84 So. 2d 25, 26–27 (Fla. 1955) (homeowner could sue City for failing to protect
him from baseball-chasing crowd); City of Coral Springs v. Rippe, 743 So. 2d 61, 62, 65 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (jury’s finding that City knew its fences were too short to protect
spectators was reasonable); Collazos v. City of West Miami, 683 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not have been entered in
case involving four-year-old struck by baseball bat); City of Jacksonville v. Raulerson, 415
So. 2d 1303, 1304, 1306 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (whether injured youngster appreciated
dangers posed by baseball chalking machine was a question for the jury); Jackson v. Atlanta
Braves, Inc., 227 So. 2d 63, 63–64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (summary judgment entered
against fan hit by baseball reversed for further fact-finding); City of Bradenton v. Finley, 208
So. 2d 675, 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (City named as third-party defendant in accident
arising from its alleged failure to maintain spring training facility had to be sued in county in
which it was located); Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 765, 768 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (spectator’s suit dismissed because of sovereign immunity); Nielsen v. City of Sarasota,
110 So. 2d 417, 417, 420 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (summary judgment for defendants
appropriate where fan who fell through open space in baseball stadium’s grandstand could not
explain how accident happened); Giordano v. Babe Ruth League, Inc., No. 11CA1352, 2013
WL 6911496, at *1 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. July 10, 2013) (summary judgment granted to defendants
in suit brought by spectator hit in the head by errant warm-up throw).
168.
Am. Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
169.
Id. at 485, 489.
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Three player cases have involved pitching machines.170 In the first,
two friends were sharing a batting cage.171 While taking a swing at a pitch,
one of the friends accidentally hit the other with his bat.172 The injured
friend later sued the facility’s operator, claiming he should have warned
patrons that it was dangerous for two players to be in the cage at the same
time.173 The trial court agreed, but the Second District reversed.174
In the second, a child was injured when a pitching machine’s arm
unexpectedly struck him.175
After his parents sued the machine’s
manufacturer and its distributors, they were counter-sued for contribution.176
Finding that the child had released his parents from liability, the Third
District affirmed the dismissal of the counter-suit.177
In the third, a batter was injured when a pitching machine
malfunctioned.178 After jury selection, one of the defendants settled the case
for $1.1 million.179 It then sought contribution from the other defendants.180
Two of the co-defendants refused to pay and claimed they had defenses that
would have shielded them from any judgment.181 The trial court agreed with
the co-defendants, but the First District reversed.182
XXIII. REAL PROPERTY LAW
As part of its plan to build a new power station, the City of
Jacksonville filed an eminent domain lawsuit to acquire thirty-six acres of
privately-held land.183 Contending that it did not need the entire parcel, the
property’s owner, as well as a baseball team with a subordinate interest,

170.
Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 500 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1986); Dudley Sports Co. v. Berry, 407 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Chambers v. Cline, 161 So. 2d 224, 224–25 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
171.
Chambers, 161 So. 2d at 225.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
Dudley Sports Co., 407 So. 2d at 336.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 337.
178.
Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 500 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1986).
179.
Id. at 666.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id. at 665–66, 668–69 (rejecting manufacturer’s statute of repose defense).
183.
Inland Waterway Dev. Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 38 So. 2d 676, 676–77
(Fla. 1948).
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objected but lost at trial.184 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed.185
In a different action to stop the City of Gulfport from leasing a
portion of Tomlinson Park to a baseball league, the Second District found the
proposed arrangement to be a valid public use.186
When a law transferring Al Lopez Field—the spring training home
of the Cincinnati Reds—from the City of Tampa to the Tampa Sports
Authority was challenged, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the statute as
a proper exercise of the Florida Legislature’s municipal oversight powers.187
In a similar action, a taxpayer sued the City of Fort Myers for failing
to give proper notice of its plan to transfer City of Palms Park—the spring
training home of the Boston Red Sox—to Lee County.188 Finding that the
plaintiff did not have standing, the Second District dismissed.189
In yet another case, a group of North Bay Village homeowners
sought to prevent the construction of a baseball field at Treasure Island
Elementary School, claiming it would create a nuisance.190 The Third
District dismissed the complaint on sovereign immunity grounds.191
XXIV. TAX LAW
In 1948, a husband and wife won a car during a raffle at a Tampa
Smokers baseball game.192 The IRS assessed income taxes, which the couple
paid under protest.193 In court, they argued that a sign at Plant Field had
informed fans that a car would be given away, thereby making the vehicle a
gift.194 Agreeing with this contention, the Southern District ordered the
government to issue a refund.195

184.
Id. at 677.
185.
Id. at 679.
186.
Fla. Little Major League Ass’n v. Gulfport Lion’s Little League, Inc., 127
So. 2d 707, 708, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
187.
State v. Tampa Sports Auth., 188 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 1966).
188.
Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 944 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
189.
Id. at 1093, 1096.
190.
Paredes v. City of North Bay Village, 693 So. 2d 1153, 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
191.
Id. at 1153–54.
192.
Fernandez v. Fahs, 144 F. Supp. 630, 630–31 (S.D. Fla. 1956).
193.
Id. at 630.
194.
Id. at 632.
195.
Id. at 631–32. By the time the court ruled, the Smokers had folded. See
DE QUESADA JR., supra note 1, at 8 (explaining that the team’s last year was 1954).
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When the Hillsborough County Value Adjustment Board granted a
tax break to the New York Yankees’ spring training facility in Tampa, the
Hillsborough County property appraiser challenged the decision.196 The trial
court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing.197 On appeal, the Second
District affirmed.198 In later proceedings, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the Second District.199
Because of a back-loaded contract, the New York Mets owed
deferred compensation to outfielder Darryl Strawberry.200 When the team
sought to make the first payment, both the IRS and Strawberry’s former wife
stepped forward.201 Agreeing with the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
the Northern District found for the IRS as the first-in-time creditor.202
XXV. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
Generally speaking, professional athletes are entitled to receive
workers’ compensation.203 Two Florida cases have authorized such
benefits,204 and two others have rejected procedural attempts to block such
claims.205
XXVI. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing makes clear, Florida’s courts have been in the
middle of almost every conceivable type of baseball-related dispute. What
sorts of cases will they handle in the future? Although prognostications
always are fraught with risk, it seems likely that actions involving injured

196.
Turner v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth., 739 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
197.
Id. at 177.
198.
Id. at 179–80.
199.
Fuchs v. Robbins, 818 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 2002).
200.
Colon v. Strawberry, No. 4:12-CV-101 MCR/CAS, 2013 WL 7023169, at
*1–2 (N.D. Fla. July 26, 2013).
201.
Id. at *3.
202.
Id. at *4.
203.
WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., SPORTS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 256 (4th ed.
2011).
204.
Miles v. Montreal Baseball Club, 379 So. 2d 1325, 1325–26 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (infielder injured at a team press party); Sielicki v. New York Yankees, 388
So. 2d 25, 25–26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (pitcher forced into early retirement due to arm
strain).
205.
Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115, 1115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (statute of limitations); Detroit Tigers v. Castillo, 843 So. 2d 1026, 1026 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (venue).
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fans will continue to be brought, especially if the nascent movement to
jettison the venerable “Baseball Rule”—which protects stadium operators
from liability for balls that leave the field and hit spectators—takes root in
Florida.206
A number of lawsuits will arise if the Tampa Bay Rays decide to
exercise their new-found right to depart Tropicana Field early.207 Indeed, it
almost is a certainty that a group of wary taxpayers will challenge whatever
funding mechanism is used to finance the project. Moreover, if the
negotiations are not transparent, an open government lawsuit is practically a
given. And, of course, at least some residents will seek to force the club to
fully honor its existing lease.208
The minimum wage litigation taking place in California between
minor league players and MLB has enormous potential ramifications for
Florida. The players contend they are being grossly underpaid in violation of
federal law.209 If they prevail, the continued financial viability of one or
more of Florida’s minor league teams could be in jeopardy.
Just before the start of the 2015 season, MLB punished Miami
Marlins pitcher Jarred Cosart after rumors spread that he had bet on
baseball.210 Nevertheless, MLB and the country’s three other major sports
leagues are getting closer to dropping their longstanding opposition to sports
gambling.211 This will have significant implications for Florida’s casinos,

206.
The Baseball Rule was announced in Crane v. Kansas City Baseball &
Exhibition Co. and quickly gained widespread acceptance. 153 S.W. 1076, 1077–78 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1913). Four recent cases, however, have called it into question. See Coomer v. Kansas
City Royals Baseball Corp., 437 S.W.3d 184, 197–98 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); S. Shore
Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 907–09 (Ind. 2014); Rountree v. Boise Baseball,
L.L.C., 296 P.3d 373, 376 (Idaho 2013); Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. F.F., 761
S.E.2d 613, 616 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Florida
has not had to construe the Baseball Rule.
207.
Charlie Frago, City, Rays Break Logjam on Stadium, TAMPA BAY TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2016, at 1 (explaining that after nearly a decade of negotiations, the City of St.
Petersburg has authorized the Rays to leave Tropicana Field before their lease ends in 2027).
208.
For on-going coverage of the Rays’ efforts to find a new home, see Noah
Pransky, Shadow of the Stadium, http://shadowofthestadium.blogspot.com.
209.
Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991–92
(N.D. Cal. 2015).
210.
Craig Davis, MLB Fines Cosart but Finds No Baseball Bets, SUNSENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2015, at 5C. Concluding he had gambled on other sports but not baseball,
MLB fined Cosart an undisclosed amount of money. Id.
211.
Barry Svrluga, Unafraid of Change, Rob Manfred Steps to Plate, Faces
Pitches on Pace of Play, Gambling, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/02/05/unafraid-of-change-rob-manfred
-steps-to-plate-faces-pitches-on-pace-of-play-gambling (“Adam Silver, who has been the
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which undoubtedly will lobby state legislators for permission to operate
sports books.212
President Obama’s decision at the end of 2014 to normalize relations
with Cuba will have important consequences for baseball in general and
Florida in particular. Already, there is talk of holding spring training games
in Cuba.213 Many baseball fans—especially those in South Florida—will
travel to such games, and it is not difficult to imagine some of these road
trips ending in lawsuits if something goes wrong.
Lastly, baseball is seemingly a topic of conversation every time
Florida’s lawmakers meet. During its 2015 regular session, for example, the
Florida Legislature helped advance construction of a joint-use facility for the
Houston Astros and Washington Nationals in West Palm Beach by
approving needed zoning changes.214 It also considered bills relaxing the
transfer rules for high school athletes,215 imposing new restrictions on ticket
resellers,216 punishing disruptive youth sports coaches,217 and requiring the
state to regularly assess its efforts to retain MLB spring training sites.218
Additionally, to mark the sixtieth anniversary of Roberto Clemente’s big
league debut, the Florida Senate passed a resolution honoring the Pittsburgh
Pirates’ Hall of Fame right fielder.219

NBA’s commissioner just more than a year, has embraced the idea of legalizing sports
gambling, and he has discussed that with his counterparts in baseball, football and hockey.”).
212.
Of course, even if MLB greenlights gambling on its games, Florida’s
casinos will not be able to operate sports books until the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, either is repealed by Congress or struck
down by the courts. A challenge to the statute currently is pending before the full Third
Circuit in Philadelphia. See Joe Drape, Court Will Reconsider Its Ban on Sports Betting in
New Jersey, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2015, at B17.
213.
Manfred Foresees Teams Visiting Cuba, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 11, 2015, at
1C.
214.
Joe Capozzi, Scott’s Pen Clears Way for Stadium, PALM BEACH POST,
June 11, 2015, at 1B.
215.
Dan Sweeney, Bill Gives Young Athletes Options on Where to Play:
Possibility of Creating ‘Powerhouse’ High Schools a Fear, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 29, 2015, at
1A.
216.
Dan Sweeney, Lawmakers Want to Ban Bots for Ticket Resellers,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 2015, at 8A.
217.
Sean Rossman, Bill Boots Unruly Coaches, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT
(Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/31/bill-boots-unrulycoaches/70732638.
218.
H.B. 7067, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015); S.B. 1214, 2015 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2015) (amending FLA. STAT. § 288.0001 to require triennial reports by the Office
of Economic and Demographic Research and the Office of Program Policy Analysis and
Government Accountability).
219.
S. Res. 1666, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015).
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Farther afield, the Florida House of Representatives voted to let
private adoption agencies refuse to place children with same-sex couples.220
This much-criticized step came just weeks after the Tampa Bay Rays urged
the Supreme Court of the United States to recognize gay marriages,221 and
MLB, in response to Indiana’s new religious restoration statute, which many
observers viewed as an attack on LGBT rights, issued a press release
condemning discrimination in any form.222

220.
Gray Rohrer, House Bill Has Tax Cuts, Gay-Adoption Controversy,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 10, 2015, at 1B.
221.
Roger Mooney, Rays Backing Gay Marriage in Supreme Court Cases,
TAMPA TRIB. (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.tbo.com/news/crime/rays-backing-gay-marriage-insupreme-court-cases-20150306.
222.
Lucy McCalmont, MLB Responds to Indiana’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Law,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/01/mlb-indianalaw_n_6987220.html.
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INTRODUCTION

This Survey discusses major Florida evidentiary case law
developments during the 2014 calendar year.1 As in most years since the
Florida Evidence Code’s (“the Code”) passage, few significant statutory
changes occurred in 2014.2 Florida attorneys must continue to look to the
state’s appellate courts for guidance on the Code and other evidentiary
related issues.* As with most survey years, not every recent decision merits
discussion.* Cases have been selected for discussion in this Survey on the
basis of three criteria: (1) the case represents a new or relatively new
evidentiary development, (2) the case provides a good example of
fundamental principles in a certain area, or (3) evidentiary issues in a
particular area arose so commonly, that they are important for discussion to
both practitioners and the courts.3 As a service to readers, the author notes
that the following evidentiary areas, not discussed in the Survey’s main text,
generated opinions during 2014:4 judicial notice,5 accident report privilege,6
*
J.D., 1973, Catholic University; L.L.M., 1977, Temple University. M.
Dobson is a member of the Florida Bar and is also admitted to practice in Kansas. He is a
professor of law at Nova Southeastern University.
1.
See infra Parts II–VII.
2.
In 2014, the Florida Legislature made four changes to the Code. See Act
effective Oct. 1, 2014, ch. 2014-160, § 15, 2014 Fla. Laws 2157, 2190–91; Act effective Oct.
1, 2014, ch. 2014-200, § 1, 2014 Fla. Laws 2632, 2633; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 201419, § 30, 2014 Fla. Laws 299, 325; Act effective May 12, 2014, ch. 2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla.
Laws 676, 678. Three of these were extremely minor. Chapter 2014-160, Florida Laws,
amended section 90.404 of the Florida Statutes, by changing statutory references in
subsections (2)(b)(2) and (c)(2). See FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014). Chapter 2014-19, Florida
Laws, deleted obsolete provisions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in section 90.503 of
the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503. Finally, chapter 2014-200, Florida Laws, made
minor changes and deletions to the hearsay exception for statements of elderly persons or
disabled adults in section 90.803(24) of the Florida Statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803. The
only significant statutory change was made in section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes
concerning the propriety and nature of taking judicial notice. See FLA. STAT. § 90.204.
Chapter 2014-35, Florida Laws, added a fourth subsection to this rule, providing for the
emergency taking of judicial notice in family law cases. See id. § 90.204(4).
3.
See infra Parts II–VII.
4.
See infra Parts II–VII. The author does not claim this footnoted list is a
complete catalogue of all evidentiary issues discussed in the 2014 decisions. For example,
neither the Survey’s main text nor this list includes cases discussing expert testimony.
5.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.201–.204. When judicial notice is taken of
information not offered in open court, fairness requires the parties to be given a chance to
challenge it and to offer contradictory proof. Id. In Glaister v. Glaister, the court found a
general master in a domestic relations case erred sua sponte by taking judicial notice of an IRS
tax guide without affording a challenge opportunity as required by section 90.204(3) of the
Florida Statutes. Glaister v. Glaister, 137 So. 3d 513, 516–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014);
see also FLA. STAT. § 90.204(3).
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informer privilege, 7 litigation privilege, 8 trade secrets, 9 impeachment on
collateral matters,10 impeachment by showing potential bias,11 impeachment

As mentioned above in note 1, the 2014 Florida Legislature added a fourth
subsection to section 90.204 of the Florida Statutes, providing for the emergency taking of
judicial notice in family law cases when imminent danger to persons or property exists. Ch.
2014-35, § 2, 2014 Fla. Laws at 678 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 90.204(4)); see also supra note
1 and accompanying text.
6.
See FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4). In Wetherington v. State, the defendant’s
felony driving under the influence conviction was reversed because the trial court erroneously
allowed the investigating police officer to testify to statements Wetherington made identifying
himself as the driver of a crashed vehicle in a one car accident. Wetherington v. State, 135
So. 3d 584, 585, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). These statements were made before either
the defendant waived his Miranda rights or otherwise waived his privilege against selfincrimination. Id. at 586 n.1. This violated the accident report privilege. Id. at 586; see also
FLA. STAT. § 316.066.
7.
See State v. Powell, 140 So. 3d 1126, 1127, 1130 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (arising from the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari requesting reversal of a trial
court’s order to disclose the identity of confidential informants who provided police
information used in an application for a wiretap). The State’s general privilege in withholding
a confidential informant’s identity can only be overcome if either the informant will be a
witness at trial or if disclosing the informant’s identity is essential to a fair determination of
the case. Id. As the only purpose of disclosure was to provide information to contest probable
cause for issuance of the wiretap application, identity disclosure was not constitutionally
required. Id. at 1132.
For a recent short article discussing the informer’s privilege, see Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Trial Tactics: Informant Privilege, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2015, at 60.
8.
See Pomfret v. Atkinson, 137 So. 3d 1161, 1162–64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2014). Although there is no absolute privilege for an attorney’s alleged defamatory
statements during ex-parte, out-of-court statements to a potential, non-party witness, such
statements may be protected by a qualified privilege. Id. When the statements have some
relation to an underlying lawsuit, the party alleging defamation must show express malice. Id.
at 1164. Express malice means that the statements were made with a desire to harm the
person allegedly defamed. Id.; R.H. Ciccone Props., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
141 So. 3d 590, 591–92 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (specifying that the litigation privilege
did not support the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s quiet title action against a bank
after the bank voluntarily dismissed its foreclosure action against the appellant).
9.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.506 (generally protecting trade secrets as privileged,
as long as recognizing the “privilege will not conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice”).
This section does not define what is a trade secret, leaving this instead to section 688.002 of
the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4). When information is claimed to be a trade
secret, the court must first decide if it qualifies as such, and then hold a hearing on its
disclosure, and on how it is necessary to determine the underlying issues in the litigation. See
Bright House Networks, LLC v. Cassidy, 129 So. 3d 501, 505–06 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (finding that customer lists not publicly available can be trade secrets, thus requiring an
in camera review to determine such, and to also determine the opposing party’s need to access
them for the litigation).
For another recent case involving disclosure of trade secrets, see Laser Spring Inst.,
LLC v. Greer, 144 So. 3d 633, 633–34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), finding that billing and
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with prior inconsistent statements, 12 the rape shield statute, 13 the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, 14 authentication of photographs taken
collection documents which admittedly were trade secrets could not be ordered disclosed
without a hearing making particularized findings for their need.
10.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.608(5) (permitting “[p]roof by other witnesses that
material facts are not as testified to by [a] witness”). This language forbids impeachment by
offering contradictory proof on purely collateral matters, introduced only to contradict the
witness’s testimony on a minor point. See id. What is collateral or not must necessarily be
determined on a case-by-case basis. See Anderson v. State, 133 So. 3d 646, 647–48 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1006 (2015) (finding that whether a sexual
battery victim wore jogging clothes or pajamas at the time of the alleged attack was collateral,
even if the victim’s characterization of her dress as jogging clothes was false); Cokely v.
State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1208–09 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the witness’s
proffered testimony would not have been collateral, as it would have contradicted the victim’s
direct examination testimony related to the material contested issue of whether the victim had
been trespassing on the defendant’s property before the defendant allegedly attacked the
victim).
One area where the Florida courts have held as a matter of law that proof will never
be considered collateral is where it demonstrates potential bias. Id.
11.
See Brown v. Mittelman, 152 So. 3d 602, 604–05 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (finding that the financial relationship between a treating doctor and a referring
plaintiff’s law firm is discoverable as potential bias evidence in a negligence case).
12.
See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 377–79 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 1406 (2015) (finding that the trial court only harmlessly erred in sustaining objection to
the attempted impeachment of a witness by using another person’s statement).
13.
FLA. STAT. § 794.022. This section, commonly known as the Rape Shield
Statute, although not part of the Code, is clearly meant to regulate proof in some criminal
cases. See id.; Cooper v. State, 137 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). While the
section forbids the introduction of a victim’s prior sexual acts with persons other than the
defendant, by its explicit terms, it does so only in sexual battery prosecution cases under
section 794.011 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2). Thus, when such acts are
asked about in cases not being brought under this chapter, section 794.022 of the Florida
Statues does not forbid the inquiry, despite a charge’s sexually related nature. Id. § 794.022;
see also Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531 (arguing that where the state confessed on appeal that
section 794.022 of the Florida Statutes should not have prohibited cross-examination of a
victim about her prior sexual experiences in a lewd and lascivious molestation and battery
case). Despite this confession of error, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to reverse
because the defense had not argued the section’s inapplicability at trial when the State
objected to the defense’s inquiry. Cooper, 137 So. 3d at 531–32. Furthermore, the defense
had not proffered what the defense’s questions would have revealed. Id. at 531 n.1. The
Fourth District summarily rejected the argument that excluding the potential testimony was
fundamental error. Id. at 531.
The result in Cooper illustrates the requirements that are ignored all too often by
trial counsel. See id. The contemporaneous objection rule requires that counsel object
promptly, precisely, and correctly when seeking to exclude evidence. FLA. STAT. § 90.104.
On the other side, when an objection is made, the attorney wishing to introduce certain
information must correctly explain to the trial court why the objection should be overruled.
See id. If the objection is sustained, the proponent of the information must make an adequate
offer of proof to preserve the issue for appeal. See id. Failure to satisfy any of these
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from videotapes,15 sequestration of witnesses,16 lay opinion testimony,17 and
various hearsay rule issues.18
requirements will almost always lead to an appellate court declining to address an evidentiary
issue. E.g., McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078–79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). As
Cooper also shows, fundamental error arguments are often given short shrift and rarely lead to
reversals. See 137 So. 3d at 531–32. Furthermore, the defense had not proffered what its
questions would have revealed. See id. at 531 n.1.
14.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applied to the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965)). The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees an accused the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Id.
Several cases during this Survey period briefly discussed the scope of this clause’s
protection. E.g., McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 879 (Fla. 2014). Although the clause
protects the accused against the admission of testimonial hearsay in a criminal trial, it does not
protect against the State using all non-cross-examined hearsay. Id. at 882. Particularly, when
the defendant’s own statement constitutes the hearsay, the Confrontation Clause will not bar
its use by the prosecution. Id. (finding no evidentiary error in the State using a selfrepresented defendant’s opening statement at trial against him as evidence of guilt); Peterson
v. State, 129 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that an automobile’s
computer-generated air bag control system report was non-testimonial, as it was nonaccusatory and did not describe any specific wrongdoing). Although the court did not reject
the defendant’s argument on this basis, the author believes a better ground is that the report
was not hearsay to begin with, as it did not constitute an assertion by any person. See FLA.
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a); Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453. Thus, there was no statement under the
definition of the hearsay rule. Peterson, 129 So. 3d at 453 (defining statement); see also FLA.
STAT. § 90.801(1)(a).
The right to confrontation does not protect an accused against the introduction of
physical evidence or testimony about unavailable physical evidence. See Yero v. State, 138
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation
when the State introduced testimony from several witnesses who described how a theft
defendant had appeared on subsequently destroyed video evidence). The video had been
overwritten before the State was able to secure it for trial. Id. at 1183. However, Yero’s
confrontation rights were satisfied by his ability to cross-examine at trial the witness who
testified about the tape’s contents. Id. at 1184.
15.
See Lerner v. Halegua, 154 So. 3d 445, 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(finding that to admit still photographs taken of frames from a video surveillance tape,
someone who knew about the operation and storage procedures for the tape was necessary to
authenticate them to show their reliability).
16.
FLA. STAT. § 90.616(1). Although this rule provides for the sequestration
of witnesses upon a party request or a court order, it does not specify what remedies there are
for violation of a sequestration order. Id.
In Cokely v. State, a proposed defense witness violated the trial court’s sequestration
order by being present at a pre-trial stand-your-ground defense hearing and hearing an alleged
battery victim testify. Cokely v. State, 138 So. 3d 1204, 1205–07 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014). At trial, the court, as a matter of law, excluded this witness’s testimony for violating
its order without holding any hearing into the violation’s circumstances. Id. at 1207 n.4. The
Fourth District reversed the defendant’s subsequent conviction. Id. at 1209.
In this situation, trial courts need to balance the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to present a defense against violation of the court’s sequestration order. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; Cokely, 138 So. 3d at 1208. This requires the trial court to determine first,
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RELEVANCY AND ITS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section 90.401 of the Code states that information that tends “to
prove or disprove a material fact” is relevant. 19 Beyond this brief statement,
relevancy cannot be defined by any code or set of rules. Relevancy contains
two sub-categories: materiality and probative value.20 Materiality is usually
a function of either the underlying claims and defenses in a particular lawsuit
or of matters properly affecting witnesses’ credibility. 21
Whether
information tends to prove or disprove 22 a material fact, and thus, is
probative, depends upon the strength or weakness of the logical connection
between the information and what it is offered to prove.23
Since relevancy is mainly a function of logical deduction and
substantive law, altering facts even slightly can affect information’s potential
relevancy greatly. 24 Thus, cases discussing relevancy in general under
whether the defendant or defense counsel had been involved in causing the violation, and
second, even if there was active defense involvement, the violation’s effect on the witness’s
proposed testimony. Id. If the witness’s testimony would not have been substantially affected
by hearing what the witness should not have heard, complete witness’s exclusion is too harsh
a remedy. See id. Since the trial court never held any hearing on these issues, its virtually
automatic exclusion of the witness was erroneous. See id. at 1209.
17.
FLA. STAT. § 90.701 (permitting lay opinion testimony if doing so is
necessary to convey the witness’s testimony and the opinions “do not require a special
knowledge, skill, experience, or training”). Two cases during this Survey discussed this rule.
See Alvarez v. State, 147 So. 3d 537, 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Herring v. State, 132
So. 3d 342, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). In Herring, the court found that witnesses who
knew and had seen the defendant around the time he had killed his father should have been
allowed to give their opinion as to his sanity. See 132 So. 3d at 344–46. The witnesses were
the defendant’s mother and a police officer, who apparently came to the victim’s home shortly
after the killing while the defendant was still there. Id. at 344. However, the error was found
harmless. Id. at 346.
However, in Alvarez, the same district court of appeal found reversible error in
letting a police officer, testifying as a lay witness, give his opinion as to the skin color and
race of a robbery and murder perpetrator who was captured on surveillance tape during the
crime. 147 So. 3d at 538–39, 544. The tape was admitted into evidence; thus the jurors could
view it just as well as the officer and come to their own conclusions as to what it showed. See
id. at 539, 542. The officer’s opinion was thus unnecessary, and any opinion as to identity
should have been let to the jurors. See id. at 542.
18.
See infra Part VII.
19.
FLA. STAT. § 90.401.
20.
Id.
21.
1 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, EHRHARDT’S FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 401.1 (2014
ed.).
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
See id. There is a common assertion that no item of information is
inherently relevant. See id. As a general proposition, this saying is correct. See 1 EHRHARDT,
supra note 21, at § 401.1.
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section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes seldom have much precedential value
as they are so fact specific. During this Survey period, no case discussing
general relevancy alone under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes was
unusual enough to merit extended discussion.
However, general relevancy is not the end of the story for
admissibility under the Code. Once logical relevancy requirements have
been satisfied, the Code expresses a preference that “[a]ll relevant evidence
[be] admi[tted] except as provided by law.”25 This language encompasses
reasons extending from evidence being excluded because of its substantive
nature, such as hearsay or privilege, to evidence being excluded because of
procedurally related problems, such as a question being asked outside the
scope of cross-examination or evidence being offered to bolster a witness’s
character for truthfulness before the witness’s credibility has been attacked.
The substantive reason for excluding evidence that would otherwise be
admissible under section 90.401 of the Florida Statutes may also stem from
the information’s inherently prejudicial nature or the potential the evidence
has for being confusing.26 In certain specific situations, the Code expressly
provides for the exclusion of otherwise probative information.27
No statutory scheme or evidence code can possibly specify every
factual instance where evidence should be excluded because of its prejudicial
or confusing nature. The Code generally follows the Federal Rules of
Evidence by providing for exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence when
“its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.”28
There are two important points which should be remembered about
this language. First, only unfairly prejudicial types of evidence merit
exclusion. 29 Evidence that fairly hurts the other side’s case or fairly
advances the case of the proponent should not be excluded. Second, even
25.
FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (2014).
26.
Id. § 90.401.
27.
See id. § 90.407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when offered “to prove negligence, the existence of a product defect, or culpable conduct in
connection with [an] event” causing injury or harm). During this Survey period, no reported
cases discussed this exclusionary rule. See id. § 90.401; supra Part I.
28.
FLA. STAT. § 90.403. Unlike the Code, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 also
includes undue delay and wasting time as other reasons for exclusions. FED. R. EVID. 403.
But see FLA. STAT. § 90.403. Section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes includes an additional
sentence that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 does not. Compare FLA. STAT. § 90.403, with
FED. R. EVID. 403. The section expressly provides that it “shall not be construed to mean that
evidence of the existence of available third-party benefits is inadmissible.” FLA. STAT. §
90.403.
29.
See id.
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unfairly prejudicial evidence will not be excluded unless its unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs any probative value the information has. 30
There is a preference for admission when the balance between
relevancy and prejudice, or other section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes
concerns, is close or even. Only a fairly gross disproportion of section
90.403’s general concerns merits excluding any relevant evidence. As with
cases discussing logical relevancy, cases discussing section 90.403 are likely
to be so fact bound that their precedential value is questionable. However,
one decision during 2014, refusing to reverse a death sentence for admission
of potentially unfair prejudicial evidence, merits discussion.31
Unfair prejudice exists when certain evidence is likely to arouse the
jurors’ emotion in a way that would lead them to decide a matter on an
improper basis.32 Poole v. State (Poole II)33 certainly has to potentially be
considered such a situation, if one ever existed.34 Poole was convicted of
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, armed
robbery, and sexual battery. 35 The two victims, Loretta White and Noah
Scott who lived together,36 went to sleep late one night after playing video
games at their mobile home.37 Later that night, White woke up with Mark
Poole on top of her pushing a pillow down on her face. 38 He started to
sexually assault her, and White begged him to stop and physically resisted.39
30.
Id. The words any probative value are purposefully used here to illustrate
a very simple but often overlooked point with regard to arguments on admissibility. See id.
When arguing relevancy issues, attorneys should be careful to do so in a logical order. If an
attorney first argues that information should be excluded because its probative value is
outweighed because of section 90.403 concerns, the attorney has implicitly conceded the
information’s relevancy. See id. § 90.403. To then next argue the same information should be
excluded under section 90.401 makes no sense. See FLA. STAT. § 90.401. If information has
no relevancy under section 90.401, the considerations in section 90.403 do not matter. Id. §§
90.401, .403. The information should be excluded for lack of helpfulness to begin with. See
id. § 90.401.
31.
Poole v. State (Poole II), 151 So. 3d 402, 414–19 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015).
32.
Id. at 414. For example, deciding a case on the basis of a party’s sexual
orientation, race, or religion. Id. at 409; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
33.
151 So. 3d 402 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052 (2015).
34.
See id. at 414–16.
35.
Id. at 405.
36.
Poole v. State (Poole I), 997 So. 2d 382, 387 (Fla. 2008). The two victims
obviously had different last names. Id. Whether they were married to each other is not stated
in either opinion discussing the case. Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387.
This fact is however completely irrelevant to the charges against the defendant. Poole II, 151
So. 3d at 406; Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 387.
37.
Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
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Poole then struck her several times with a tire iron, severing one finger and
part of another finger from her hand.40 Scott woke up, attempted to help
White, and in turn he was beaten by Poole with the tire iron.41 Scott died
from the blunt force head trauma suffered in this beating.42 Poole finally left,
and White passed out from his attacks. 43 She recovered early the next
morning and called the police who came and found Scott dead.44 Besides
losing the fingers, White suffered multiple face and head wounds plus a
concussion.45 The evidence against Poole was extremely strong46—so strong
that at trial his defense counsel in closing argument conceded his guilt on the
sexual battery, robbery, and burglary charges.47 However, defense counsel
argued he was not the person who inflicted the other injuries on the two
victims.48 Not surprisingly, a jury convicted Poole of all charges and after a
sentencing hearing, recommended death by a twelve to zero vote.49 The trial
judge agreed with the jury and imposed a death sentence.50
On direct appeal in Poole v. State (Poole I),51 the Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed the defendant’s conviction but vacated the sentence and
remanded for another hearing.52 Although Poole argued numerous errors had
affected the fairness of the guilt phase of his trial, the court found that
defense counsel’s failure to make contemporaneous objections waived many
of these points for appeal.53 On the one point, defense counsel had promptly
objected to an erroneous comment on the defendant’s silence at trial in
closing argument, the Supreme Court of Florida found the trial court had not
abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial.54 But when it came to
the claimed errors in the sentencing hearing, the Supreme Court of Florida
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 406.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. Witnesses placed Poole near the trial the night of the attack. Poole II,
151 So. 3d at 406. He was found with several items stolen from the trailer and was found to
have sold several others. Id. at 407. DNA evidence from a vaginal swab matched him to
White’s attack, and other scientific evidence, such as fingerprints and blood stains, connected
him to the crimes. Id.
47.
Poole I, 997 So. 2d 382, 390 (Fla. 2008).
48.
Id.
49.
Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 407.
50.
Id.
51.
997 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2008).
52.
Id. at 397.
53.
Id. at 390–91. Many of these claims of error involved the prosecutor’s
statements in the closing argument, commenting on Poole’s silence after arrest and on his
failure to testify at trial. Id. at 391.
54.
Id. at 389.
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reached a different result.55 Here, the court found that the defense counsel’s
objections to improper cross-examination of the defense witness, about
Poole’s prior convictions that were not statutory aggravating factors and
about the content of a tattoo on Poole’s stomach that said Thug Life, required
reversal for a new sentencing proceeding.56
A new sentencing hearing was held, after which the jury voted
eleven to one for death, and the trial court again sentenced Poole
accordingly.57 On appeal from this second sentence, the Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed the sentence.58 Again, defense counsel failed to preserve
certain issues for appeal, either by not making prompt contemporaneous
objections 59 or by not making certain legal arguments at the trial court
level.60 However, one preserved issue brought up the issue of the evidence’s
probative value versus potentially unfair prejudicial effect in a starkly
dramatic fashion.
At the new sentencing, the State introduced a jar of formalin liquid
containing White’s severed fingertip.61 The defense apparently objected to
this as unfairly prejudicial.62 What exactly was the prosecutor’s response to
the objection at trial is unfortunately not clear from the Supreme Court of
Florida’s opinion. In the Court’s words, “the prosecutor offered no credible
reason as to why the severed fingertip was relevant to any issue in the
penalty phase, much less any issue in dispute.”63 This language can be read
in two ways. One, when the defense objected at trial, the prosecutor could
not credibly articulate why the fingertip was relevant. Two, the prosecutor
did specify a reason for admitting the fingertip at trial, but the defense just
did not agree it was a credible one. If the Court meant the first interpretation,
the remainder of its opinion is incredibly disturbing. If the prosecutor could
indeed articulate no credible reason for admission at trial, then any reason
55.
56.
57.

See Poole I, 997 So. 2d at 391.
Id. at 393.
Poole II, 151 So. 3d 402, 408 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2052

(2015).
58.
Id. at 405.
59.
See id. at 413. These missed objections were the failure to make
contemporaneous objections to the prosecutor’s comments in the closing, disparaging the
testimony of the defendant’s family members as all that crap, to the prosecution’s potential
mischaracterizing intoxication evidence, and to the prosecution’s legally erroneous comments
about merger of the aggravating circumstances. Id. at 415–17.
60.
Id. at 413. Defense counsel’s failure to make legal arguments at trial that
the State’s impermissible disparate questioning of prospective jurors had led to a racially
impermissible use of preemptory challenges and waived this issue for appeal. Poole II, 151
So. 3d at 413–14.
61.
Id. at 414.
62.
Id.
63.
Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 414.
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given then and any reason the State came up with on appeal is arguably
disingenuous. A more favorable reading is the alternative, that the State had
a reason but the defense just did not find it a credible one.64
Regardless of which alternative reading one chooses, the remainder
of the Court’s opinion on this issue merits close inspection and criticism.
The Court began by instructively laying out the process trial judges should
follow when ruling on section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes objections.65
This process involves two steps.66 “[T]he trial judge must first determine
that the evidence is relevant for a specific purpose.”67 Then, the Court “must
weigh the importance of the evidence to the specific purpose, against the
possibility that the evidence will unfairly prejudice” the other side. 68 In
Poole II, the defense objected to the fingertip being unfairly prejudicial in
general and specifically objected to admitting the natural fingernails with the
skin attached.69 The trial court rejected this, saying the fingertip was not
difficult to look at, not unpleasant, and had no blood on it.70 Nowhere in the
opinion is there any specific purpose that the trial court determined the tip
was relevant for, nor does the Supreme Court of Florida mention any explicit
weighing process the trial court went through.
Despite this, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion articulates its
own basis for admission.71 As the fingertip “was severed during the same
criminal episode at issue in this penalty phase,”72 and it was “relevant to the
amount of force used during the attempted . . . murder,”73 it was relevant.74
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida supplied its own specific purpose for
relevancy, despite the State’s potential inability to do so, and the trial judge’s
apparent failure to do likewise. Even if the State had articulated these two
purposes, the two-step process still requires the weighing contemplated by
step two. Amazingly, the Supreme Court of Florida totally ignores this step
and merely finds the fingertip’s admission was not an abuse of discretion.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion ignores the very two-step
process it had articulated should be done only paragraphs earlier!
Since the Supreme Court of Florida did not do the second step of the
weighing process, it is appropriate to discuss what might have been the result
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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Id. at 414.
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had it done so. Assuming the fingertip had some relevancy, how necessary
was its introduction to the State’s case? Put another way, would refusing to
admit the severed fingertip as an exhibit have deprived the State of its fair
opportunity to argue about the amount of force Poole used in committing his
crimes? The State still could have produced testimony about the fingertip
being severed and arguably would have had to do so to authenticate the
exhibit. Thus, admission of the actual fingertip was to some extent
cumulative to the voice testimony. Furthermore, assuming the victim,
White, testified at the hearing,75 she might have been able to hold up her
hand to show the jurors where her fingers had been severed,76 or there might
have been photographs of her hand available. What is the potential unfair
prejudicial effect? Obviously, the jury might become irrationally inflamed
by seeing the fingertip, both during the admission of evidence and during its
deliberations where they would have it available as an exhibit.
By not following the very process its own opinion sets forth, the
Court never addresses the balancing question of relevancy versus unfair
prejudice. Even more, by rendering the decision on this point that the court
did, it arguably promotes bad lawyering. The prosecution had already been
reversed once because of the errors it created.77 One would think it would
have been extra careful to not do so again, but reading this opinion’s
description of what the prosecution did gives a different impression. Finally,
by rendering its decision on the basis it does, the Supreme Court of Florida
also may send a message to trial judges that they will be protected from bad
decisions. In fairness to the Poole II opinion, it did conclude this matter by
finding that any error would have been harmless anyways.78
Precedents and decisions send messages beyond just this is what the
law is. Poole II could easily send the message that such potentially
excessive lawyering will not only be excused by finding it harmless error in
some cases, but also encouraged, by not finding it error to begin with. One
hopes that this is not the standard type of lawyering a court would want to
promote.

75.
Id. If she did not, then how did the State authenticate the exhibit? Poole
II, 151 So. 3d at 414–15.
76.
See id. The crimes took place the evening of October 12 through 13 of
2001. Id. at 406. I say might here because White could have had cosmetic surgery done on
her hand, so just displaying it would not accurately show the force. Id. at 414–15. Still, her
testimony about this would have been available. See id.
77.
See Poole II, 151 So. 3d at 408.
78.
See id. at 418–19.
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SPECIAL RELEVANCY CONCERNS

Statements in Plea Negotiations

Section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes protects offers to plead guilty,
pleas of nolo contendere, and withdrawn guilty pleas from admission in any
civil cases and most criminal cases.79 It also protects against admission of
statements made in connection with negotiations for these pleas. 80 The
purpose behind this protection is to encourage the state and defense to
engage in plea discussions and to resolve more charges without full-blown
trials whenever possible.81 Promoting free discussion in negotiations without
having the fear one’s words will come back to haunt a party is thought to
further these two goals.82
However, section 90.410 of the Florida Statutes does not define what
should be considered plea negotiations—or to use the statute’s words,
“statements made in connection with any of the [covered] pleas or offers.”83
Thus, parties may still, on occasion, unwittingly make careless
statements about possible plea offers that come back to haunt them. As most
criminal defense lawyers also know, sometimes accused parties can become
some of their own worst enemies. Both these principles were recently
illustrated by a decision briefly discussing section 90.410 of the Florida
Statutes. In Bass v. State,84 the State charged the defendant with seconddegree murder and armed robbery.85 Sometime before trial, Bass had been
incarcerated, and defense counsel received a potential twenty-year plea offer
from the State.86 Counsel transmitted this potential plea offer to Bass, who
decided he wanted to first talk to his mother about it.87 The facts do not
indicate whether defense counsel knew of Bass’s desire to do this. Bass
talked to his mother about the offer the day after defense counsel told Bass

79.
FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014). It does not, however, protect against
admission of guilty pleas that have not been withdrawn. See id. Federal Rule of Evidence
410—the federal counterpart—covers the same types of pleas and statements made in plea
negotiations, but it does not offer as broad a protection against admission in all cases.
Compare FED. R. EVID. 410, with FLA. STAT. § 90.410.
80.
FLA. STAT. § 90.410.
81.
See FED. R. EVID. 410; FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v. Herman, 544
F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1977).
82.
See Herman, 544 F.2d at 796.
83.
FLA. STAT. § 90.410.
84.
147 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d
507 (Fla. 2015).
85.
Id. at 1034.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
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about it.88 Unfortunately for Bass, the State recorded his phone discussion89
with his mother and later offered it at his trial and again, in the State’s
closing argument90 to show Bass’s consciousness of his own guilt.91
Defense counsel, during a hearing on the State’s motion in limine to
use the conversation, argued it should be protected since a plea had been
made and Bass was talking with his mother in connection with this offer.92
The trial court disagreed, and the appellate affirmed this decision.93 The
First District Court of Appeal said that to decide if statements were made in
connection with plea offers and thus protected under section 90.410 of the
Florida Statutes, the first step was looking at the plain meaning of the rule.94
If the answer was not clear from the rule’s plain meaning, then a totality of
circumstances approach should be taken. 95 This totality included two
factors: “[W]hether the defendant had a subjective expectation of engaging
in plea negotiations when the statements were made, and, if so, whether the
expectation was . . . reasonable.”96 Under either step, the district court found
against Bass.97 First, the State’s offer was not definite, only a pending one.98
Second, Bass’s statements about not taking twenty years but willing to
accept less only came up in response to his mother’s question about the
potential length of his sentence.99 Nothing Bass said about being willing or
unwilling to take a certain length of time had yet, or later was, communicated
to the State in response to the pending offer.100 Additionally, what Bass was
really telling his mother was merely what his attorney had told him, not the
traditional give and take one expects in plea discussions.101 His rejection of
the State’s offer the next day after the conversation further indicated Bass did

88.
Id. at 1034–35.
89.
Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35. The State did not allow Bass to call his
mother the day defense counsel relayed the plea offer but permitted Bass to do so the next
day. Id.
90.
Id. In the conversation, Bass told his mother he expected to have to serve
some prison time, but told her he would not accept the twenty-year offer and would instead
accept one of fifteen or sixteen years. Id. at 1034.
91.
Id.
92.
Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–35.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (2014).
95.
Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.410; United States v.
Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978).
96.
Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035 (citing Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1366).
97.
Id.
98.
Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1035.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id. at 1036.
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not have a subjective expectation that he was engaging in plea discussions
when talking with his mother.102
The court’s opinion illustrates that there is a difference between
actually engaging in plea discussions and talking about plea discussions in
general—especially when the person the discussions are being talked about
with is not one’s own attorney or an agent of the state. The decision also
illustrates another important point that defense counsel should strictly follow.
Never let your client talk about his case with anyone outside your presence,
and especially, never let your client talk about his case with anyone else but
counsel—even family members—during a phone call from a jail or
correctional facility as these conversations are regularly recorded. Defense
counsel, at their initial contact with clients, should remember to
automatically warn them about this. Bass illustrates that warning family
members about this is also a good idea.103
B.

Compromises and Offers to Compromise

Similar to its provision on pleas and plea negotiations in criminal
cases, the Code seeks to promote settlement negotiations as a favored way of
resolving disputes between private parties.104 Section 90.408 of the Florida
Statutes protects compromises, offers to compromise, and statements or
conduct made during bona fide settlement negotiations conducted in good
faith efforts to achieve resolutions before trial.105 A recent case demonstrates
that Florida law is strict on this point, even stricter than its federal rule
counterpart. 106 Panama City-Bay County Airport & Industrial District v.
Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.,107 arose from litigation following the
building of a new airport in Panama City.108 When the airport opened in
2010, a storm water retention pond had to be rebuilt to comply with Florida
Department of Environmental Protection regulations.109 Four main parties
had been involved in the planning and construction of the airport and pond:
the Panama City Airport District (“the Airport”), a plans and specification
designer (“Atkins North America” or “Atkins”), a construction and program
102.
Id.
103.
See Bass, 147 So. 3d at 1034–36.
104.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2014).
105.
Id.
106.
See FED. R. EVID. 408; FLA. STAT. § 90.408; Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport &
Indus. Dist. v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 140 So. 3d 1112, 1116–17 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d 510 (Fla. 2015).
107.
140 So. 3d 1112 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 163 So. 3d
510 (Fla. 2015).
108.
Id. at 1113.
109.
Id. at 1113–14.
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management overseer (“Kellog Brown” or “KBR”), and a prime construction
contractor (“Phoenix Construction Services” or “Phoenix”). 110 After the
pond had to be rebuilt, numerous claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, and
third-party claims were filed among the four main parties.111
By trial, only claims between the Airport and KBR remained.112 The
rest had been disposed of by various settlements. 113 One settlement was
between the Airport and Phoenix.114 In that settlement, the Airport admitted
liability to Phoenix. 115 Phoenix accepted liquidated damages from the
Airport in return for a share of any recovery in the lawsuit remaining
between the Airport, KBR, and at that time, Atkins.116 Under the agreement,
the Airport and Phoenix would cooperate in this remaining litigation by
using the airport’s general counsel and common counsel paid for by
Phoenix.117 The agreement also provided that both Phoenix and the Airport
retained control of their own claims and could settle them independently.118
Both the Airport and Phoenix settled before trial with Atkins, and neither
Atkins nor Phoenix remained a party when the case went to trial.119
Before trial, the Airport’s counsel moved in limine to exclude any
evidence of Phoenix’s settlement offer or of the Airport-Phoenix settlement
agreement itself.120 The trial court excluded terms of any offer but permitted
the agreement to be disclosed.121 KBR disclosed the agreement at trial, using
it to impeach some of the Airport’s witnesses and to advance KBR’s
counterclaims.122 After a jury verdict for KBR and denial of a new trial, the
Airport appealed.123
In a short but important opinion, the First District reversed.124 The
district court’s opinion focused on both section 90.408 and section 46.015(3)
of the Florida Statutes, which the court found required this result.125 Both
statutory sections prohibited the admission of completed settlement

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 1114.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114–15.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115.
Id.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1115–16; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014).
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agreements, and section 46.015(3) additionally prohibited telling the jury a
party has been dismissed from a lawsuit because of such.126
KBR made two arguments why the apparently complete statutory
bans in the two provisions should not be followed. 127 KBR claimed the
settlement between the Airport and Phoenix amounted to a Mary-Carter style
agreement that Florida case law had found outside the statutory bans. 128
Mary-Carter agreements exist when one of multiple parties to litigation
enters into a secret agreement with another party to reduce the first party’s
exposure in the lawsuit and to have the second party remain in the lawsuit so
that the two can secretly work against some or all of the remaining nonparties to the agreement.129 These agreements were found to undermine the
openness and integrity of the trial process by creating sham adversary
relationships between name parties. 130 Thus, when such agreements are
made, a non-party to them can inform the jury of their existence. 131
However, here, the settlement arrangement was considered different. 132
Phoenix did not remain a party to the litigation after the agreement with the
Airport. 133 Second, even though the Airport and Phoenix agreed to use
common counsel, each retained control of its remaining claims and each did
settle its remaining claims with some of the parties.134 Thus, the subterfuge
and prospects of subterfuge existing in a Mary-Carter Agreement situation
were not present.135
Finally, any argument that the settlement’s existence should be
admissible to show possible bias was rejected.136 As the court said, these
two statutory sections contain neither explicit nor implicit exceptions for
impeachment. 137 Thus, Florida evidence law, unlike the federal rule

126.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408.
127.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–17.
128.
Id. at 1116.
129.
Id.; Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1083 n.3 (Fla.
2009) (defining Mary-Carter Agreement); Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla.
1993).
130.
Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083; Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246; Pan. City-Bay
Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116.
131.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1116; see also
Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243.
132.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117.
133.
Id. at 1116.
134.
Id. at 1114.
135.
Id. at 1116.
136.
Id. at 1115–17.
137.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1115–16; see also
FLA. STAT. §§ 46.015(3), 90.408 (2014).
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regarding settlements and offers,138 has made the policy choice in favor of
broad exclusion of this type of evidence.139
C.

Character Evidence

Character is one area of evidence law which seems to present many
problems. As a general rule, evidence is usually forbidden in any case,
criminal or civil, to prove that a person has a certain general character or type
of character trait, and acted consistently with this on a particular occasion.140
This is commonly called the propensity rule.141 Evidence is not admissible
to show someone has a propensity to act a certain way and followed this
propensity at a particular time.142 Character evidence can be shown by one
of three methods: testimony as to one’s reputation in the community,
testimony about a witness’s personal opinion of someone else’s character, or
testimony about past specific acts of conduct of the person whose character
is to be proven.143
Despite the general prohibition, not every use of character evidence
to show propensity is forbidden.144 Similarly, not every use of one of the
three methods of proving character even involves character evidence at all.145
A recent case during this Survey period demonstrates both an exception to
the ban on character evidence to show action in conformity therewith and
also how proof of someone’s reputation may not necessarily involve
character evidence at all.146
Antoine v. State 147 involved charges against the accused of firstdegree murder and of attempted first-degree murder, both by use of a
138.
FED. R. EVID. 408. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 explicitly contains an
impeachment exception to the rule’s broad provisions on exclusion to show validity or
invalidity of claim. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 by its explicit terms does not allow
statements made in settlement negotiations to be used to impeach by inconsistent statements.
Id.
139.
Pan. City-Bay Cty. Airport & Indus. Dist., 140 So. 3d at 1117; see also
FLA. STAT. § 90.408.
140.
Fed. R. Evid. 404.
141.
See id.; Antoine v. State, 138 So. 3d 1064, 1075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
142.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). This prohibition is embodied in the
introductory language to section 90.404(1) of the Florida Statutes: “Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is inadmissible to prove action in conformity with it on a
particular occasion . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1).
143.
FED. R. EVID. 405(a)–(b).
144.
See id. 404(a)(2)(A)–(C).
145.
See id. 405(a)–(b).
146.
See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1075–76.
147.
138 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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firearm. 148 The jury could not reach a verdict on the first charge but
convicted Antoine on the second one.149 Both charges arose from the same
unfortunate incident at a Palm Beach nightclub late one evening.150 The two
victims, Brandon Hammond and Jeffrey Thompson, had been ejected from
the nightclub twice that evening for their rowdy behavior.151 They returned a
third time and managed to get themselves thrown out again.152 After their
third ejection, Hammond and Thompson had a confrontation outside the
nightclub with some men who were leaving. 153 The defendant, Narcisse
Antoine, tried to intervene and make peace.154 The two victims turned their
attention to Antoine both with racial statements and threats of violence.155
The club’s bouncer, Tyrone Slade, was also present when this
occurred.156 Slade testified that Thompson gave him “the impression . . . he
was about to sneak up and attack.”157 Hammond then hit Antoine in the jaw,
splitting his lip.158 Antoine gave Slade the drink he was holding and pulled
out a handgun.159 Slade later testified about the subsequent events.160 Even
then, Antoine did not immediately fire on either man.161 Hammond began
“‘reaching in his pants as if he had a gun’” 162 while racially cursing
Antoine.163 Slade, the bouncer, heard Antoine asking Hammond if he was
armed and if he planned to shoot Antoine.164 Slade also asked Hammond
what he was reaching for and told him to stop. 165 The defendant shot
Hammond multiple times, killing him, and shooting Thompson. 166
Thompson survived this shooting but was in a coma for some days
afterward.167 At trial, he was unable to remember the events surrounding the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1068.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1068.
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069.
Id.
Id.
Id. Slade supposedly told Hammond, “[Do not] do this Brandon.” Id.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1069, 1071.
Id. at 1071.
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shootings.168 A security guard at a nearby parking lot corroborated Slade’s
testimony.169
Antoine testified at trial, claiming self-defense for both shootings.170
He said that earlier that evening, he had intervened inside the nightclub to
prevent a fight between Hammond, Thompson, and three other men. 171
Then, when Antoine left, he saw Hammond and Thompson trying to provoke
another fight outside.172 Hammond had punched him and then threatened
him with physical harm, including a threat to kill.173 Antoine said that when
Hammond reached inside his own shirt, he was convinced Hammond was
going to kill him first.174 Antoine then shot Hammond and shot Thompson
whom Antoine claimed appeared to be reaching for a gun and coming
towards Antoine.175 Antoine drove off, talked to an attorney early the next
morning and was arrested later on.176
Slade knew Hammond’s family and also knew Hammond’s
reputation for violence and being a drunk. 177 A second bouncer at the
nightclub also gave reputation testimony about Hammond’s reputation for
violence.178 The trial court used Florida Jury Instruction—Criminal 3.6(f)—
on the significance of the reputation evidence to the self-defense claim.179
This instruction required that not only must a victim have a reputation for
violence, but that a defendant must also know of this reputation before a jury
could consider it.180 The defense objected to requiring Antoine to know of
Hammond’s reputation and requested an additional instruction that the jury
could independently consider the victim’s reputation for violence when
determining who was the first aggressor. The judge denied the request and
kept the instructions’ original wording.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1067.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1070.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 1070–71.
Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1071.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id. The exact instruction the trial court gave was as follows:

If you find that Brandon C. Hammond had a reputation of being a violent and
dangerous person, and that their [sic] reputation was known to the defendant, you
may consider the fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were
those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation.

Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1072.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a
new trial due to error in this instruction. Section 90.404 of the Florida
Statutes establishes one of the statutory exceptions to the ban on
circumstantial use of character evidence. This exception explicitly provides
that “evidence of a pertinent trait of character trait of the victim of the
[alleged] crime” is admissible when offered by the accused to prove the
victim acted in conformity therewith. 181 Furthermore, when the character
evidence is so offered, reputation testimony is the appropriate method of
doing so. 182 Thus, the trial court’s instructions were erroneous for two
reasons: First, they conditioned the jury’s consideration of Hammond’s
reputation for violence on Antoine’s knowledge of this fact.183 Second, they
did not tell the jury that if it found Hammond had such a reputation, the jury
could use this in considering whether he acted in conformity therewith before
the shooting, namely engaged in violent acts or threatening violent acts that
caused Antoine to react in self-defense. Why is the defendant’s actual
knowledge of the victim’s reputation for violence required? As the district
court said, “‘because the evidence is offered to show the conduct of the
victim, rather than the defendant’s state of mind.’” 184 If Antoine’s selfdefense claim had been predicated on previous violent acts of Hammond
towards others, Antoine would have had to know about them for them to be
relevant as they would have gone to his state of mind, not the victim’s
conduct. Indeed, under Florida evidence law, previous acts of someone are
usually not allowed to prove that person’s subsequent action in conformity
therewith.185
Would Antoine’s knowledge of Hammond’s reputation have been
helpful to his self-defense claim? Yes, in that case Antoine would have been
able to use the reputation evidence two ways, instead of one: First, to show
Hammond’s action in conformity therewith as the first aggressor;186 second,
to show the reasonableness of Antoine’s claim that he feared he would be
shot and so fired first.187 But just because the second way was foreclosed
due to the defendant not actually knowing Hammond’s reputation, this
should not legally prevent him from using it the other way.188
181.
FLA. STAT. §90.405(1) (2014).
182.
Id. Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Florida does not allow proof of
circumstantial character by personal opinion.
183.
Id. at 1075.
184.
Id. (quoting Dwyer v. State, 743 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999)).
185.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404.
186.
See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076.; FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1).
187.
See Antoine, 138 So. 3d at 1076.
188.
See id. at 1075–76. The jury had deadlocked on the murder charge
involving Hammond’s death but convicted on the attempted murder charge for shooting
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Williams Rule Issues–Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts

As noted above, when character evidence is used to prove the
defendant has a certain character trait to further prove the defendant has a
tendency to act in accord with this trait, the propensity rule is violated.189
This violation occurs however the character trait would be proven—whether
by reputation, opinion, or specific acts of past conduct. 190 Evidence law
recognizes that a person’s past bad acts can be relevant for legitimate nonpropensity purposes.191 In Florida, this use of collateral crimes evidence is
called Williams Rule evidence.192
The Code has codified the Williams Rule.193 Section 90.404(2)(a) of
the Florida Statutes states that “[s]imiliar fact evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue .
. . but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad
character or propensity.”194 What might these material facts be? The section
lists them as “including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”195
While the Williams Rule has a similar counterpart in the Federal
Rules of Evidence,196 there are several differences between the two that are
actually more favorable to defendants in Florida. First, in Florida, the state
must give the defense notice of its intent to use such evidence and a
description of it ten days before trial.197 In a federal court, the prosecution
must only provide reasonable notice of such. 198 Second, under the federal
rules, the existence of the accused’s other crimes must only be shown by a
preponderance of the evidence.199 In Florida, it must be established by clear

Thompson. Id. at 1068. However, since both charges stemmed from the same series of
events, if the jury had found Antoine’s actions in shooting Hammond reasonable, it might
have also done so in connection with the immediate shooting of Thompson afterwards. See id.
at 1075–76. Thus, reversal was needed. See id. at 1078.
189.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
190.
See id. 404(a)(1), 405.
191.
Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661 (Fla. 1959).
192.
Id. at 659.
193.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2014).
194.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2)(a).
195.
Id.
196.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
197.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(d)(1).
198.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2)(A).
199.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 684 (1988).
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and convincing evidence. 200 Third, in Florida the evidence cannot be so
focused upon that it becomes a feature of the trial.201
More reported cases discussed this section of the relevancy rules
than any other. 202 Cases discussing section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida
Statutes generated a fair number of reversals.203
1.

To Prove Matters Independent of Section 404(2)
a.

Inextricably Intertwined Evidence

Sometimes to tell a coherent story, the State must introduce other
acts evidence that is not directly related to the crimes charged.204 When this
happens, the other crimes evidence is admissible.205 Some jurisdictions call
this evidence of the res gestae. 206 In Florida, this type of other crimes
evidence is referred to as inextricably intertwined evidence.207 Technically
speaking, it is not Williams Rule evidence because its purpose is not to prove
or disprove an element of the case.208 Rather its purpose is to prevent the
story of the case from becoming confused, broken, or disjointed.209 Thus,
some courts then do not require the State to follow section 90.404(2) of the
Florida Statutes’ usual notification provisions.210
200.
See McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1256 (Fla. 2006).
201.
Id.; see also Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (during this Survey period rejecting the argument that the Williams Rule evidence had
improperly become a feature of the trial).
202.
McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1251; Carlisle v. State, 137 So. 3d 479, 486 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63.
203.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a) (2014). There was reversal in six cases
where the state introduced evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and reversal in one case
where the defense was denied the right to introduce Reverse Williams Rule evidence. See
Moore v. State, 143 So. 3d 468, 469 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Parker v. State, 142 So. 3d
960, 965 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kyne v. State 141 So. 3d 759, 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2014); Jackson v. State, 140 So. 3d 1067, 1073 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Carlisle,
137 So. 3d at 487. The one Reverse Williams Rule case was Carlisle, where the court found
the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine an alleged sexual battery victim about
her earlier recantation of other sexual claims against the defendant. Carlisle, 137 So. 3d at
483–84, 487. The questioning would have been admissible to show a motive to falsify on the
victim’s part. Id. at 484.
204.
Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d 759, 762 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
205.
Id.
206.
State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988).
207.
Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762.
208.
See Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413, 414–15 (Fla. 1993); Kyne, 141 So.
3d at 762.
209.
Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 762.
210.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014). Kyne v. State, where the State argued
no notice was due because the defense as evidence of prior threats between the defendant and
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When other crimes or acts evidence is offered under the inextricably
intertwined rationale, courts must be especially careful to make sure the
evidence is necessary or else risk a high chance of reversal. 211 This is
especially true because the other acts evidence is often potentially
inflammatory in nature.212 During this Survey period, four cases where the
State introduced evidence under the inextricably intertwined rationale
resulted in conviction reversals. 213 Three of the four shared a common
characteristic.214 They all involved evidence of possession of handguns or
other firearms as the alleged inextricably intertwined acts.215
Parker v. State216 provides the most overall instructive discussion of
the three. Parker’s vehicle was pulled over for a traffic routine stop, during
which an officer saw a gun partially sticking out between the vehicle’s
seats.217 The officer had Parker exit the vehicle and arrested him when it was
discovered Parker was a convicted felon. 218 Later, during an inventory
search, officers discovered illegal narcotics inside the vehicle.219 Parker was
charged with multiple drug possession offenses as well as being a felon in
possession of a firearm.220 The State severed the firearm possession charge

his step-father weeks before the defendant allegedly strangled his mother, was inextricably
intertwined with the killing. Kyne v. State, 141 So. 3d at 760–61. The district court of appeal
rejected this argument and also held that while the evidence might have been otherwise
admissible as Williams Rule evidence, this could not be considered on appeal due to the
state’s failure to supply the notice required under section 90.404(2)(d)(1) of the Florida
Statutes. Id. at 763; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(d)(1).
Kyne sends an important message to the state. If other acts are allegedly admissible
as both inextricably intertwined with charged offenses’ facts and also separately admissible as
Williams Rule evidence, careful prosecutors will always provide notice of intent to use such.
Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763. Thus, if an appellate court later rejects the inextricably intertwined
grounds, the state can preserve its ability to argue Williams Rule evidence as a fall back
position. Id.
211.
Id.
212.
See Williams, 621 So. 2d at 415.
213.
Parker v. State 142 So. 3d 960, 963 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see
also Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 761; Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142–43 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2014); Francois v. State, 132 So. 3d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
214.
Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132 So.
3d at 1207–08. Kyne is the fourth and only non-weapons case where admission of other bad
acts evidence caused reversal as not being inextricably intertwined with events surroundings
the charges and not otherwise admissible under the Williams Rule. Kyne, 141 So. 3d at 763.
215.
See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 963; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d at 1142; Francois, 132
So. 3d at 1207–08.
216.
142 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
217.
Id. at 962.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
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before trial.221 The defense moved to exclude any evidence relating to the
gun found in car as unnecessary to prove the remaining drug charges.222 The
State claimed that testimony about finding the gun was needed to explain
why the vehicle was searched and the drugs subsequently found.223 The trial
court agreed with this argument.224 At trial, the first officer was allowed to
talk about finding the gun and how the defendant’s hand was near where the
gun was actually found.225 Not only was this testimony given but also the
State physically introduced the gun as an exhibit. 226 A second officer
testified Parker had been arrested for possessing the weapon, but the trial
court sustained an objection to this, and the jury was instructed to ignore
it.227
The Fourth District listed four instances where uncharged acts or
crimes evidence would be considered inextricably intertwined with the
charges against an accused. 228 When the evidence was necessary to “(1)
adequately describe the deed; (2) provide an intelligent account of the
crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire context out of which the charged
crime(s) arose, or (4) adequately describe the events leading up to the
charged crime(s).”229 Here, it seemed as if the State was relying on either the
third or fourth reasons to justify the testimony and the gun’s admission.230
Whatever the State’s reason was, the Fourth District of Appeal reversed the
conviction. 231 The court found that testimony about the gun was totally
unnecessary to prove the drug charges. 232 The State could have just
produced testimony about finding the drugs in Parker’s car during a search
car. Additionally, error in admitting the gun-related testimony was
compounded by admitting the gun itself as an exhibit. 233 The gun’s
admission aggravated matters by “giving the weapon featured billing during
the trial.”234

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. (quoting McGee v. State, 19 So. 3d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Parker, 142 So. 3d at 962.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 963–64.
Id. at 963.
Id.

2009)).
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Perhaps the most flagrant of the three cases involving reversals for
uncharged weapons testimony is Francois v. State. 235 There the State
charged the accused with armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed
robbery.236 The robbery victim and other witnesses said a handgun had been
used in the crime.237 This gun was never found.238 Police officers went to
the defendant’s residence and found four rifles there, one of which was under
a bed and another sticking out from a mattress. 239 The State argued that
evidence of the rifles in the home showed Francois could have also once
possessed the handgun and hidden it after the robbery. 240 Evidently, the
reasoning went something like this–people who possess firearms in general
are likely to possess a particular type of firearm and when that firearm is
used in a crime they are likely to hide it. Of course, part of this reasoning
rests on using evidence for prohibited propensity purposes. The other part—
that someone who commits a crime with a weapon is likely to hide the
weapon to avoid detection—could have been made without introduction of
any evidence about the rifles at all. The trial court termed this argument
“tenuous, at best, and labeled it far-fetched.”241 Surprisingly after declaring
such, the judge admitted the rifles believing “the evidence comprised part of
the police investigation and that Francois would not be prejudiced by the
testimony.”242 In a short opinion, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed
finding the evidence totally irrelevant to prove anything about the missing
handgun.243 Additionally, there was no proof that Francois’s possession of
the rifles was not perfectly legal. 244 The court recognized that admitting
testimony evidence about the rifles created a very real risk that “the jurors
[would] conclude . . . Francois exhibited a propensity to commit crimes.”245
All three cases could be described as good examples of prosecutor
attempts at overkill causing reversals. 246 Unfortunately, there are also
examples where trial courts did not give careful scrutiny to arguments and
235.
132 So. 3d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
236.
Id. at 1207.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1207.
241.
Id.
242.
Id. (emphasis added).
243.
Id. at 1209.
244.
Id.
245.
Francois, 132 So. 3d at 1209.
246.
See id. 132 So. 3d at 1209; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 964; Tolbert, 154 So. 3d
at 1143. The third case is Tolbert v. State, which involved testimony about a handgun found
in the same bag as illegal drugs. Tolbert v. State, 154 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2014). There was no proof connecting Tolbert to the gun, nor proof that he illegally
possessed it. Id. at 1142–43.
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evidence offered for admission.247 The lesson to be learned from all three
reversals is simple: Inextricably intertwined is not a magic argument or
phrase that will automatically allow in other crimes or acts evidence not
essentially connected to the crimes charged. This is especially so when the
other acts involve weapons possession.
b.

To Legally Establish an Element of the Charged Offense

There is another, probably an even more rare, non-Williams Rule
reason to legitimately present uncharged collateral crimes evidence.248 There
may be a legal necessity to present other crimes evidence when proof of an
earlier act or crime is an essential element of a later charged offense.249 In
this situation, the extent of the other crimes evidence should be determined
by the elements of the charged offense.
Spipniewiski v. State 250 involved charges of aggravated stalking,
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and misdemeanor battery.251 The
victim and defendant were neighbors who had once been on good terms.252
Trouble started when the victim who had been giving the defendant food,
rides, and money told him she would no longer do so. 253 The charges
concerned events that happened from January to December 16, 2011.254 The
State produced evidence that the defendant had punched the victim in
November 2011, approached her swinging a bat in December 2011, and
pulled her hair and bit her in December 2011.255 The November punching
incident was also the subject of a separate misdemeanor charge in county
court.256
The Third District found the punching incident testimony relevant to
the charge of aggravated stalking.257 As part of this charge, the State had to
show the defendant had engaged in a course of conduct designed to
repeatedly harass her, and that the defendant threatened the victim with

247.

Id. at 1142–43; Parker, 142 So. 3d at 961, 964; Francois, 132 So. 3d at

1208–09.
248.
Spipniewski v. State, 134 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
249.
See id.
250.
134 So. 3d 563 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
251.
Id. at 564. Originally, there was a fourth charge—harassing the victim—
but the State dropped this before trial. Id. The opinion does not explain why. See id.
252.
See id.
253.
Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 564.
254.
Id.
255.
Id. at 564–65.
256.
Id. at 565.
257.
Id.
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intent to make her fearful of death or bodily injury.258 Course of conduct as
defined in the aggravated stalking statute is “a pattern of conduct composed
of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a
continuity of purpose.”259 Thus, the other acts evidence was directly relevant
and legally necessary to prove the aggravated stalking charge.260 Ultimately,
the jury convicted the defendant of simple stalking; thus, in any event,
admission of the other acts would have been harmless even if done in
error.261
2. To Prove Traditional Williams Rule Issues
As mentioned, section 90.404(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes lists a
number of reasons why other crimes or acts evidence is relevant, besides
solely showing propensity. 262 The list follows the inclusionary approach,
and is not intended to be exclusive but merely to give examples of the most
common, legitimate Williams Rule purposes. 263 During this Survey,
Williams Rule evidence was admitted to prove a number of matters,
mentioned 264 and unmentioned 265 in the section. 266 Some decisions show
how careless counsel is in urging admission of this evidence and how
careless courts are in going along with their arguments. It should never be
sufficient for counsel to just laundry list the issues given in the Rule as
reasons why the evidence should be admitted. Courts should not allow such
laundry listing to occur, but sometimes this happens. 267 Fortunately one
opinion during this Survey provides an excellent example of the careful
258.
Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566; see also FLA. STAT. § 784.048(3) (2014).
259.
FLA. STAT. § 784.048(1)(b).
260.
Spipniewski, 134 So. 3d at 566.
261.
Id.
262.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a).
263.
See id.; Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659–60 (Fla. 1959).
264.
Two cases involved Williams Rule evidence offered at trial to prove
intent. See Barnett v. State, 151 So. 3d 61, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Jackson v. State,
140 So. 3d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). Two cases involved used it to show
identity. See Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63–64; Lewis v. State, 143 So. 3d 998, 1000, 1002 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
265.
See Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (finding the evidence admissible to show consciousness of guilt). The author
strenuously disagrees with this conclusion and believes the evidence was improperly admitted
as proof of propensity.
266.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(a).
267.
See, e.g., Barnett, 151 So. 3d at 63 (where this happened at the trial level).
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the admission of the evidence but after conducting a
much more careful analysis and after correctly concluding it was admissible to prove identity
and motive. Id. at 63–64.
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analysis the trial, and appellate courts should engage in before approving use
of Williams Rule evidence.268
Jackson v. State269 involved an appeal from a conviction for burglary
of a dwelling and for battery. 270 The State claimed that in March 2011,
Jackson broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and attacked her with a
knife.271 Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the State to produce
evidence of two prior incidents to prove the defendant had the intent needed
to commit the March 2011 crimes.272 The first incident occurred in June
2010, when Jackson had pulled the victim from a car and attacked her.273
The second one occurred in November 2010, when Jackson had come to the
victim’s apartment at her invitation, but had battered her there. 274 In a
thoughtful opinion, the First District reversed the convictions.275 The court
acknowledged that Williams Rule evidence is admissible to prove material
facts in a case. 276 However, it differed from the trial court as to how
materiality should be determined.277 Just because an issue is technically an
element of an offense does not make it automatically material for Williams
Rule purposes.278 Instead, the issue must be a truly contested one at trial.279
Jackson did not raise any issue of intent.280 Rather, he claimed he had never
been at the victim’s apartment on the particular date in March and thus did
not commit any crime there.281
“Even if intent [had been] a [true] material issue,” the other incidents
were not substantially similar enough to demonstrate it.282 The first incident
did not take place at the victim’s residence, and while the second one did,
Jackson had been invited over to the apartment. 283 Thus, while both
incidents allegedly involved batteries, neither one of them came close to
involving a burglary and so, were not relevant in determining if he

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1071–73.
140 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id. at 1069–70.
Id. at 1070.
Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070.
Id. at 1070–73.
Id. at 1069–70.
Id. at 1070–71.
Id. at 1071; see also Williams, 110 So. 2d at 659.
Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070–71.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. at 1071–72; see also McLean v. State, 934 So. 2d 1248, 1255 (Fla.

283.

Jackson, 140 So. 3d at 1070.

2006).
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committed a burglary.284 As to the battery charge, the First District found the
other acts’ relevancy was solely based on pure propensity reasoning—he
attacked this woman twice in the past, so that makes it more likely he
attacked her here—which is what the Williams Rule explicitly forbids!285
Overall, Jackson is an excellent example of the thorough analysis
trial, and appellate courts should engage in when faced with Williams Rule
questions. As this type of evidence has the potential to be unfairly
prejudicial to defendants, it should not be admitted unless its materiality is
truly factually an issue and not just an issue in a formal legal sense.
3.

To Prove Child Molestation Charges

Both the Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence have added special
provisions relating to the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
evidence in child molestation cases.286 Section 90.404(2)(b)(1) of the Florida
Statutes provides that in criminal child molestation cases, “evidence of the
defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of child molestation
is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter for which
it is relevant.”287 This section’s language indicates the legislature intended to
allow what is usually not permitted in criminal case—evidence admitted
largely for its propensity purposes. Evidently, the legislature felt that when it
comes to certain types of sex crimes, there is a very real risk of repeat
offenders, so that evidence that an accused had committed an earlier sexual
offense is strong indication he committed a later criminally charged one. In
McLean v. State,288 the Supreme Court of Florida held that even when this
section merely serves “as a conduit for evidence that corroborates the
victim’s testimony that the crime occurred rather than to prove the identity of
the alleged perpetrator,”289 it does not violate due process.290 McLean did not
find that evidence of prior acts of molestation was automatically admissible,
despite the statutory wording that could be construed that way. Instead, the
court focused on the words “‘and may be considered for its bearing on any

284.
Id. at 1072.
285.
Id. at 1070, 1072; see also Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 659, 661,
663 (Fla. 1959).
286.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2) (2014); FED. R. EVID. 414.
287.
FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b)(1). There is a similarly worded provision for
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” in a sexual offense charge case. See id. §
90.404(2)(c)(1). The Florida Legislature passed these sections in 2001. Act effective July 1,
2001, ch. 2001-221, § 1, 2001 Fla. Laws 1938, 1938.
288.
934 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2006).
289.
Id. at 1251.
290.
Id.
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matter [for] which it is relevant.’”291 When it comes to relevancy and other
acts, relevancy must be evaluated first by how similar the other sexual acts
are to the crime charged.292 The more similarity, the more probative they
are.293 Likewise, the less similar, the less probative, and the more likelihood
they will generate unfair prejudicial against an accused and should be
excluded by section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes.294 McLean set out a fourpart test to determine admissibility of other acts of molestation.295 First, how
similar are the other acts and the charged ones in terms of when, where, how,
and to whom they occurred?296 Second, how close in time are the other acts
and the ones charged?297 Third, how frequently did the other acts occur?298
Finally, are there any intervening circumstances between the other acts and
the ones charged?299
Four reported opinions discussed this type of evidence in child
sexual victim cases during the Survey period. 300 Not surprisingly, the
appellate courts affirmed admission in three out of the four cases.301 Stewart
v. State302 represents what is probably a typical approach to admission of this
type of evidence. 303 The accused was charged with sexually battering a
person between twelve and eighteen years of age while he was in a position
of familial authority.304 The State introduced proof Stewart had previously
sexually battered his step-daughter and also his wife’s daughter, both when
the girls were young. 305 In affirming his conviction, the First District
described this as Williams Rule evidence even though it seems to have been
introduced solely for its propensity. 306 The court described section
291.
Id. at 1254.
292.
Id.
293.
McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1255.
294.
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014); McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1256.
295.
McLean, 934 So. 2d at 1262.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
Id.
300.
See Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014);
Stewart v. State, 147 So. 3d 119, 121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Fincher v. State, 137 So.
3d 437, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 485 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
301.
Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175; Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124; Fincher, 137
So. 3d at 442; Peralta-Morales, 143 So. 3d at 486.
302.
147 So. 3d 119 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
303.
See id. at 123–24.
304.
Id. at 120; see also FLA. STAT. § 794.011(8)(b) (2014).
305.
Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 121.
306.
Id. at 123–24. The court found it “showed an underlying pattern of
molestation where the appellant was in a familial or custodial setting with the victims and the
molestation occurred in the home.” Id. at 121.
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90.404(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes as establishing a relaxed standard of
admissibility307 even though similarity between the charged offense and the
past acts was still important.308 The court emphasized that similarity did not
mean the two sets of offenses had to be identical or the same in all
respects.309 Here, sufficient similarity to uphold admission existed because
the victims were all underage females, the offenses all took place in the
family home, the defendant was in a familial or custodial role each time, and
the victims were all vulnerable due to being either asleep or under
anesthesia.310 The fact that some of the acts involved digital penetration, and
some involved penile penetration did not outweigh the other similarities.311
Ironically, the only decision reversing a conviction for improper
admission of this type of evidence also came from the First District.312 In
Harrelson v. State,313 the appellate court reversed and remanded, for further
proceedings, the defendant’s conviction for lewd, lascivious, or indecent
assault on a child under sixteen.314 The victim was either the defendant’s
daughter or step-daughter.315 Harrelson and her mother were divorced when
the acts allegedly occurred.316 The defendant was alleged to have grabbed
the victim’s hand and made her touch his penis during a visit to Harrelson’s
mother’s home. 317 At least some of the claimed other acts also occurred
during other visits to Harrelson’s father’s home.318
The State gave the defense the required notice of intent to use.319
However, the trial court and defense undertook an unusual and ultimately
legally reversible procedure to determine admissibility. Defense counsel
Some may claim this is not propensity, but the author does not agree. See id. at 123.
It shows Stewart had a propensity to sexually molest young girls when he got them in the
home. See id. at 121. Thus, he must have molested the young victim here. See Stewart, 147
So. 3d at 123–24.
307.
Id. at 123 (quoting Easterly v. State, 22 So. 3d 807, 814 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2009)); FLA. STAT. § 90.404(2)(b).
308.
Stewart, 147 So. 3d at 124.
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Id. The other two opinions, not discussed in this Survey’s text, affirming
admission of other acts of molestation are Fincher and Peralta-Morales. Fincher v. State, 137
So. 3d 437, 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Peralta-Morales v. State, 143 So. 3d 483, 486
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also supra note 365 (briefly criticizing Peralta-Morales).
312.
Harrelson v. State, 146 So. 3d 171, 175 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Both opinions were per curiam. Judge Rowe is the only judge named as being on both panels.
313.
146 So. 3d 171 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
314.
Id. at 172, 175.
315.
See id. at 174.
316.
Id. at 174.
317.
Id. at 173.
318.
Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 174.
319.
Id. at 173.
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suggested the trial court should first do the required weighing under section
90.403 of the Florida Statutes of probative value versus unfair prejudice
before making a finding that the other acts had been proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 320 The trial judge did so and ruled the substantial
similarity between the alleged offenses outweighed any potential
prejudice. 321 The trial court then concluded that no finding of clear and
convincing evidence was needed as the other crimes involved the same
victim, the same conduct, and the same approximate timeframe as the
charged offense.322 The defense cross-examined the victim about the other
acts and also called Harrelson’s mother as a defense witness.323 She testified
some of the furniture supposedly in the home at the time was gone by then,
all in an effort to dispute the acts’ existence.324
In a brief opinion, the First District reversed.325 The court ruled that
findings that other crimes, wrongs, or acts exist by a clear and convincing
evidence standard are legally mandated in all cases. 326 The fact that the
alleged other crimes involved the same, instead of different, victims did not
change this requirement.327 As the defense had at trial denied their existence
with strong proof, the court could not say there was not a strong possibility
this evidence did not influence the jury.328 However, a new trial was not
necessarily required. 329 As the trial court had already done the required
section 90.403 of the Florida Statutes balancing, only a hearing to see if the
State could meet the clear and convincing evidence standard was required.330
If so, the conviction should have been re-instated.331 If not, a new trial was
necessary.332
Harrelson is important because it emphasizes to both counsel and
trial courts the importance of following the complete procedure discussed in
McLean for determining the admissibility of other acts of child molestation.
Also, as McLean has been cited as requiring clear and convincing proof for
any Williams Rule evidence, this multi-step procedure should be strictly

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014).
Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id. at 174–75; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2014).
Harrelson, 146 So. 3d at 175.
Id.
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followed for all evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts no matter what the
offense charged.
IV.

WITNESS EXAMINATION ISSUES

Witness examination issues can arise in any number of ways.
During this Survey period, one case provided the factual background for the
Supreme Court of Florida’s discussion of several of them. 333 The
prosecution in Wilcox v. State 334 charged the defendant with first-degree
murder, armed kidnaping, and armed robbery. 335 Wilcox had called his
cousin, Richaundu Curry, and asked if he could stay at her Lauderhill
townhome. 336 Curry shared her home with her brother, her sister, and
Curry’s ex-boyfriend.337 The four of them lived next to the victim, Nimoy
Johnson. 338 The day Wilcox arrived, someone burglarized Johnson’s
home. 339 Johnson initially blamed it on someone living in Curry’s
townhome, and the two of them had words about this.340 After Curry had
assured Johnson they were good neighbors, he apologized, and everything
seemed fine.341 About one week later, an intruder came to Johnson’s home,
and got him to call three female friends of his to come over.342 The intruder
had Johnson tie up the three women and then took Johnson from the room
they were in.343 Later that evening, someone stole one of the women’s car.344
After they had freed themselves, they found Johnson shot dead in his
home.345 Eyewitness testimony placed Wilcox around Johnson’s home at the
time of the kidnapping and murder.346 Besides this, DNA evidence linked
him to a cigarette the intruder had smoked in the home.347 Wilcox had even
admitted that morning in a phone call to Curry’s brother that he had killed

333.
S. Ct. 1406 (2015).
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See Wilcox v. State, 143 So. 3d 359, 366–71 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135
143 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1406 (2015).
See id. at 369.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368.
Id.
See id. at 367–68.
Id. at 369.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1

122

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

EVIDENCE: 2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW

107

Johnson the night before or earlier that same morning. 348 Abundant other
evidence linked Wilcox to the charged crimes.349
At trial, Wilcox claimed he did not perpetrate these crimes.350 He
claimed never to have been to the county where the crimes took place and
claimed he was in a neighboring county that weekend. 351 Wilcox was
arrested at an apartment complex where the stolen car was found but claimed
Curry’s brother gave it to him three days after the crimes.352 At the guilt
phase, Wilcox represented himself, with standby counsel appointed for his
assistance if Wilcox wished to ask for help. 353 This self-representation
decision led to several evidentiary issues discussed below.
A.

Refreshing Recollection

Sometimes witnesses forget for various reasons and need help in
remembering so they can give or continue giving testimony. The process of
doing this is called refreshing recollection.354 Although this process is not
laid out in statute or rules, it is so common that questions about it seldom
arise. To prove its case against Wilcox, the State called his cousin,
Richaunda Curry, whose home was next to the victim’s home. 355 Curry
testified that in a second police interview after the crimes, detectives had
asked her if she knew someone with gold teeth. 356 She had not yet told
police about her cousin, Wilcox because she did want to tell them she
believed he was involved in the crimes.357 When she learned police were
looking for someone with gold teeth, she felt comfortable telling them about
Wilcox and his gold teeth.358 On cross-examination by Wilcox, she denied
knowing anyone else with gold teeth, including her sister or her sister’s
348.
Id. at 368.
349.
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 368–71.
350.
See id. at 369.
351.
Id. at 369.
352.
Id. at 368–69.
353.
Id. at 369, 373.
354.
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. Some jurisdictions may alternatively call
this refreshing memory, but the concept is the same. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.613. Both the Code
and the Federal Rules of Evidence imply this process is available, although neither one
directly says so. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 612. Certainly, a trial judge’s inherent power to
control proceedings under section 90.612(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes to “[f]acilitate, through
effective interrogation and presentation, the discovery of . . . truth” permits judges to allow
this. FLA. STAT. § 90.612(1)(a). Also, the existence of section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes,
Refreshing the Memory of a Witness, implies this. See id. § 90.613.
355.
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 375.
356.
Id. at 377.
357.
Id.
358.
Id.
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boyfriend. 359 Specifically, Curry testified in response to a question from
Wilcox that “[you are] the only one that got gold teeth, that I know of.”360
After another question and brief answer, Wilcox asked, “[c]an I refresh your
memory, please?”361 The State objected to lack of a proper foundation to
refresh recollection, and the judge told Wilcox to rephrase his question.362
Wilcox then asked “do you think any document . . . would refresh your
memory as to who all had gold that was at your respective apartment?”363
After Curry said probably, the State again objected, but the judge let Wilcox
proceed.364
Up to now, one cannot hardly find fault with the proceedings on this
point. Technically speaking, there may not have been an absolute need to
refresh recollection, but the judge acted wisely in giving a pro se defendant,
especially one in a capital case, leeway. What happened next provoked
error, although the Supreme Court of Florida found all trial errors harmless
given the overwhelming proof against Wilcox.365
Wilcox then tried to refresh Curry’s memory by using the statement
of another witness, Jean, which was summarized in and attached to the
affidavit for his arrest.366 According to the summary, Jean was the victim’s
friend and had talked with Johnson about a week before the charged
crimes.367 The summary claimed Johnson told Jean about confronting two
people, one of whom had gold teeth, regarding Johnson’s home being
burglarized.368 The man with gold teeth allegedly told Johnson he was not
afraid of Johnson, and Johnson had allegedly threatened to shoot him.369 The

359.
Id.
360.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377.
361.
Id.
362.
Id. at 377–78. Technically, it seems that the State’s proper objection was
lack of a predicate to refresh recollection. See id. Curry never said she could not remember
whom else she knew who had gold teeth or that she was not sure if she knew someone else
with gold teeth. Id. at 377.
Lawyers are not entitled to refresh recollection any time they get an answer they
may not like or expect. See FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014). There must be a need to do so
caused by a witness’s complete or partial inability to recall. See id.
At common law, a witness had to have complete memory failure about a matter.
See NLRB v. Fed. Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487, 488–89 (1st Cir. 1962). This is not required by
the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Code. See FED. R. EVID. 612; FLA. STAT. § 90.613.
363.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 377.
364.
Id. at 377–78.
365.
Id. at 378–79.
366.
Id.
367.
Id.
368.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.
369.
Id.
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prosecutor objected to Curry being refreshed by Jean’s statement, and the
trial court refused to let Wilcox use the document to do so.370
The Supreme Court of Florida found error in this ruling.371 When a
witness needs his or her memory refreshed, “a party may show the witness a
writing or other object to attempt to refresh . . . recollection.”372 If a writing
is being used to refresh, it does not have to be one actually written by the
witness. 373 Nor does it have to be otherwise admissible into evidence. 374
The witness should not be allowed to read parts of the writing aloud, nor
should the questioning attorney do so, as that would cause potential hearsay
issues. 375 If the witness’s memory is successfully refreshed, and the
witness’s testimony is based on remembering an event, not on remembering
the contents of whatever is shown to the witness, “that which prompted the
witness’s memory is immaterial.”376 Thus, Wilcox should have been allowed
to use the arrest affidavit summary to refresh Curry’s memory, if it could.
B.

Impeachment with Prior Convictions

Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes recognizes that any party may
impeach a witness and that there are multiple ways of doing so. 377 One
standard method of impeaching a witness’s credibility is by showing the
witness has committed certain crimes that theoretically cast doubt on the
witness’s ability to tell the truth.378 Section 90.610(1) of the Florida Statutes
limits these crimes to ones “punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of [one] year” in the jurisdiction of conviction 379 or ones that involved
“dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”380

370.
Id. The court also refused to let Wilcox use the summary to impeach
Curry. Id.
371.
Id.
372.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378.
373.
Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So. 2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1976).
374.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 379; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.613 (2014).
375.
See Garrett, 336 So. 2d at 569.
376.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 378. Sometimes the witness’s memory of the
underlying event or fact is not truly refreshed. See K.E.A. v. State, 802 So. 2d 410, 411 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Rather what the witness has used as the basis for his or her
subsequent testimony is what has been just shown to the witness. See id. When opposing
counsel suspects this is the case, section 90.613 of the Florida Statutes requires that the item
used to refresh recollection be produced so opposing counsel can use it to demonstrate this
continued memory failure. FLA. STAT. § 90.613.
377.
Id. § 90.608.
378.
Id. § 90.610.
379.
Id. § 90.610(1). These are commonly called felonies, as the quoted
language is the standard definition for a felony at common law. See id. § 90.610; State v.
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While section 90.610 of the Florida Statutes sets out what general
crimes qualify for impeachment, case law has delineated the proper
procedure for doing so. The questioning attorney should ask, “have you ever
been convicted of a felony or a crime involving dishonesty [or false
statement]?”381 If the witness admits committing crimes of these types, then
the questioner is limited to asking either, if so, how many? Or just how
many?382 If the witness answers both questions accurately, further questions
about the witness’ criminal record should not be asked; at least not for
purposes of impeaching by a prior conviction.383
In the Wilcox case described above, problems also arose about the
proper way of doing this type of impeachment. 384 Wilcox testified and
denied his involvement in the murder, kidnappings, and robbery. 385 On
cross-examination the prosecutor asked him: “[H]ave you been previously
convicted of a felony or crime involving dishonestly?” 386 After a short
exchange between the two, Wilcox admitted, “I have been convicted of a
crime.”387 When again asked if he had been convicted of a felony or crime
involving dishonesty, Wilcox replied saying, “[g]ot to make me understand.
As far as dishonesty is concerned, I do [not] see where I lied about
anything.”388 The prosecutor told him it was not the state’s job to make him
understand and asked for the third time about felonies or crimes of
dishonesty.389 Wilcox replied by saying, “I got to say no.”390
The prosecutor responded by inquiring if Wilcox had been convicted
of second degree murder, armed robbery, and grand theft motor vehicle.391
Wilcox admitted he had, but added it was as an accomplice. 392 The
Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984). However, some jurisdictions recognize aggravated
misdemeanors that are punishable by more than one year.
380.
FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1).
381.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372.
382.
Id. at 372–74.
383.
Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610. This describes how impeachment by
prior convictions should proceed when the person being impeached is an actual witness. See
FLA. STAT. § 90.610. For discussion of the proper procedure for impeaching a hearsay
declarant, see infra Section IV.D.
384.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374.
385.
Id. at 371–72.
386.
Id. at 371. Note how even this question is not technically in the correct
form as it omitted any reference to crimes of false statement. See FLA. STAT. § 90.610.
However, this omission had nothing to do with the subsequent erroneous cross-examination.
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374.
387.
Id. at 372.
388.
Id.
389.
Id.
390.
Id.
391.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372.
392.
Id.
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prosecutor then asked Wilcox about each crime in turn and whether he
considered that type crime to be a crime of dishonesty or dishonest,
beginning with the theft conviction and ending with the second degree
murder conviction.393
The defendant argued that allowing the State to impeach him by
mentioning his specific crimes was improper, because the prosecutor had to
exploit his confusion about the questions to do so. 394 In turn, the State
argued Wilcox was being cagey395 and wrongfully tried to resist answering
the State’s questions. 396 Additionally, the State argued this issue had not
been preserved for appeal by a contemporaneous objection.397
The Supreme Court of Florida partially agreed with both sides.398
The Court found that Wilcox was genuinely confused by the questioning
itself when he said, “[you] [g]ot to make me understand” that he may have
been confused about the proper way to object to the cross-examination and
that the trial court was aware of this confusion.399 As there was no indication
Wilcox did not fail to object to gain a tactical advantage; and also with the
leeway pro se defendants should be given, the Court found the claim of error
preserved.400
As to the merits of Wilcox’s claim, the Court found that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in letting the State initially inquire about
Wilcox’s criminal record for the three convictions.401 The convictions were
all felonies, thus permissible for impeachment.402 Besides this, Wilcox was
given several chances to ask for help from standby counsel but did not do
so.403 Although he truthfully said one time that he had been convicted of a
crime, he had also twice explicitly said no when asked about this.404 Thus,
the State was entitled to clear this up at trial.405
However, even with this entitlement, the State’s follow up questions
about whether Wilcox considered certain of the felonies crimes of dishonesty
393.
Id.
394.
Id.
395.
Id.
396.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372.
397.
Id.
398.
Id. at 373–74.
399.
Id. at 372–73.
400.
Id. at 373.
401.
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 373–74.
402.
Id. at 374.
403.
Id. at 373.
404.
Id. at 372–73.
405.
Id. at 373–74. The Supreme Court may have found that Wilcox likely
was, or at least probably was, partially lying at trial. See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 372. The
Court declared that “[a] reasonable person could conclude that Wilcox was being, as the State
contends, cagey with his responses to the prosecutor’s questions.” Id. at 373.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

127

Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1

112

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

was erroneous.406 Once the State was able to show he had a past criminal
record of certain type felonies, questioning about them should have
stopped.407 Florida law recognizes that some crimes involve dishonesty or
false statement and some do not.408 However, this distinction is important
for impeachment purposes only when the crimes are misdemeanors, not
felonies.409 Since any felony can be used to impeach under section 90.610(1)
of the Florida Statutes, whether the felony additionally involved dishonesty
was irrelevant.410 What the prosecution tried to do here was to get double
mileage from the same felony conviction.411 The Supreme Court of Florida
concisely summed up its ruling on this point. After a witness’s prior
convictions are displayed by name and number before a jury, “the
prosecution may not then continue to question the witness regarding whether
his or her prior felony convictions are also crimes of dishonesty.”412
The prosecution’s impeachment by prior convictions was also
incorrect for other points not discussed by the Court. First, robbery and
motor vehicle theft are crimes of dishonesty under Florida law. Second,
none of the prosecutor’s questions about the crimes being ones of dishonesty
ever should have been allowed for another reason. The questions asking
whether Wilcox considered certain crimes to involve dishonesty asked for
Wilcox’s opinions about what he had done in the past.413 This is irrelevant
for prior conviction impeachment purposes. What should count is not what
Wilcox felt about his crimes being ones of dishonesty, but whether as a
matter of Florida law, they were. Both the prosecutor and trial judge seem to
have ignored this distinction, and the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion
surprisingly fails to comment on it.
Even with these additional errors, the Supreme Court of Florida’s
finding of harmless error is easily defensible given the apparent
overwhelming evidence of Wilcox’s guilt and lack of credibility.414
C.

Inappropriate Witness Dress in Criminal Cases

The next witness examination issue does not involve actual witness
questioning.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 374.
Id.
See State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1984).
Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374.
Id. at 374; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014).
See Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 374.
Id.
Id. at 372, 374.
See id. at 374−75.
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Hopefully, it also arises so rarely that seeing a case having to discuss
it is surprising indeed. Finally, the fact that the issue could have been easily
avoided by the use of good judgment is especially disappointing since it led
to reversible error.415
In Hayes v. State,416 the State claimed the defendant and another man
committed armed robbery and assault against a single victim.417 Hayes was
tried alone.418 The victim identified Hayes at trial, and the jury was not told
if the second person had ever been caught.419 The robbery took place in the
front yard of a man named Pharory Greene.420 Greene appeared as a defense
witness, claimed that he saw the robbery take place, and that Hayes was not
one of the perpetrators.421
The problem was not with what Greene said but how he had to say it.
Greene, at the time of Hayes’s trial, was incarcerated in the jail for an
unnamed offense. 422 The offense apparently had no connection with the
robbery on trial. Greene, over defense objections, had to testify wearing jail
clothes.423 Days before the trial, defense counsel had brought clothes to the
jail for Greene to change into before taking the stand.424 When Greene was
brought to court in jail garb, defense counsel objected to this.425 He argued
that the State would not ordinarily be permitted to cross-examine the witness
about his incarceration;426 but that once Greene appeared in jail clothes, his
prisoner status would be obvious.427 The trial court overruled this objection
stating, “‘[w]e [do not] dress out witnesses’” no matter whom they would
testify for. 428 Counsel also argued the jury would think Greene was a
codefendant, while he in fact was not.429 The defense wanted to bring this
out but declined to do so when the trial judge said it would open up Greene

415.
Id. at 1108−09.
416.
140 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
417.
Id. at 1107.
418.
See id.
419.
Id.
420.
Id.
421.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108.
422.
Id. at 1107.
423.
Id. at 1107−08.
424.
Id.
425.
Id. at 1107.
426.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107. The opinion never mentions the exact offense
for which Greene was jailed. See id. at 1107–08. However, it was obviously one that was
unavailable for impeachment by prior conviction under section 90.610(1) of the Florida
Statutes. See id. at 1107; FLA. STAT. § 90.610(1) (2014).
427.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1107.
428.
Id. (first alteration in original).
429.
Id.
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to inquiry about his criminal history.430 Greene ultimately testified in jail
clothes, and the jury never heard he was not a codefendant to the robbery
charge.431
In a short but well-reasoned opinion, the First District reversed and
remanded for a new trial.432 The court first discussed the prohibition against
forcing a defendant to testify in jail clothing. 433 To do so would violate
several of an accused’s fundamental rights. 434 First, it would violate his
presumption of innocence. 435 Secondly, it would also violate his right to
equal protection of the law as forcing defendants to testify in jail clothes
would usually only affect those who could not make bail before trial.436
As to forcing a defense witness to testify dressed in jail clothes, only
the Second District Court of Appeal had previously addressed this issue.437
In Mullins v. State,438 the court found such to be error as it could have an
indirect effect on the accused’s presumption of innocence.439 Witnesses do
not have the same presumption of innocence as defendants, but defendants
should not be exposed to the dangers of guilt by association or to having
their witness’s credibility unfairly undermined by matters that would be
otherwise unusable for impeachment.440
The First District agreed with this reasoning and noted that courts
from other states agreed with it as well.441 Hayes also commented that at
least one other state court had found that forcing a defense witness to testify
in jail clothes generally “‘further[s] no vital State interest.’” 442 The First
District recognized there could be unusual situations when safety concerns or
other circumstances justified requiring witnesses to testify in jail clothes or
even physical restraints. 443 But this was not the case here. 444 Instead, it

430.
Id. at 1107–08.
431.
Id. at 1108.
432.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108–09.
433.
Id. at 1108.
434.
Id.
435.
Id.
436.
Id.
437.
See Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108; Mullins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1136, 1136
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
438.
766 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
439.
Id. at 1137.
440.
See id.
441.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1108.
442.
Id. (quoting State v. Artwell, 832 A.2d 295, 303 (N.J. 2003)).
443.
Id. at 1109.
444.
Id.
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seemed that it was merely “not the common practice”445 for this judge to let
prisoner witnesses’ change into civilian clothes before testifying.446
The appellate court refused to find harmless error. 447 Greene’s
testimony that Hayes was not one of the robbers was critical to Hayes’s
defense; thus, anything detracting from Greene’s credibility could hurt
this.448 The court thus could not say there was “‘no reasonable possibility
that the error contributed to the conviction.’”449
Three things in general should happen as a result of this decision.
First, this practice should be stopped. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that
it happened in the first place. Perhaps, the First District’s opinion should be
required reading for newly elected or appointed judges when they attend
judge school. Second, defense counsel should be alert, like the one here, to
object to this when it might take place. Finally, prosecutors should also try
to prevent such errors from taking place. Prosecutors have an ethical
obligation to seek justice and not just try to get convictions at all cost.450
Additionally, why would any smart prosecutor want this to happen when it
might easily lead to reversible error like it did here? In fairness to the State
in this case, there is no mention of the State ever objecting to Greene
testifying in civilian clothes or objecting to a short continuance while he
changed. In the future, prosecutors should join with defense counsel to see
that this scenario is never repeated.
D.

Impeaching a Hearsay Declarant

Occasionally, statements from someone who does not actually testify
get admitted as substantive proof.451 If offered for their truth, the statements
are hearsay.452 When this happens, section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes
provides in part that the declarant’s credibility “may be attacked . . . by any
evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had
testified as a witness.”453 Cases construing this provision seldom arise for

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Hayes, 140 So. 3d at 1109.
Id.
See id. at 1107–09.
Id. at 1109 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986)).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n

2013).
451.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (2014).
452.
Id.
453.
Id. § 90.806(1). This subsection also provides that if so attacked, the
declarant’s credibility “may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those
purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.” Id.
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various reasons. 454 First, it is more persuasive to rely on testimony from
actual witnesses than from someone’s statement about what someone else
said. 455 Second, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause acts as a
partial check on admission of some hearsay from unavailable declarants.456
One instance where counsel may try to admit hearsay from
unavailable declarants involves defendants who want their exculpatory outof-court statements admitted without their having to testify and be fully
cross-examined.457 Provisions of section 90.806(1) of the Florida Statutes
stand as a partial obstacle for those defendants who wish to have their cake
and eat it too by doing this.458 One 2014 case illustrates both the danger to
the criminally accused in trying to do so and also sets parameters on the
extent of the State’s ability to impeach hearsay declarants.459
In Mathis v. State,460 the State charged James Mathis with possession
of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.461 The drugs were found
when the police executed a search warrant at Mathis’ residence.462 He was
home and arrested after the drugs were found.463 On cross-examination, a
police officer admitted talking with Mathis the day of the arrest. 464 The
officer conceded Mathis never made any admissions during their
conversation.465 The trial court, on the State’s request, ruled the defense had
introduced exculpatory testimony during the cross-examination, thus
entitling the State to introduce copies of Mathis’ eight felony convictions and
one misdemeanor conviction for a crime of dishonesty.466 The State did so,
and Mathis was convicted.467
On appeal, Mathis argued the officer’s cross-examination testimony
was not exculpatory.468 The Second District disagreed as the conversation
established Mathis “presumably denied . . . the drugs belonged to him.”469

454.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.806; 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1.
455.
See 1 EHRHARDT, supra note 21, at § 801.1.
456.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. STAT. § 90.806.
457.
See Freeman v. State, 74 So. 3d 123, 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
458.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.806(1).
459.
Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
460.
135 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
461.
Id. at 485.
462.
Id.
463.
Id.
464.
Id.
465.
Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485.
466.
Id.
467.
Id.
468.
Id.
469.
Id. This ruling seems undoubtedly correct. Why would the defense have
asked the question involved if not to elicit exculpatory testimony?
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Thus, the State could impeach him by prior convictions.470 However, the
appellate court agreed the State’s actual impeachment of Mathis went too
far.471 While the State was entitled to impeach Mathis with his past criminal
record, it was not automatically entitled to introduce copies of the prior
convictions themselves. 472 Had Mathis taken the stand and testified, he
could have been impeached by prior conviction under section 90.610 of the
Florida Statutes.473 Under this rule, the State could have asked Mathis if he
had ever been convicted of a felony or any crimes involving dishonesty or
false statements.474 If Mathis had said yes, the State would then have been
allowed to ask him how many? or how many times?475 If Mathis had given
accurate answers to both questions, further interrogation on his prior
convictions would have been disallowed.476 The State would only have been
able to introduce copies of his prior convictions if Mathis had answered
untruthfully to one of the two previous answers.477
In Huggins v. State, 478 the Supreme Court of Florida permitted
introduction of a defendant’s prior convictions after he elicited his own
statements as favorable hearsay but limited the procedure for doing so.479
The trial court told the jury of the number of the accused’s convictions and
whether they were for felonies or for crimes of dishonesty or false
statement.480 The trial court also gave a special limiting instruction on the
permissible use of the convictions.481 The names of the convictions were
never mentioned.482 After Huggins, in Freeman v. State,483 the district court
of appeal suggested an added procedure.484 The trial court should wait until
the defense rests before deciding on a state’s request to impeach a hearsay
declarant.485 If the declarant testified later at trial, then cross-examination

470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 485–86.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610 (2014).
Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485–86; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.610.
Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 487.
Id. at 486–87.
Id. at 487.
889 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2004).
Id. at 755–56.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 756–57.
74 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
See Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125.
Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125.
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could proceed according to the usual procedure.486 If not, the impeachment
would follow as Huggins discussed.487
The trial court in Mathis followed neither procedure.488 It did not
wait to see if Mathis would ultimately testify. 489 It also did not give a
cautionary jury instruction to use Mathis’ prior convictions only to evaluate
the credibility of his out-of-court statements and not as substantive proof of
guilt, which would have been improper propensity use of the convictions.490
Finally, it improperly admitted copies of the convictions, thus allowing the
jury to see the exact crimes he was convicted for.491 The Second District
declined to find these errors were harmless.492 Only one witness said the
drugs were Mathis’, and her own credibility was in question because of her
prior convictions.493
V.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

The privilege for attorney-client confidential communications is
recognized by all states and by federal case law as well.494 Section 90.502(2)
of the Florida Statutes provides that “[a] client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing the contents of
confidential communications when such other person learned of the
486.
Id.
487.
Id.; Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57.
488.
Mathis v. State, 135 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see
also Huggins, 889 So. 2d at 755–57; Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125.
489.
Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 486–87.
490.
Id. The cautionary instruction in Freeman is a good example of what the
jurors should have been told. Id. at 486; see also Freeman, 74 So. 3d at 125. “[E]vidence of
prior convictions should be considered only for the purpose of assessing the defendant’s
credibility of statements he allegedly made that were related by a witness and are not to be
considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense.” Freeman, 74 So. 3d. at 125.
491.
Mathis, 135 So. 3d at 485. The court’s opinion does not say whether this
happened, but if the copies had been allowed back into the jury room during deliberations, this
would have been further error. See id. at 485–87.
492.
See id. at 487.
493.
Id. at 487.
494.
See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 recognizes several general types of privileges: Those
recognized at common law; those in the U.S. Constitution; those created by federal statute;
and those created by the rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. FED. R. EVID. 501.
When a common law version of a privilege conflicts with any of the latter three types, the
common law version gives way. Id.
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized as existing at common law
and thus, continues to exist under federal case law. See id. 501, 502. Federal Rule of
Evidence 502 specifically discusses waiver limitations and inadvertent disclosure of material
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege and its closely related common law
cousin, work product. Id. 502.
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communications because they were made in the rendition of legal services to
the client.” 495 Cases on the privilege decided during this Survey period
seemed to fall within two main areas.496 They involved questions about the
privilege’s scope and its waiver, or about the crime-fraud exception to the
privilege.497 Each of these areas deserves brief discussion.498
A.

Scope and Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege

The privilege does not protect all interchange of information
between clients and their lawyers, only those communications that are
considered confidential and made to get or give legal advice.499 Florida law
places the burden on the party claiming the privilege to show it exists and
also to show it has not been waived.500 During this Survey period, Florida
courts found the following protected by the privilege: fee arrangements
between clients and their attorneys, 501 billing records between clients and
attorneys, 502 and original draft responses to interrogatories sent from the
client to her attorney.503 However, information that would not be protected
in a client’s possession does not become protected by transfer to an
attorney.504 Thus, trust account wire receipts reflecting payments into a law
firm’s trust accounts after judgment was obtained against a judgment debtor
are not protected by the privilege.505
As with other privileges, the one for attorney-client communications
can be waived. 506 This may be done by answering questions at a

495.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502(2) (2014).
496.
See Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064,
1065–66 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Merco Grp. of the Palm
Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); RC/PB, Inc. v.
Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 132 So. 3d 325, 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); infra Sections
V.A–V.B.
497.
See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66; McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50; RC/PB,
Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326; infra Sections V.A–V.B.
498.
See infra Sections V.A–V.B.
499.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(1).
500.
RC/PB, Inc., 132 So. 3d at 326.
501.
Tumelaire v. Naples Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 137 So. 3d 596, 598
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
502.
Id. at 599.
503.
See Montanez v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 135 So. 3d 510, 512 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
504.
See Sweetapple Broeker & Varkas, P.L. v. Simmons, 151 So. 3d 42, 43
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
505.
Id.
506.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.507 (2014) (discussing waiver in general for all
privileges); infra Part VI (discussing waiver of the psychotherapist-privilege).
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deposition507 or by using the communications as the basis for arguments or
answering questions at a hearing.508
One recent case concerning the privilege’s scope in bad faith tort
actions is worthy of discussion.509 Insurance companies owe a duty of good
faith to their insureds in defending them in lawsuits.510 The companies also
owe a duty of good faith to the plaintiffs bringing such lawsuit to process the
plaintiffs’ claims in a reasonable manner.511 When a plaintiff is awarded a
judgment against an insured in excess of the insured’s policy limits, both
first-party and third-party bad faith actions against the company become a
possibility.512
Boozer v. Stalley 513 involved the following factual background.
Benjamin Hintz was severely injured in a motor vehicle accident involving
Emily Boozer.514 Boozer was covered by two Allstate policies totaling $1.1
million coverage. 515 Douglas Stalley, Hintz’s guardian, sued Boozer for
negligence and recovered a $11.1 million verdict.516 Allstate paid its policy
limits exposure, leaving $10 million unsatisfied. 517 Virgil Wright, an
attorney, had been retained to defend Boozer.518 When Stalley filed a thirdparty bad faith action against Allstate to collect the unsatisfied balance,
Wright continued to appear on Boozer’s behalf in the post judgment
proceedings.519 Stalley wished to both depose Wright and to subpoena his
files in the underlying negligence action.520 Wright moved for a protective
order, asserting attorney-client privilege. 521
Wright argued that
communications between he and Boozer were privilege protected and that
she had not assigned any first-party bad faith claim she might have against

507.
See Montanez, 135 So. 3d at 512. However, here, the court found the
actual answers did not constitute a waiver. Id. at 512–13.
508.
See Butler v. Harter, 152 So. 3d 705, 713–14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2014). Here, the court found that an attorney’s affidavit merely listing the number of hours
worked on a case and the fees incurred did not disclose privileged information. Id. at 714.
509.
Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en
banc).
510.
Id. at 143.
511.
Id. at 143–44, 44 n.1.
512.
Id. at 142.
513.
146 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en banc).
514.
Id. at 139.
515.
Id.
516.
Id.
517.
Id.
518.
Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141.
519.
Id.
520.
Id.
521.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1

136

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

EVIDENCE: 2014 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW

121

Allstate to Stalley. 522 Wright appeared at a deposition with his litigation
file.523 He answered general questions about his case management system
and also about how his files were organized.524 He refused to answer any
questions or produce documents relating to his direct representation of
Boozer. 525 Both Wright and Boozer petitioned for a writ of certiorari
claiming the trial court erred by not granting them a protective order. 526
Stalley responded that since he had filed a third party action, he stood in
Boozer’s shoes and should be able to obtain any communications that would
be available to her as a client.527
After deciding that certiorari review was an appropriate means to
address the legal issues here, the Fifth District Court of Appeal undertook an
extensive review of the law in this area.528 Boston Old Colony Insurance Co.
v. Gutierrez529 was deemed the first modern decision to consider whether an
attorney representing both an insured and an insurer could be deposed and
required to produce a litigation file in a third-party bad faith action brought
without an assignment of claim from the insured.530 There, the court found
the plaintiff was entitled to the insured’s attorney’s entire file from the
lawsuit’s start until the date judgment was entered in the underlying
action.531 This was so because the excess judgment creditor now stood in the
position of the insured as far as bringing a bad faith action.532 Following
Gutierrez, the Fifth District in Dunn v. National Security Fire & Casualty
Co.,533 had rejected claims of both work product and attorney-client privilege
protection against disclosure of original litigation files in third party bad faith
actions.534
In Boozer, the Fifth District acknowledged both those decisions
supported the trial court’s ruling that Stalley should be able to review parts of
Wright’s litigation file and to depose him about his representation of her.535
However, the Court found two subsequent Supreme Court decisions left the
522.
Id.
523.
Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141.
524.
Id.
525.
Id.
526.
Id.
527.
Id.
528.
Boozer, 146 So. 3d at 141–48.
529.
325 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
530.
Id. at 416–17.
531.
Id. at 417.
532.
Id.
533.
631 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
534.
Id. at 1105; see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417.
535.
Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 139, 140, 142, 147–48 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2014) (en banc).
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holdings in Gutierrez and Dunn in question. 536 Allstate Indemnity Co. v.
Ruiz, 537 had held that in statutory first-party bad faith actions, 538 work
product material was discoverable depending upon whether the requesting
party could show both a need for such and substantial hardship unless it is
able to do so.539 In so doing, the court refused to draw any distinction for
discovery purposes between first-party and third-party bad faith actions.540
The Fifth District found Ruiz’s possible impact potentially countered
by the Supreme Court of Florida’s later holding in Genovese v. Provident
Life & Accident Insurance Co., 541 a first-party bad faith action case that
refused to extend Ruiz’s holding to discovery issues involving attorney-client
privileged communications.542 Genovese noted a clear distinction between
the purposes behind each privilege.543 The work product privilege exists to
protect an attorney’s efforts to prepare, bring and defend litigation. 544
However, it can be overcome in circumstances of need and hardship.545 The
attorney-client privilege exists to foster open communications in the
attorney-client relationship. 546 Unlike work product, claims of need and
hardship are not sufficient to abrogate this privilege. 547 As there is no
statutory exception for disclosure of this privilege’s protected
communications in first-party bad faith actions, the privilege protected
communications between an insurer and its attorney in these cases.548
The Fifth District noted that the certified question in Genovese was
limited to first-party action cases.549 However, Boozer examined cases from
Florida’s state550 and federal courts551 that found the same result should be

536.
Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1069
(Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So.
2d 1121–22 (Fla. 2005); see also Gutierrez, 325 So. 2d at 417; Dunn, 631 So. 2d at 1105.
537.
899 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2005).
538.
FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1)(b)(1) (2002).
539.
Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1122.
540.
Id. at 1131. Ruiz contains a helpful discussion on the evolution of thirdparty and first-party actions in Florida. Id. at 1129.
541.
74 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. 2011), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1043 (Fla. 2014).
542.
Id. at 1069; see also Ruiz, 899 So. 2d at 1132.
543.
Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1067.
544.
Id.
545.
Id. at 1068.
546.
Id. at 1067.
547.
Id. at 1068.
548.
See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1068; FLA. STAT. § 90.502(c) (2014).
549.
Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66.
550.
Boozer v. Stalley, 146 So. 3d 139, 144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (en
banc); see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. Scoma, 975 So. 2d 461, 465 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
551.
See Maharaj v. Geico Cas. Co., 289 F.R.D. 666, 670 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
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obtained in third-party bad faith actions. 552 Thus, it found the protective
order should have been granted in Boozer.553
The court in so doing, recognized the uncertainty in this area and
certified the following question as one of great public importance:
“DO THE DECISIONS IN ALLSTATE INDEMNITY CO. V. RUIZ . .
. AND GENOVESE V. PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE CO.
. . . SHIELD ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
FROM DISCOVERY IN THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH LITIGATION?”554
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction on this
question.555 However, before any briefs were filed, both parties moved to
dismiss, and the court granted the motion.556 Justices Pariente and Lewis
both filed dissents from the dismissal.557 Both justices argued that once the
court accepted jurisdiction, it could still decide the issue regardless of the
parties’ motions.558 Justice Pariente noted that the underlying bad faith claim
had been removed to federal court.559 Thus, the privilege issue might arise
again there, and the Supreme Court of Florida could be asked to decide it on
a certified question.560 Both justices also recognized the present uncertainty
that exists in this area and the need for its resolution.561
This is an issue that is not likely to go away. When and how the
Supreme Court of Florida ultimately resolves it cannot be determined. The
author believes that proponents of the privilege protection have the better
argument. If Florida is to recognize the privilege, then it should recognize it
for all cases unless exceptional reasons exist for doing otherwise. Since the
privilege is a creature of statute, any exceptions should be recognized first by
the legislature. Yes, application of the privilege may mean that in some
individual cases it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs like
Stalley to successfully bring a claim. But that is the price to be paid
whenever privilege protection exists. The legislature has decided so far that
this price is one generally worth paying.562 The decision whether to change
this should be left in its hands.

552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
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See id. at 141, 148.
Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
Stalley v. Boozer, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Fla. Apr. 17, 2015).
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Id.
Id.
Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting).
Stalley, 40 Fla. L. Weekly S221b (Pariente J., dissenting).
Id. (Pariente and Lewis, JJ., dissenting).
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Crime-Fraud Exception

Statutorily, there are five exceptions where otherwise confidential
communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 563 The
most commonly invoked and discussed exception is the one dealing with
claims of crime or fraud.564 The whole purpose for the privilege’s existence
in the first place is to encourage people to seek legal advice without creating
situations where either what prospective clients tell attorneys or what
attorneys tell clients will come back to haunt the client.565 Lawyers need
accurate and complete information from clients in order to best advise them,
and clients should not be afraid their attorneys’ advice will be disclosed to
the world unless the client chooses to do so.566 However, when a client seeks
assistance for legally unworthy purposes, such as for advice on how to
commit a crime or on how to hide assets from creditors after the fact, the
privilege’s purposes are not being furthered.567
During this Survey period, one case provided important instruction
on how trial courts should proceed when claims of the crime-fraud exception
are made. 568 In Merco Group of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor,569
judgment creditors served subpoenas upon Merco Group’s lawyers, seeking
documents on the location and treatment of funds that had been put into
Merco’s lawyers’ trust account.570 Merco opposed the subpoena, claiming
the records were attorney-client privilege protected among other reasons.571
The trial court rejected all other reasons572 except the privilege claim.573 As
to that, the judge ordered production of all documents for in camera review
and also instructed Merco to file a privilege log identifying each specific
document it claimed privileged.574 After this and an additional hearing on
issues of relevancy, the judge ordered production of the documents, finding
prima facie evidence Merco had used the attorney-client relationship to

563.
Id. § 90.502(4)(a)–(e).
564.
Id. § 90.502(4)(a). No case during this Survey period discussed any of the
four other exceptions.
565.
See Genovese, 74 So. 3d at 1065–66.
566.
See id.
567.
See Merco Grp. of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. McGregor, 162 So. 3d 49
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
568.
See id. at 51.
569.
162 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
570.
Id. at 50.
571.
Id.
572.
Id. The opinion does not state what these reasons were. Id.
573.
McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 50.
574.
Id.
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conceal assets that should have been discoverable.575 From this order Merco
petitioned for certiorari.576
The Fourth District agreed that the trial court’s procedure was
improper and that its production order should be at least temporarily
quashed.577 There was no error in ordering the in camera inspection of the
documents. 578 The court also did not address whether the trial judge’s
conclusion that the creditors had made a prima facie of fraud was correct.
Where the trial court erred was in not holding a subsequent evidentiary
hearing after this finding where Merco could try to provide a “reasonable
explanation of its conduct or communications.”579 Thus, whenever there is a
claim the crime-fraud exception requires production of otherwise privileged
information, at least two hearing should be required.580 The first hearing
should be to address whether the exception might lie. 581 This should be
followed by in camera inspection that would protect the privileged
information if the privilege claim is sustained.582 If the trial finds a prima
facie case that the exception applies, an evidentiary hearing must be afforded
the party claiming the privilege to further explain why the court’s tentative
conclusion is incorrect. 583 Only after rejecting any explanations from the
privilege’s proponent should disclosure be ordered.584
The hearing at which a party claims the exception applies must be
noticed as an evidentiary one if the party plans to introduce proof there.585
Otherwise, counsel cannot fairly defend against claims the privilege is
inapplicable. 586 Failure to properly notify an opponent that a scheduled
hearing is meant to be evidentiary in nature should mean that both any
finding of fraud made there and any in camera inspection order should be
quashed on certiorari. 587 This situation occurred in Trans Health
Management, Inc. v. Nunziata588 during this Survey period.589
575.
Id. at 50–51. The opinion also does not state what the judgment against
Merco was for and how much it was for. Id. at 50.
576.
Id. at 51.
577.
McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52.
578.
Id. at 51.
579.
Id.
580.
Id.
581.
Id.
582.
McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51.
583.
See id. at 50–51.
584.
See id. at 51.
585.
See id.
586.
Id.
587.
McGregor, 162 So. 3d at 51–52; see also Trans Health Mgmt., Inc. v.
Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850, 859–60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
588.
159 So. 3d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
589.
See id. at 859–60.
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PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

Florida law contains a statutory privilege for confidential
communications between a psychotherapist 590 and patient. 591 Section
90.503(2) of the Florida Statutes provides in part that patients have a general
privilege against disclosure of confidential communications to their
psychotherapist with several statutory exceptions.592 The broad nature and
scope of this privilege is obviously to encourage people to seek assistance for
their mental or emotional problems without having their discussions about
them revealed to the world. During 2014, three reported cases discussed
various aspects of this privilege.593
A.

The Privilege in General

S.P. ex. rel. R.P. v. Vecchio594 demonstrates that the privilege affords
protections to some persons who are not formal parties to litigation. Vecchio
was accused of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen-year-old child.595
The child told a night security guard at a condominium she had escaped from
a man who molested her.596 The child received a physical exam from a Child
Protection Team doctor which revealed semen in her vaginal area.597 Police
interviewed Vecchio after the security guard identified him from surveillance
footage in one of the condominium’s elevators. 598 Vecchio admitted

590.
FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(a)(1)–(4) (2014).
The definition of
psychotherapist under this privilege is extremely broad. See id. It includes medical doctors,
psychologists, credentialed clinical social workers, mental health counselors, family
therapists, and treatment personnel of certain statutorily listed facilities if these persons “are
engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including
alcoholism and other drug addiction.” Id.
The definition also includes advanced registered nurse practitioners who are
engaged in similar diagnosis or treatment care. Id. § 90.503(1)(a)(5).
591.
Id. § 90.503(1)(b). A patient is someone who consults or is interviewed
by a psychotherapist for “diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional condition[s],
including alcoholism and other drug addiction.” FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(b).
592.
See id. § 90.503(2)–(4).
593.
See S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Scully v. Shands
Teaching Hosp. Clinics, Inc., 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
594.
162 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
595.
Id. at 77.
596.
Id.
597.
Id.
598.
Id.
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performing sexual acts with the victim.599 The semen discovered in the exam
also was found to be the defendant’s.600
The victim had been sent out of state for treatment.601 Unfortunately.
she relapsed after ten months of treatment when she heard the case against
Vecchio had not been concluded.602 The treatment center filed a declaration
of her unavailability, and the state said it would proceed without her as a
witness.603 Vecchio moved to subpoena her medical, psychiatric, and other
records.604 The trial court conducted an in camera review of the records and
made one of them available to the defense.605 The others were re-sealed.606
After this, the defendant pled open “to lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or
lascivious molestation, and battery on a child.” 607 The State’s sentencing
memorandum mentioned the victim’s continuing emotional distress, and her
father testified about the same.608 Vecchio moved the trial court to unseal the
victim’s records, so he could raise a discovery violation on appeal.609 S.P.,
the victim’s natural guardian opposed unsealing the records, arguing they
were private and privileged.610 The trial court granted Vecchio’s motion, and
the State petitioned for certiorari review, which was granted.611
The Fourth District quashed the trial court’s order for several
reasons.612 Under Florida law, the Florida Constitution’s Right to Privacy613
protected the victim’s medical records from disclosure.614 Florida statutory
law also protects confidential medical records from disclosure.615 Finally,
the psychotherapist-patient privilege protected her confidential
communications to her doctors and others, made so she could get
treatment. 616 The privilege admittedly created three statutory exceptions
where disclosure was allowed: “(1) during involuntary commitment
proceedings, (2) when . . . a court order[s] mental examination[s], [and] (3)
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
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Id. at 77–78.
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id. at 81.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
Id.; S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79.
FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014); S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79.
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when the patient . . . relies on [his] mental condition . . . as [a] claim or
defense” in litigation. 617 However, none of these applied. 618 The Fourth
District also recognized that the privilege could be breached if good cause619
was shown but declined to find such here.620 The records would only have
confirmed the victim’s trauma already shown at the sentencing hearing.621
As to any potential Brady v. Maryland622 discovery violation, the defendant
did not meet his burden of showing this existed.623 The Fourth District also
commended the trial court’s in camera review of the victim’s records as
ensuring no exculpatory evidence was withheld.624
The Fourth District’s last point, commending the trial court’s in
camera review of alleged privileged records to see if an exception or good
cause existed for their disclosure, stands in partial contrast to what happened
in Scully v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.625 There, the appellant
had filed a perceived disability based claim under the Florida Civil Rights
Act alleging she had been wrongly constructively discharged.626 The alleged
constructive discharge came from Scully’s refusal to give Shands a copy of a
monitoring contract with the Professional Resource Network (“PRN”). 627
Scully had been “admitted to a psychiatric hospital [due to] an adverse
reaction to . . . medication for her psychiatric condition.”628 PRN assured
Shands she could safely return to work and was in the process of establishing
a monitoring contract with PRN.629
Scully sought to protect her PRN records from discovery. 630 The
trial court denied her a protective order and ordered their production. 631
Scully sought certiorari review in the district court.632
The First District found the records relevant and not protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as “Scully placed her medical and
psychiatric condition[s]” in issue by both the basis of her “claim and her

617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.

Id. at 79–80; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(a)–(c).
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 80.
Id. at 79; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.4615(2)(c).
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
Id.; 128 So. 3d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988.
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 988.
Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988.
Id.
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request for emotional . . . damages.”633 Thus, a statutory exception contained
in the privilege existed634 and some disclosure was appropriate.635
However, the disclosure’s scope was inappropriate. 636 PRN had
made its determination Scully could safely return to work in November
2011. 637 The discovery request asked for any medical records and
information about her without setting any time limitations.638 The trial court
compounded this problem, but not limiting its order to the time period related
to Scully’s claims. 639 Furthermore, unlike the trial court in S.P., the trial
court here had conducted no in camera review to make sure only records
relevant to Scully’s claim were ordered disclosed. 640 Thus, the case was
remanded for the trial court to do so.641
The message collectively sent about the psychotherapist-privilege by
these two decisions should be clear. Florida law seeks to protect as
privileged, psychotherapist-patient confidential communications unless there
is a clear good reason for not doing so.642 Even then, the privilege must be
protected to all extent possible consistent with the legitimate needs of the
parties.643 Thus, even when a statutory exception or other good cause for
disclosure exists, trial courts should do in camera records review to make
sure their disclosure orders are not broader than they should be.
2.

Confidential Communications and Third Party Presence

Like any other privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege can be
waived by its holder.644 Section 90.503(1)(c) of the Florida Statutes defines
a confidential communications as one “not intended to be disclosed to third
persons” 645 except for three instances. 646 Usually the presence of a third
party to an otherwise confidential communication will destroy the
633.
Id.
634.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(4)(c) (2014) (providing that there is no privilege
when any party “relies upon the [mental or emotional condition of the patient] as an element
of [the party’s] claim or defense.”).
635.
Scully, 128 So. 3d at 988.
636.
Id. at 989.
637.
Id. at 987.
638.
Id. at 988.
639.
Id. at 988–89.
640.
S.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Vecchio, 162 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989.
641.
Scully, 128 So. 3d at 989.
642.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (2014).
643.
S.P., 162 So. 3d at 79.
644.
State v. Topps, 142 So. 3d 978, 981 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
645.
FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c).
646.
Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(1)–(3).
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communication’s confidentiality and waive the privilege. 647 The Fourth
District in a case of first impression recently discussed a situation where it
found that should not be so.648
Avery Topps stabbed a dog to death and then tried to be admitted to
a hospital.649 A deputy sheriff went to the hospital to arrest Topps.650 An
emergency room doctor acting as a psychotherapist to possibly provide either
for the defendant’s psychiatric commitment or for his clearance to be jailed
examined Topps with the deputy in the room.651 The deputy was present to
provide for the medical staff’s safety. 652 As standard part of Topps’
psychiatric evaluation, the doctor asked Topps why he came to the
hospital. 653 Topps then told the doctor about the stabbing. 654 The State
argued Topps waived any privilege by making the statements in the
officer’sa third partypresence.655
The trial court agreed with Topps and granted his motion to exclude
the statement as privileged.656 In so doing, the judge found the officer had
been present for multiple reasons: to keep custody of Topps, to ensure
medical staff safety, and to make sure Topps got needed medical attention.657
Thus, as Topps had sought the treatment himself, “the deputy’s presence
furthered the interest of the patient by allowing the examination to take place
even though he was in custody as an arrestee.”658
The Fourth District acknowledged the general rule that when a third
party hears a communication, that can often destroy confidentiality and make
testimony about it admissible.659 However, the privilege statutory language
recognizes there are times when third parties may be needed to help
communication in the therapeutic setting or otherwise aid the patient’s
interest in getting diagnosis or treatment.660 One of those third party groups
are “[t]hose persons present to further the interest of the patient in the
consultation, examination, or interview.” 661 Another group includes
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.

Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981.
Id. at 978.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id.
Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979.
Id.
Id. at 979–80.
Id. at 980; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c) (2014).
FLA. STAT. § 90.503(1)(c)(1).
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“persons necessary for the transmission of the communication.” 662 The
deputy fell into both of these groups.663
The deputy’s presence furthered Topps’s interest in getting care
because without it, no attempt to treat him would have occurred.664 Topps
would not have been left alone with the doctor without law enforcement
there.665 So the deputy’s presence was essential to Topps getting any help at
all.666 The deputy was also a person whose presence was needed for the
transmission of the communication because again, without the deputy being
present, Topps would not have been allowed to be with the doctor.667 The
doctor needed Topps’s statement as to why Topps came to the hospital for
help.668 Topps would never have been able to make this statement if he had
been immediately removed from the hospital itself. 669 Additionally, no
follow-up on the statement could be done without it being made in the first
place.670
The Fourth District noted that sometimes a third party’s presence
when a statement is made implies a waiver of an otherwise privileged
communication.671 That should not be the case here because the deputy’s
presence was not voluntary on Topps’s part.672 As long as Topps stayed in
the room with the doctor, the deputy would be there whether Topps wished it
or not.673 Since waivers usually must be voluntary or at least be implied
voluntary from reasonable circumstances, no express or implied waiver was
found here.674
The Topps opinion also gives several cogent policy reasons why
waiver should not be found here. The policy behind the privilege is to not
only protect certain communications patients do not want widely revealed
but also to encourage those who feel in need of mental health care to seek it.
Finding waiver here would discourage persons who commit criminal acts
from seeking the mental health assistance they need. Finally, as the court
662.
Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(2). A third group is “persons who are participating in
the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.” Id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3).
This third group clearly did not exist in State v. Topps. See id. § 90.503(1)(c)(3); Topps, 142
So. 3d at 978, 980–81.
663.
See Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981–82.
664.
Id. at 981.
665.
Id. at 981–82.
666.
See id.
667.
Id.
668.
Topps, 142 So. 3d at 981.
669.
See id. at 981–82.
670.
See id. at 982.
671.
Id. at 981.
672.
Id.
673.
Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979, 981.
674.
Id. at 981–82.
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noted, people should not have to give up their privilege against selfincrimination to seek medical treatment and diagnosis.675
Several points apparently not raised by the State are not addressed by
the court’s opinion. Topps could have arguably whispered his answer to the
doctor or have insisted the deputy stand far enough away so the deputy could
not hear the answer.676 In theory, either of these could have been done. To
insist that they be done to preserve the privilege would be ridiculous. First,
Topps was already having problems or believed he had serious problems.
Why else would he have gone to the hospital? To require under these
circumstances that he whisper his answer would be to require extraordinary
action from him. People should not have to go to extreme lengths to
preserve their privileges. Second, even if Topps had wanted the deputy to
stand far enough away so the deputy could not hear, the deputy might not
have agreed to do so. Indeed, if concern for medical staff safety was one
reason for the deputy’s presence, having him stand far away from Topps and
the doctor could actually increase the risk of harm to medical staff. Topps
supposedly had just engaged in a violent act, what is there to say he might
not do so against the doctor?
The court’s opinion is a wise accommodation between the need for
safety, security, and the need to have certain communications protected, so
they will be made to begin with. True, the exclusion of Topps’s statement
may mean there is not sufficient evidence to convict him. But the loss of
potential evidence is always the price that must be paid to recognize and
enforce a privilege’s protection. The legislature has decided this is not too
great a price to pay to promote psychotherapist-patient interchange.677 Topps
goes far in respecting and furthering that decision.
VII.

HEARSAY

Unless someone is a hermit and lives alone in a cave or is a castaway
stranded alone on a deserted island without any modern means of contact
with the outside world, communication with other people is a daily fact of
life. Indeed, one can hardly go through an ordinary day without it. As a
result, many to most trials involve some testimony about what people say or
write to one another.678 When these out-of-court statements are offered for
their truth at trial, hearsay issues arise.679
675.
Id. at 982; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
676.
Topps, 142 So. 3d at 979–81.
677.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.503(c) (2014).
678.
See id. § 90.801(1); Topps, 142 So. 3d at 978–79; infra notes 800–10 and
accompanying text.
679.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c).
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Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes defines hearsay as “a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
[other] hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” 680 In theory, hearsay is inadmissible at trial. 681 However, any
experienced lawyer or judge knows this is a myth. Despite the general
prohibition against admitting hearsay statements, most hearsay statements
fall within either one of three statutory exemptions682 or one of the thirty
exceptions to the general prohibition in the rules.683
The key to handling hearsay issues is to first determine if a statement
is hearsay to begin, with and, if so, then consider whether it falls within an
exemption or exception. If a statement is not being offered for its truth, it is
not hearsay.684 If hearsay falls within an exemption, it also is not considered
hearsay, despite having all the attributes of a classical hearsay statement.685
At one time, a number of common misconceptions as to what was or was not
hearsay were prevalent. One would think that after almost forty years under
the Code these misconceptions would no longer exist. Unfortunately, one
recent case meriting brief mention shows that this is not so.686 In Taylor v.
State,687 a victim told a police officer about the defendant’s alleged threats
against her shortly after they happened. 688 The defense objected to her
testifying about these statements and convinced the trial court her statements

680.
Id. § 90.801(1)(c).
681.
Id. § 90.802. This principle is embodied by section 90.802 of the Florida
Statutes, which states that “[e]xcept as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”
Id.
682.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(a)–(c). Section 90.801 of the Florida Statutes,
after defining hearsay, provides three explicit situations where statements, which would
otherwise fall within this definition, are declared exempt from the prohibition: (1) prior
inconsistent statements under oath; (2) prior consistent statements offered to rebut claims the
declarant has a motive to falsify or fabricate; and (3) prior statements of identification. Id. §
90.801(1)(c), (2)(a)–(c). All three exemptions require that the declarant’s whose statement is
being introduced testify and be subject to cross-examination about the earlier statement. Id. §
90.801(2)(a)–(c).
683.
Section 90.803 of the Florida Statutes, which does not require declarant
unavailability, contains twenty-four exceptions. See id. § 90.803. Section 90.804 of the
Florida Statutes, which does have a declarant unavailability condition, has an additional six
exceptions. See id. § 90.804.
684.
FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1); Caballero v. State, 132 So. 3d 369, 371 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that a victim’s prior inconsistent statement that the defendant
had not sexually battered her at a certain time was not hearsay, as it would have been
admissible for impeachment purposes and not for its truth).
685.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801.
686.
See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 114–15 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
687.
146 So. 3d 113 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
688.
Id. at 114.
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did not fall within the excited utterance exception. 689 However, the trial
court ruled her statements were not hearsay at all690 because the victim, the
declarant, was available and subject to cross-examination at trial.691 As the
Fifth District declared, “[i]n so ruling, the trial [court] articulated a common
misconception about the hearsay rule.”692 Only if the victim’s out-of-court
statements, which were clearly offered as a truthful account of what just
happened to her, fell within one of the three exemptions in the rule could
they be considered non-hearsay. 693 As they did not, the statements were
hearsay despite the declarant’s availability for cross-examination at trial.694
As with other areas of evidence law, not every case mentioning the
hearsay rule merits. Thus, this Survey does not discuss cases arising during
2014 concerning the following issues of hearsay: hearsay in restitution
hearings, 695 hearsay in probation revocation hearings, 696 corpus delicti
rule, 697 prior consistent statements, 698 state of mind exception, 699 and past

689.
Id. at 115; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2). As the Fifth District said on
appeal, this ruling was wrong. See Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16.
690.
Id. at 115.
691.
Id.
692.
Id.
693.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2); Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115.
694.
Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115.
695.
See Phillips v. State, 141 So. 3d 702, 705, 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (finding a trial court erred in allowing a victim to testify as to the value of stole items
when the testimony was based on a website the victim had consulted).
696.
See McDoughall v. State, 133 So. 3d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (finding hearsay admissible at probation revocation hearings, but it cannot provide the
only basis for revocation).
697.
Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 446 (Fla. 1993) (Shaw, J., concurring and
dissenting). Before the State can introduce an accused’s statement’s to prove an offense, it
must offer evidence to independently prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. Id. at 443.
The corpus delicti has been defined as “the fact that a crime has actually been committed, that
someone is criminally responsible” for it. Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also J.B. v.
State, 166 So. 3d 813, 815–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing defendant’s petit theft
conviction where the only evidence other than her admissions to the theft was inadmissible
hearsay testimony from store employees who did not see the crime itself but only testified to
an absent declarant’s statements).
The general corpus delicti rule is not statutorily codified, but comes from cases
construing the Code’s exception for personal admissions. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(a). In
certain types of sexual abuse crimes, the corpus delicti rule has statutorily been relaxed. See
id. § 92.565(2) (provides that in certain prosecutions for sexual crimes, an accused’s
statements can be introduced without proof of the corpus delicti if the trial court finds that
“the state is unable to show the existence of each element of the crime, and . . . finds that the
defendant’s confession or admission is trustworthy”). However, this does not preclude the
state from introducing a defendant’s confession by satisfying the traditional requirements of
corpus delicti needed for other, non-sexual offenses. See Ramirez v. State, 133 So. 3d 648,
652 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that when the state meets the traditional corpus
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recollection recorded exception. 700 Several significant cases on hearsay
topics are discussed below.701
A.

Excited Utterances
1.

In General

One of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is
that of excited utterances. 702 Section 90.803(2) of the Florida Statutes
defines these as “[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declaring was under the stress of
delicti requirement, the hearing and findings required under section 92.565 of the Florida
Statutes do not apply).
698.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b); Howard v. State, 152 So. 3d 825, 828–29
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statement did not qualify under the exemption for
prior consistent statements, under section 90.801(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes, as a state
witness’s prior consistent statements elicited on direct examination were used prematurely to
improperly bolster the witness’s testimony before any cross-examination had been done
suggesting the witness was being untruthful).
699.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); Combs v. State, 133 So. 3d 564, 567 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that statements of a third party that he and another man
planned to rob a bank defendant was accused of robbing should have been admitted under the
state of mind exception). The statements showed the declarant’s present intent to do a future
act, and the actual robbery provided enough of a basis to show the declarant had acted
consistent with this intent. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567.
Under this exception, the statements must be offered to prove the declarant’s, not
someone else’s state of mind or subsequent acts, and the declarant’s state of mind must be
relevant. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(3)(a); see also Combs, 133 So. 3d at 567. For a recent case
finding error in admitting statements under this exception when the declarant’s state of mind
was not relevant, see Henderson v. State,135 So. 3d 472, 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
700.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(5); Blount v. State, 152 So. 3d 29, 30–31 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding the deposition of a victim who claimed he could not
completely remember the event testified to in the deposition qualified as past recollection
recorded when the other requirements for the exception were met); McNeal v. State, 143 So.
3d 1078, 1079–80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that before a writing qualifies under
this exception, the declarant must verify its accuracy or correctness. Here the victim’s failure
to do so for her written out-of-court statement disqualified it under this exception.).
This Survey’s author notes that the defense did not object to the deposition being
entered at trial on grounds that it would have violated the accused’s Confrontation Clause
rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Blount, 152 So. 3d at 30. Hopefully such an objection
would be made if the state tries to make similar use of deposition in the future. See Blount,
152 So. 3d at 30. Whether the accused would have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the victim for confrontation purposes would then have to be addressed. See Yero v. State, 138
So. 3d 1179, 1184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). To the author’s knowledge, no reported case
in Florida has addressed this issue.
701.
See infra Sections VII.A–C.
702.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2).
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excitement caused by the event or condition.” 703 This exception and its
requirements have been discussed in many reported cases. 704 Depending
upon which case one wishes to cite, the exception has either two or three
elements.705 State v. Jano706 appears to have the most complete one. There
the Court found three requirements for the exception: (1) there must be an
event sufficient to cause nervous excitement, (2) the declarant must in fact
have been excited by the event, and (3) the declarant’s statement was made
while the excitement from the event was continuing. 707 Another way of
saying this by use of a trilogy is that there must be an excited statement made
by an excited person whose excitement was caused by an exciting event. As
this exception comes up fairly frequently, especially in criminal cases, the
cases mentioning it during this Survey period are worth reviewing.
Nine-one-one telephone calls present a common scenario where a
party, usually the State, argues there are excited utterances.708 Emergency
phone calls seem to so intuitively involve excited utterances that courts and
attorneys may make the mistake of assuming this is so.709 With any other
exception, the proponent of the hearsay has the burden of demonstrating its
requirements are met.710 When an objection is made, the trial court should
hold a brief hearing or make explicit findings on the record concerning the
exception’s requirements before admitting the statements.711 Failure to do so
can often result in reversal.712
Unless the declarant or someone who knew and heard the declarant
when the call is made testifies, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy
the exception’s requirements. For example, in Brandon v. State713, a 911
caller identified the defendant as the person who had assaulted the caller and
threatened her husband.714 When the caller could not be at trial to testify
703.
Id.
704.
See State v. Jano, 524 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1988); Taylor v. State, 146
So. 3d 113, 115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Brandon v. State, 138 So. 3d 1150, 1152 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
705.
See Jano, 524 So. 2d at 661; Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115; Brandon, 138 So.
3d at 1152.
706.
524 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1988).
707.
Id. at 661; see also Stoll v. State, 762 So. 2d 870, 873–74 (Fla. 2000)
(later discussed these same requirements but merely combined the second and third ones, so as
to find two, instead of three requirements. Substantively this makes no difference).
708.
See Morrison v. State, 161 So. 3d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014);
Tucker v. State, 884 So. 2d 168, 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
709.
See Morrison, 161 So. 3d at 565.
710.
See Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152.
711.
See id. at 1151–52; FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014).
712.
See, e.g., Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152.
713.
138 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
714.
Id. at 1151.
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about the events, the State offered the call’s contents to prove them.715 After
the contents were admitted and the accused convicted, the appellate court
reversed.716 As neither the caller nor someone who knew her testified, the
State never proved the caller’s identify.717 Likewise, since the State only
could produce testimony from the person who received the call, there was no
proof whether the caller was excited at the time, and even more importantly,
how long after the alleged assault and threats the call had been made. 718
Without showing the time element, the State could not establish that the
declarant had no time to contrive or to reflect on the alleged event.719 In
fairness to the State, it appears the prosecution may have been surprised by
the alleged victim’s absence. 720 However Brandon shows that in some
instances it is better to just drop charges than try to stretch meager facts to fit
an exception. At least the wasted cost of trial and appeal is not incurred then.
Taylor, referred to above, shows the requirement that the declarant
be excited cannot be taken to an extreme. 721 The defendant allegedly
threatened and shot at the victim who drove away in her car.722 She went to
a restaurant to call 911 but stopped from doing so when she saw a police
officer.723 Instead, the victim promptly told the officer what happened.724
The trial court allowed the officer to testify about what the victim had said
on the erroneous ground it was not hearsay, after making the equally
erroneous finding the statements were not excited utterances. 725 After
Taylor’s conviction, the Fifth District found the statements should have been
admissible as excited utterances, even though they clearly were hearsay.726
The officer testified the victim had calmed down some so she could tell him
what happened; however, she was still shaking, crying, and appeared
excited.727 Thus “[a]though she may have calmed down enough to speak”728
as the officer had said she did, the overall excitement from the shooting and

715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
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Id. at 1152.
Id.
Brandon, 138 So. 3d at 1152.
Id.
See id. at 1151.
See Taylor v. State, 146 So. 3d 113, 115–16 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114–16.
Taylor, 146 So. 3d at 115–16.
Id. at 116.
Id.
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threats just minutes previously existed. 729 Therefore, the statements fell
within the exception.730
2.

The First Complaint Exception

Under the Code, hearsay statements are only admissible as provided
by statute.731 Thus, theoretically only exceptions explicitly listed in the Code
should be recognized. However, some Florida courts continue to recognize a
common law exception not explicitly listed, sometimes similar to the one for
excited utterances. Twenty years ago, Pacifico v. State732 found that if the
alleged victim of a sexual assault or battery makes a statement “at [the] first
opportunity to complain to anyone other than [the alleged attacker] after the
sexual encounter,” the statement would be admissible over a hearsay
objection.733 Subsequent case law found that even if the victim’s first try to
complain to another person is unsuccessful, later statements to that same
person about the assault may fall under the first complaint exception if they
are not made after “an unduly long period of time.”734
Pacifico suggests the statements would be admissible even if they do
not qualify under any other hearsay exception.735 Another court, soon after
the Pacifico decision, took a slightly more restrictive approach to the first
complaint exception.736 In Burgess v. State,737 the court took an approach
that might be described as an attempt to split the baby, even though it is hard
to view this decision as having much Solomonic quality. Burgess recognized
the exception’s existence but limited its contents to “only the fact of the
report of the sexual battery but not the details.”738 Burgess would require
that statements reporting the details satisfy the statutory elements of another
hearsay exceptionone mentioned in the Codesuggesting this would
probably be either one for excited utterances or for present sense
impressions. 739 This presents the unusual situation that under the first
complaint exception, a jury might be able to hear the victim say she had
reported being attacked but would not be able to hear any details from the
729.
Id.
730.
Id.
731.
FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (2014).
732.
642 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
733.
Id. at 1186.
734.
Fletcher v. State, 698 So. 2d 579, 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1997); see
also Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
735.
Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1186–87.
736.
Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92.
737.
644 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
738.
Id. at 591.
739.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(1)–(2) (2014); Burgess, 644 So. 2d at 591–92.
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victim about the attack unless, of course, the statement describing the details
falls within a statutory exception. So then why is first complaint exception
needed in the first place?
Apparently, the answer is that a relatively prompt first complaint
rebuts any claim the victim had consented to the sexual acts involved. Case
law before passage of the Code admits such complaints to corroborate the
victim’s testimony.740 If the victim complained about being attacked when
she first had a chance, then her actual testimony about the attack in court is
more likely to be true.741 Under this theory a statement giving details of the
attack is not necessary for corroboration. The complaint is not being offered
for its details but for the fact that it was made relatively promptly thereafter.
Under this theory, the statement is not being offered for its truth but for the
mere fact it was made; but then, it would not be hearsay in the first place. So
why is an exception needed? Probably because courts realize that the mental
gymnastics this line of reasoning requires juries to perform is difficult or
impossible for them to do. Juries will almost undoubtedly take a complaint
to someone that I have been attacked as proof the attack happened and not as
proof that the victim is not lying when she says at trial it happened.
Thus, the exception itself rests on the theory that juries will perform
mental exercises it is almost impossible for a reasonable person to do,
regardless of whether a limiting instruction is given them or not. However, if
the statement is admissible under an exception, then—in theory—no limiting
instruction is required.742 So then, why not also allow testimony under the
exception about the details?
Besides this problem with the exception, there is another difficulty
with it. The exception apparently rests on the now fallaciously proven idea
that any female sexually attacked would of course report it at the very first
chance. What if the female does not do so? Then, the sexual act must either
never have taken place743 or have been consensual to begin with. However,
modern studies show that it is not unusual for victims to delay reporting

740.
Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768, 770 (Fla. 1889) (noting that this is supposedly the
first case to recognize this exception). The Court there declared that:
The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that
she does complain goes to the jury as evidence; but her detailed statement of the
circumstances under which she was outraged cannot be given in evidence . . . by the
party to whom she made the statement. Such testimony is hearsay, and it is
calculated to confuse and mislead the jury, and is not permissible.

Id.
741.
See Custer v. State, 34 So. 2d 100, 106 (Fla. 1948) (en banc).
742.
See Pacifico v. State, 642 So. 2d 1178, 1186–87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994); McDonald v. State, 578 So. 2d 371, 373–74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
743.
Custer, 34 So. 2d at 106. Modern medical testimony now can much more
effectively rebut this assertion. See Pacifico, 642 So. 2d at 1181.
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being attacked for various reasons, not including consent.744 Thus, the need
for the first complaint exception is based on outdated, fallacious reasoning,
both about sexual attack victims and the mental ability of juries.
More recent case law has questioned the legitimacy of recognizing
such an exception and suggested it is beyond the power of courts to judicially
do so. 745 The latest case questioning the exception’s very existence was
decided during this Survey period.746 In Browne v. State,747 a college student
intern at a doctor’s office claimed that the doctor had attempted to sexually
batter her late one evening after her intern hours.748 The victim claimed she
fought the defendant off, drove home, and called a friend about being upset
because Browne was following her.749 The victim went to the friend’s home
where she met the friend’s boyfriend.750 The defendant claimed the victim
had consented to the encounter, and the State called the victim’s friend to
testify about what the victim had told her that night. 751 Over defense
objection, the friend was allowed to repeat the victim’s account based on
either the first complaint or excited utterance exceptions.752
The Fourth District found error in admission of the friend’s
testimony and reversed the convictions. 753 As to the excited utterance
exception, the State failed to establish how much time had passed between
the alleged attack and when the statements were made; thus it did not satisfy
the requirement that the victim had not had time for reflection.754 As to the
first complaint exception argument, the court’s opinion was even more
detailed.755
The court noted that while some courts still accepted the existence of
the first complaint exception, others did not.756 Section 90.802 of the Florida
Statutes explicitly provided that the only exceptions to the hearsay rule were,

744.
JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA: RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE
TOWN, at xiii (2015).
745.
See Browne v. State, 132 So. 3d 312, 316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
This case did not directly question the legitimacy of the first complaint exception. Id.
Instead, it questioned in general the legitimacy of any exception not recognized in the Code.
Id.
746.
See id.
747.
132 So. 3d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
748.
Id. at 314.
749.
See id. at 314–15.
750.
Id. at 315.
751.
Id.
752.
Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2) (2014).
753.
Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317, 319.
754.
Id. at 317; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(2).
755.
Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17.
756.
Id. at 316.
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thus, statutorily recognized in the Code. 757 Section 90.102 of the Florida
Statutes provides that “[t]his chapter—[chapter 90]—shall replace and
supersede existing . . . common law in conflict with its provisions.”758 Thus,
section 90.802 of the Florida Statutes had effectively abolished the common
law first complaint exception, and the legislature had not codified it. 759
Therefore, the court found the exception no longer existed in Florida.760
Browne’s reasoning seems hard to refute. Although the court did not
use this, it clearly was invoking the principle of statutory construction that a
specific provision should control over a more general one. Section 90.802 of
the Florida Statutes specifically abolished all but statutory exceptions; thus,
the first complaint exception no longer existed despite section 90.102 of the
Florida Statutes’ general language. 761 Browne also provides interesting
authority that the exception is no longer valid in Florida since the Fourth
District had recognized the exception earlier in Burgess. 762 Although
Browne did not expressly overrule Burgess, it certainly does so by
implication.
The Supreme Court of Florida has not yet decided this issue. 763
Until it does so, some courts may recognize the exception. Better courts and
good prosecutors will seek to avoid invoking it and instead try to use a
statutory one in its place.
B.

Market Reports and Commercial Publications

As mentioned above, the Code has three statutory exemptions and
thirty statutory exceptions to the ban against using hearsay. 764 Most
attorneys know the common ones. Once in a great while, a decision will
discuss what might be called one of the exotic exceptions to hearsay, in the
sense that this exception is rarely, if ever, encountered in practice.
757.
FLA. STAT. §§ 90.802, .803.
758.
Id. § 90.102.
759.
See id. §§ 90.102, .802; Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316.
760.
Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802. The
court also found that even if the exception still had existed, the friend’s testimony went
beyond just testifying about the complaint and recited the details of the alleged attack—
something the exception did not allow. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17.
Finally, Browne rejected the argument that the victim’s statement was admissible as
a prior consistent statement under section 90.801(2)(b) because the court found the victim had
a motive to falsify before the statements were made. Browne, 132 So. 3d at 317–18; see also
FLA. STAT. § 90.801(2)(b).
761.
FLA. STAT. §§ 90.102, .802; see also Browne, 132 So. 3d at 315–16.
762.
See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316; Burgess v. State, 644 So. 2d 589, 591–92
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
763.
See Browne, 132 So. 3d at 316–17.
764.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.801, .803–.804.
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Section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes contains one of the less
frequently invoked exceptions to hearsay. 765 This section provides that
“[m]arket quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published
compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in
particular occupations if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of
information and method of preparation were such as to justify their
admission” 766 are not excluded by the hearsay rule. 767 This is commonly
called the trade reports exception.768
Until 2014, only one reported Florida case discussed this
exception.769 In Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Services, P.A.,770
the court upheld a party’s use of American Medical Association (“AMA”)
terms and categories used for computer billings to establish damages for
uncompensated services.771 The opposing party had used the same terms and
codes, and these came from a trustworthy source, the AMA’s Current
Procedural Terminology Editorial Panel.772
During this Survey period, Hardy v. State,773 held that information in
the Florida Department of Health’s computer database about prescription
drugs did not come within the trade reports exception for two reasons.774
First, section 90.803(17) of the Florida Statutes, unlike its federal
counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17),775 requires the information to
be published. 776 The First District interpreted this to mean it must be
available to the public.777 As access to the database was limited to certain
authorized state employees, it did not qualify.778 Second, the court looked at
the exception’s general title and found the database was not like a market
765.
766.
767.
768.

See id.
Id. § 90.803(17).
Id.
See id.; Hardy v. State, 140 So. 3d 1016, 1019 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.

2014).
769.
See Health Options, Inc. v. Palmetto Pathology Servs., P.A., 983 So. 2d
608, 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
770.
983 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
771.
Id. at 616.
772.
Id.
773.
140 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
774.
Id. at 1019–20.
775.
FED. R. EVID. 803(17); FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014). Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(17) states that “[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations [that
are] generally . . . relied [on] by the public or by persons in particular occupations” are not
excluded by the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 803.
776.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17); Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020; see also FED. R.
EVID. 803(17).
777.
Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1020.
778.
Id.
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report or other compilation commonly used in commerce.779 Thus, even if
the data had been freely available to the public, it would still not fall within
the exception.780
Judge Rowe wrote a protracted dissent in which he interpreted the
word published more broadly than the majority.781 According to him, “the
court’s focus should be the purpose for which the information was
disseminated rather than how widespread the information was
disseminated.”782 The judge acknowledged the database was not published
in the ordinary sense of the word but was still published to not only
authorized Department of Health employees but also some law enforcement
officers for limited purposes.783 He also argued that the database should be
considered “within the category of other publications in the same ilk as a
tabulation or list as set forth in the statute”784 even if it was not a compilation
commonly used in commerce.785
Judge Rowe’s dissent, while forcefully argued and well-written,
ignores the exception’s express language. The exception does not use the
words other publications; it says other published compilations.786 So long as
this database is not published within the ordinary sense of that word, under
basic principles of statutory construction, the majority’s opinion has the
better of this argument.
C.

Business Records in Foreclosure Cases

Business records are among the commonly used hearsay exceptions,
especially in commercial cases.787 During this Survey period, a number of
reported decisions discussed the business records exception.788 All but one
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting).
Hardy, 140 So. 3d at 1022 (Rowe, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
See id.
FLA. STAT. § 90.803(17) (2014).
Id. § 90.803(6). This section provides in part that:

A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make such . . . . are not excluded by the general prohibition against
hearsay.

Id.
788.
See, e.g., Yisrael v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 955–58 (Fla. 2008); Hunter v.
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 572–73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review
denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014).
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of them involved the introduction of bank records in loan foreclosure
actions.789 The foreclosing party’s failure to either attempt to introduce any
business records790 or failure to lay a proper foundation for their introduction
resulted in a number of reversals.791
The required elements for the business records exception are not in
debate. In Yisrael v. Florida,792 the Supreme Court of Florida clearly stated
that proponents of business records must demonstrate four elements: “(1) the
record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from
information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the

789.
See Caldwell v. State, 137 So. 3d 590, 590−91 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014). Caldwell was the one reported decision not involving loan foreclosure. See id. There
the court reversed the defendant’s robbery conviction because of the admission of a booking
report. Id. at 590, 592. The booking report and statements in it were used to prove the
defendant’s height and weight at the time of his arrest. Id. at 590–91. Although the court
found such reports could be business records under the hearsay exception, the State’s failure
to lay a foundation for when the information in them was received, how the reports were kept,
and that it was a regular practice to keep reports like this made this report inadmissible
hearsay. Id. at 591–92.
790.
See Beauchamp v. Bank of N.Y., 150 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2014). Beauchamp reversed judgment for the bank because a loan service company
representative’s testimony was admitted based on the records that had never been introduced
into evidence and thus were inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 827−29. Although the opinion does
not mention this, the testimony also violated the best evidence rule as it was about the material
contents of a document that had not been admitted or otherwise accounted for. See id. at 827–
28.
791.
See Kelsey v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 131 So. 3d 825, 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2014). Six reported decisions discussed the foundation for the business records. See
Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 822−26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014);
Wolkoff v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 153 So. 3d 280, 282−83 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2014); Cayea v. Citimortgage, Inc., 138 So. 3d 1214, 1216–17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014);
Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 572; Lindsey v. Cadence Bank, N.A., 135 So. 3d 1164, 1167−68 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. Four of them found reversible error for
failure to lay a proper foundation for admission under the business records exception. See
Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 820; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 571;
Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. Two affirmed judgments foreclosing on loans, finding no error in
admission of bank records under the business records exception. See Cayea, 138 So. 3d at
1215; Lindsey, 135 So. 3d at 1169. From this number of reversals, one might conclude that
there are often problems introducing business records under the exception in loan foreclosure
actions. See, e.g., Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826. This conclusion may not be correct as the
number of the reported cases does not give any idea of how many cases there were actually
tried or decided on summary judgment where there was no issue about a proper foundation.
Contra id. Perhaps the best that can be said from the reported decisions is that when the issue
of business records foundations is raised on appeal in foreclosures, the courts are carefully
scrutinizing the trial record to make sure the exception’s requirements have been satisfied.
See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 821−22; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281–82; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at
571−72; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.
792.
993 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 2008).
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ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was
regular practice of that business to make such a record.”793
Thus, what must be shown should be no surprise to business records
proponents.794 The problem seems to be how to do so. Choosing the right
person or persons to authenticate the records and lay their foundation under
the exception is the critical choice.795 Two recent decisions provide good
representative examples as to how and how not to go about laying the
foundation needed for the business records exception.796
To successfully foreclose on a loan, the foreclosing party must show
an agreement between the borrower and the plaintiff or a subsequent legal
transfer of the loan to the plaintiff, the borrower’s default on payments, an
acceleration of the debt to maturity, and the amount remaining due on the
loan.797 When the original lender transfers the loan to another party, laying
the business records foundation to show all this has caused problems. 798
Usually to do so, the plaintiff attempts to introduce loan payment history
records that are computer generated.799 Such computer printouts may qualify
as business records assuming the proper foundation is laid even though the
actual printout was done in connection with a particular lawsuit. 800 The
person called to authenticate the records and lay the foundation must,
therefore, be familiar with the business practices of more than one company
and with how each company takes, records, and keeps payments on loans.801
While a witness’s testimony that certain computer programs and certain
practices are standardly used in the lending industry is helpful, a witness’s
testimony must also be specific with respect to how a particular company
services its loans. 802 When a witness working for one company cannot
testify about how another company who had been involved with the loan
does this, then foundation problems occur unless additional witnesses are

793.
Id. at 956.
794.
See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.
795.
See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 824; Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Hunter,
137 So. 3d at 572–73; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826; Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 282.
796.
Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1217; Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.
797.
Kelsey, 131 So. 3d at 826.
798.
Wolkoff, 153 So. 3d at 281.
799.
See, e.g., Cayea, 138 So. 3d at 1216.
800.
See id. at 1217 (stating that “[p]rintouts of data prepared for trial may be
admitted . . . even if the printouts themselves are not kept in the ordinary course of business so
long as a qualified witness testifies as to the manner of preparation, reliability, and
trustworthiness”).
801.
See id. at 1217–18.
802.
See id.; Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 826 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Hunter v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC, 137 So. 3d 570, 573 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2014).
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called who can do so.803 This was the case in both Hunter v. Aurora Loan
Services, LLC804 and Burdeshaw v. Bank of New York Mellon805 where the
employee of the subsequent loan assignees could not testify how previous
holders of loans kept and recorded their information. 806 While a witness
does not have to be the person who actually makes entries for payments on
the loan—the person who actually keeps the loan records or the person who
prepared the records for trial—the witness must know how the companies
concerned do so.807
These two decisions suggest that counsel for foreclosing lenders
should be especially careful when more than one holder of a note or
mortgage is involved. Counsel should then always ask, “do I need more than
one witness”, and “do I have the right witnesses to satisfy the business
records foundation?” Counsel must make their own investigation and
evaluation to ensure this and not just assume that whomever the foreclosing
party wants to send as a witness is sufficient.
Contrary to these two cases, it is what happened in Cayea v.
Citimortgage, Inc. 808 There, Citimortgage was the original loan holder,
making matters easier than in multiple holder cases.809
A company employee in its default research and litigation
department testified about Citimortgage’s regular practice of inputting
payments, whether made electronically or by mail, into its system by
payment processing department employees. 810 He also testified how
payment entries were kept and that it was the lender’s regular practice to do
so.811 Although he did not work in the payment department himself and had
not done any of the actual inputting or record keeping on this loan, his
testimony was sufficient to admit computer printouts of the loan history as
business records.812
Foundations for business records should be no problem if an attorney
takes the time to understand how a particular business or company is run and
selects the proper witnesses to testify about this. The Burdeshaw decision
provides a helpful multi-page summary of the cases dealing with this

803.
804.
1040 (Fla. 2014).
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.
812.

See Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573.
137 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014), review denied, 157 So. 3d
148 So. 3d 819 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 826; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573.
Burdeshaw, 148 So. 3d at 823; Hunter, 137 So. 3d at 573.
138 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
See id. at 1215.
Id. at 1215–16.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
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exception in loan foreclosure cases.813 This should be a required reading for
counsel in this field.
VIII.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Section 90.952 of the Florida Statutes provides in part that “an
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”814 This requirement is
commonly known as the Best Evidence Rule.815 The rule does not usually
apply unless the contents of the writing, recording, or photograph are
considered material to the issues in a case.816 Additionally, modern versions
of the rule do not strictly enforce the requirement of the original.817 Indeed,
copies of a writing are now freely admissible unless there is some reason to
believe that the proponent of such has either acted in bad faith or that the
offered substitute is not accurate.
The rule usually is so easily satisfied that it does not generate many
evidentiary issues. However, during this Survey period, three cases arose
that deserve brief discussion.818
A.

Videotape Evidence

Two best evidence rule cases involve admission of videotape
surveillance against an accused in a criminal case. 819 Photographs are
broadly defined under the rule to include more than just still pictures. 820
Videotapes are explicitly included within this definition.821 When videotapes
that actually capture a crime are introduced to show an accused’s guilt, there
is no best evidence rule problem.822 Problems arise when the videos are not
produced at trial, and the state still wants to benefit from them.823 The reason

813.
See Burdeshaw v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 148 So. 3d 819, 823–27 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
814.
FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014).
815.
T.D.W. v. State, 137 So. 3d 574, 575–76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
816.
See Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1184–85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
817.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.953.
818.
See infra Section VIII.A.
819.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575; Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181.
820.
FLA. STAT. § 90.951(2). Section 90.951 of the Florida Statutes defines
photographs as including “still photographs, X-ray films, videotapes, and motion pictures.”
Id.
821.
Id.
822.
See Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1184–85.
823.
See id. at 1185.
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behind the videos’ absence can make all the difference in the world as
illustrated by two recent cases.824
In Yero v. State, 825 the State charged the accused with theft of a
woman’s wallet.826 The victim and her fiancée were at a bar late at night
when they were approached by Yero who stood between them and spoke
with them briefly. 827 The wallet was sticking out of the victim’s purse,
which was hung over a chair’s back. 828 After speaking with them, Yero
excused himself, went outside, came back and bought the couple drinks.829
He then paid his own bar bill and left. 830 Five minutes later, the victim
noticed her wallet missing, and the sheriff’s office was called.831 A deputy
arrived and learned the bar had surveillance cameras.832 The deputy and the
two patrons watched the video.833 It showed Yero, at first, had no bulge in
his pockets until after he stood between the couple.834 The bulge’s shape
matched that of the missing wallet. 835 The video further showed Yero
leaving the bar, coming back inside, no longer having the same bulge in any
pocket.836
All three testified at trial and described what they had seen on the
video.837 The video itself was not shown as it had been overwritten by the
bar’s security system.838 The deputy testified he had tried to get the video
that night but was told it was unavailable. 839 Nine days later, when the
deputy returned to the bar, the tape was already overwritten.840 The system
automatically recorded over any previous surveillance footage after five
days, but no one ever told the deputy this.841 Thus, the tape was lost for use
at trial.842 However, the trial court still allowed testimony about its contents

824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.

See id.; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575.
138 So. 3d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182.
Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182.
Id.
Id.
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after the State elicited proof about how it was unavailable.843 Yero appealed
his conviction claiming the State had lost in bad faith the exculpatory
evidence, violating both his Due Process rights and the Best Evidence
Rule.844 As to his Due Process rights, the Third District found no bad faith
on the State’s part and further found the tape would have been inculpatory,
not exculpatory, in any event. 845 On the best evidence claim, the district
court noted that the rule statutorily provided for instances where originals
were not required. 846 One instance is when “[a]ll originals are lost or
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.”847 As
the facts showed there was no bad faith, the witnesses’ testimony about the
tape’s contents was permissible even in its absence.848
What if a videotape is shown at trial, but the State elicits testimony
about the contents of another tape that is not? T.D.W. v. State849 presented
that very scenario and led to a reversal.850 The State charged the defendant
with being involved in a home burglary.851 A detective testified he was able
to identify T.D.W. as one of the burglars from the angle shown on a
surveillance video the detective viewed outside of trial.852 Even though other
videotapes were shown at trial, the one showing the angle the detective
referenced was not. 853 This proved to be crucial evidence against the
defendant leading to his conviction.854
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. 855 The detective had
testified the missing video clearly showed the accused’s face as one of the
burglars.856 Unlike in Yero, the State never offered any explanation for the
video view’s absence.857 Even though the State contended on appeal the tape
843.
Id.
844.
Id. at 1182–84.
845.
Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1183.
846.
Id. at 1184–1185; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1) (2014).
847.
FLA. STAT. § 90.954(1).
848.
Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1185. Section 90.954 of the Florida Statutes lists three
other instances when testimony about the contents of a missing writing does not violate the
best evidence rule: The original cannot be obtained by judicial process, the opposing party
controls the original and is on notice it will be needed at hearing or trial, and the original is not
material. FLA. STAT. § 90.954(2)–(4).
849.
137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
850.
Id. at 575, 578.
851.
Id. at 575.
852.
Id.
853.
Id.
854.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575.
855.
Id. at 575, 578.
856.
Id. at 576.
857.
Id. at 577; see also Yero v. State, 138 So. 3d 1179, 1182 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2014).

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

165

Nova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 1

150

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

was lost or destroyed, unlike in Yero, it never offered any proof at trial to
back up this assertion.858 The State, as the proponent of the tape, had the
burden to demonstrate the reason behind its absence, especially because its
contents were clearly material. 859 Thus, it would be “unfair, under the
circumstance, to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”860 The Fourth
District found that “when offered to prove [a] crime without introduction of
the video in evidence, a witness’s in-court description of the actions depicted
on the video is content-based testimony that violates the best evidence
rule.”861
B.

Promissory Notes

As mentioned, duplicates are usually admissible to the same extent
as originals under the Best Evidence Rule.862 One exception to this general
rule of free substitution is when there is a negotiable instrument or other
special kind of commercial document.863 This includes promissory notes.864
Alavi v. Garcia865 involving promissory notes, summary judgment hearings
and the best evidence rule is a recent case of first impression.866
The appellants had summary judgment entered against them in an
action on a promissory note. 867 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510
governs summary judgment proceedings in Florida. 868 Subsection (c) of
Rule 1.510 requires that any motion for summary judgment must be served
858.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577; see also Yero, 138 So. 3d at 1182.
859.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577.
860.
FLA. STAT. § 90.953(3) (2014). The court did not actually quote this
subsection, but the gist of its opinion clearly reflects this language. See T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at
577.
861.
Id. at 576.
862.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.953; T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576–77.
863.
FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1). Admissibility of duplicates, states in part that
[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original, unless: (1) the
document or writing is a negotiable instrument, . . . a security, . . . or any other
writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security
agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary
course of business with any necessary endorsement or assignment.

Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not have similar language and seem to have
no special provisions about commercial documents under the best evidence rule. See FED. R.
EVID. 1003.
864.
See FLA. STAT. § 90.953(1).
865.
140 So. 3d 1141 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
866.
Id. at 1142. Although the court’s opinion does not label itself as one of
first impression on the issue it decides, it does say “there appears to be no precedent directly
on point.” Id.
867.
Id.
868.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014).
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on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing date, and the motion
must include copies of any evidence the movant relies upon.869 The motion
must identify any “materials as would be admissible in evidence ‘summary
judgment evidence’ on which the movant relies.”870 Subsection (e) furthers
requires any affidavits “shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence.”871 It also requires that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
[therein].”872 When Garcia filed for summary judgment, he did not file the
original of the promissory note twenty days before the hearing.873 Appellants
argued this required reversal as the best evidence rule had been violated by
the failure to do so.874
The Fifth District declined to find the best evidence rule applicable
to summary judgment hearings. 875 The court found the rule “applies to
proceedings wherein evidence is introduced” 876 but that evidence is not
formally introduced in summary judgment hearings.877 The hearings are held
to see if there are any material issues of fact meriting a trial.878 If not, the
trial court simply renders judgment as a matter of law. 879 Under the
summary judgment rule’s own language, the movant need only show proof
that would be880 admissible later at trial.881 For a promissory note, at trial the
note would have to be authenticated and the original produced at trial. 882
However, an affidavit setting forth facts supplying the authentication and
attaching a copy of the original is all that is needed for summary judgment.883
The court also declared that “[e]ven assuming that the best evidence rule
applies in the summary judgment context, we hold that the presentation of
the original note at or before the hearing satisfies [the] rule”,884 thus serving
it on the opposing party twenty days before the hearing would not be
869.
Id. 1.510(c).
870.
Id.
871.
Id. 1.510(e).
872.
Id.
873.
Alavi v. Garcia, 140 So. 3d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
874.
Id. at 1143.
875.
Id.
876.
Id.
877.
See id.
878.
Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143.
879.
See id.; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510 (2014).
880.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143.
881.
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510; Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143.
882.
Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143.
883.
Id.
884.
Id. The court noted the Fourth District had also found production of the
original at the hearing sufficient to satisfy the rule. Id.; see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.
v. Clarke, 87 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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needed.885 The court did note that surrender of the original note was needed
before final judgment could be entered unless it was proven the note had
been lost or destroyed.886
Admittedly this case is as much about summary judgment as it is the
best evidence rule. However, it serves as a reminder that some proceedings
require the originals of certain commercial documents if they are available.
The court’s construction of the summary judgment rule’s wording as would
be admissible also seems a very reasonable one. If the rule had intended a
different result, one would expect it to read, that is admissible at trial or in
the same form that would be admissible at trial. One would also not expect
the words summary judgment evidence to have been used. The use of these
three words clearly indicates that there is a distinction between it and trial
evidence. Finally, the case serves as a reminder to counsel moving for
summary judgment–bring the originals of documents to hearings in case the
trial court decides they are mandatorily required there.887 As the saying goes,
“better safe, than sorry.”
IX.

CONCLUSION

Overall, 2014 was probably a typical year for evidentiary
developments. 888 Few statutory changes were made in the Code. 889
Likewise, the courts decided few cases of first impression.890 This shows
that after over thirty years, major issues under the Code have largely been
resolved. Now that this is so, attorneys and courts have to be careful in the
judgment they use presenting and deciding evidentiary issues. Unfortunately
some of the cases discussed in this Survey could fall under the category of
can you believe that ones. Trial counsel and trial courts are on the front line
as guardians of the Code, even though the appellate courts and Florida
Legislature are its ultimate guardians. All of us must take this responsibility
seriously.

885.
886.
887.
888.
889.
890.

Alavi, 140 So. 3d at 1143.
Id.
See id. at 1142–44.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts II–VII.
See supra Parts II–VII.
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INTRODUCTION

The common thread between all attorney advertisements consists of
the delicate balance between the professionalism of the practice of law and
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protected commercial speech under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.1 Traditionally, solicitation and advertising by lawyers has been
looked down upon in the practice of law.2 In order to maintain the nobleness
of the profession, lawyers were expected to build a reputation that would
attract their business and clientele.3 The prohibition on advertising began as
a rule of legal etiquette and not rules of ethics, as advertising regulations are
modernly viewed.4 Lawyers treated the legal profession more as a public
service rather than as a trade or means of earning a living.5 It was believed
that commercializing legal services would lower the nobleness and honor of
the profession.6
Over time, these strong views against attorney advertisements
evolved into a standard for rules of ethics. 7 The Canons of Professional
Ethics, drafted in 1908 by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), entirely
prohibited attorney advertising and solicitation, claiming advertising and
solicitation by lawyers was unprofessional.8 Later in 1969, the ABA drafted
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Model Code”), which
was adopted by every state in the nation and followed the Canons model of
prohibiting all forms of attorney advertisements.9 After the Supreme Court
of the United States decided in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona10 that attorney
advertisements were classified as commercial speech and thus protected
under the First Amendment, the ABA was left to change the standards of
attorney advertisements in order to reflect this landmark decision and to
uphold First Amendment protection of attorney advertisements.11 As a result
of this decision, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA
Model Rules”) were drafted and later approved by the ABA in 1983,
allowing attorney advertisements, but strongly prohibiting in-person

1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210–12
(1953).
2.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12.
3.
Veronica Wooten Brace, Limits on Marketing of Attorney Services, 8 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (1996).
4.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977); Brace, supra note 3,
at 110.
5.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210; Brace, supra note 3, at 110.
6.
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 211–12.
7.
See Brace, supra note 3, at 110.
8.
CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); Brace, supra
note 3, at 110–11.
9.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)–(B) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1975); Brace, supra note 3, at 111.
10.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
11.
Id. at 383–84; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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solicitation by lawyers.12 The ABA Model Rules have since served as the
model for professional lawyering codes for sixty-five percent of the states,
leaving the majority of the states to permit various forms of attorney
advertisements.13 Throughout the history of the legal profession, in response
to constitutional challenges and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, the ABA has amended both ABA Model Code and ABA Model
Rules, permitting attorney advertising but still retaining a heavy grip in
regulating advertising as much as the Constitution and the Supreme Court of
the United States has allowed.14
The delicate balance between the honor and nobleness of the legal
profession and the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech is
critical in the case of a Florida law firm that is challenging The Florida Bar’s
Standing Committee on Advertising for denying the firm’s proposed plan to
send automated text messages in hopes of obtaining potential clients.15 The
law firm’s plan consists of obtaining “a daily list provided by the . . . county
clerk of court to [retrieve] phone numbers of [people who had been] arrested
the previous day.”16 The law firm would then use these contacts to send
automated text messages advertising the firm’s legal services to these listed
individuals.17 The text messages would provide an opt out option for the
recipients to choose to not receive any future communications from the
firm. 18 The Committee found that the firm’s proposal of automated text
messages is considered direct solicitation and is thus prohibited by Rule 47.18(a) of The Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 which
involves direct contact with prospective clients.20 The law firm countered
the Committee’s response by claiming that text messages are not similar to
direct telephone communications, and that due to modern habits and modern

12.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983);
Brace, supra note 3, at 111 n.19.
13.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983); Brace, supra note 3,
at 111.
14.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983 & 2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101 (1975).
15.
Nathan Hale, Fla. Bar Rejects Firm’s Plan to Send Ads Via Text
Messages, LAW360 (May 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/659251/flabar-rejects-firm-s-plan-to-send-ads-via-text-messages; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976);
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12.
16.
Hale, supra note 15.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014).
20.
Id. r. 4-7.18 (2014); Hale, supra note 15.
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modes of communication, text messages serve the same purpose as email or
direct mail.21
This Comment will focus on commercial speech, the rights of
lawyers to advertise legal services, and the regulations that The Florida Bar
has placed on attorney advertisements.22 This Comment will also discuss
why Florida’s regulations on attorney advertisements are neither consistent
with the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions, nor take into
consideration modern modes of communication utilized in today’s society.23
Part II of this Comment will examine regulations on attorney advertisements
on a national level and discuss the Supreme Court of the United States’
decisions regarding commercial speech and protection of attorney
advertisements and solicitations under the First Amendment, as well as the
ABA’s rules on attorney solicitation and advertising. 24 Part III of this
Comment will explain the various modes of attorney advertisements,
including direct and indirect solicitation of potential clients and targeted
letters to potential clients.25 Part IV of this Comment will introduce the State
of Florida’s rules regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations and
compare Florida’s rules to the ABA’s rules regarding attorney
advertisements.26 This Comment will then analyze attorney advertisements
via text messages in Part V and explain how text messages are indirect
modes of advertising and why Florida should consider modern modes of
communication in regulating attorney advertisements. 27 Ultimately, this
Comment will conclude that text messages can be considered direct
communications, which are protected forms of commercial speech that
should not be restricted by The Florida Bar.28
II.
A NATIONAL LOOK AT ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS: THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
A.

Opening the Door to Protection of Attorney Advertisements

Commercial speech was first recognized as protected speech under
the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Hale, supra note 15.
See infra Part II–IV.
See infra Part IV–V.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.29 In this case, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that commercial speech is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment, even if the speech is purely economic or the speaker’s
motive of the speech is to receive pecuniary gain. 30 The appellees,
consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy challenging the validity of a Virginia statute under the
First Amendment. 31 The state statute prohibited pharmacists to advertise
prices of prescription drugs.32 The Court explained that commercial speech
was of general public interest and served as a benefit to society, providing
consumers with the knowledge and availability of goods and services.33 It
was further held that a state’s interest in protecting and upholding the
professionalism of the field might not be sufficient enough to maintain the
prohibition of an advertisement. 34 Ultimately, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to commercial speech and concluded that although a
state is free to regulate commercial speech, a state may not place a complete
ban on advertisements or commercial speech and keep the knowledge of the
availability of goods and services away from consumers.35
The protected First Amendment right to commercial speech was
extended to attorney advertisements in the case of Bates.36 This was the first
case subsequent to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to weigh the rights of
attorneys to advertise against the ABA Model Rules and state bar rules in the
light of commercial speech and First Amendment protection.37
In this case, the appellants were two licensed attorneys in the State of
Arizona who in order to generate business, placed an advertisement in a local
newspaper advertising legal services and the prices of the services offered by
29.
30.

425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; see also U.S. CONST. amend.

I.
31.
CONST. amend. I.
32.
33.
34.

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50, 753–54; see also U.S.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50.
Id. at 764–65.
Id. at 766, 770.

The challenge now made, however, is based on the First Amendment. This casts
the [b]oard’s justifications in a different light, for on close inspection it is seen that
the [s]tate’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages
of their being kept in ignorance. The advertising ban does not directly affect
professional standards one way or the other.

Id. at 769.
35.
Id. at 770; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
37.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1970).
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the firm.38 The Arizona State Bar claimed that the firm’s use of a newspaper
advertisement to generate business violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)
incorporated by the Supreme Court of Arizona that read:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.39

A hearing was held before the Special Local Administrative
Committee, which decided that the appellants should be suspended from
practicing law for a period of six months.40 The appellants challenged the
Committee’s decision as a violation of their First Amendment rights. 41
Focusing on their previous decision and precedent set by Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the same
First Amendment protection of commercial speech was applicable to
attorney advertisements of legal services and fees.42 The Court explained
that even if a speaker’s intent in making the speech is purely economic, such
speech is protected in certain contexts. 43 Stressing the societal interests
served by commercial speech, the Court discussed how commercial speech
informs the public of the availability, prices, nature of products and services,
and assures “informed and reliable decision-making.”44 Since the decision of
the Court in Bates, attorney advertisements are not subject to complete
prohibition or suppression; however, states retain a right to regulate attorney
advertisements.45
B.

How Far Can Regulation of Attorney Advertisements Go?

Both landmark decisions of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and
Bates determined that commercial speech was protected under the First
Amendment; however, both cases held that states retained the right to
38.
39.

Bates, 433 U.S. at 353–54.
Id. at 355; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)

(1970).
40.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 356.
41.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 357; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
43.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 364.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 383–84.
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regulate commercial speech under certain contexts.46 These two Supreme
Court of the United States’ decisions determine that commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment but retains lesser protection than other
constitutionally protected forms of speech.47 Despite the lessened protection
that commercial speech is granted under the First Amendment, commercial
speech is still protected from unwarranted governmental regulation.48 Both
cases are influential decisions in regard to protection of commercial speech
under the First Amendment; however, neither of these decisions discussed to
what extent commercial speech could be regulated by the government or by
the states.49
Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of
the United States set a standard consisting of a four-prong analysis for what
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of how far the government or
states may regulate commercial speech.50 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,51 the Supreme Court was
presented with the question of whether a regulation from the Public Service
Commission of New York completely banning promotional advertising of an
electrical utility company violated the First Amendment. 52 The Court
defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.”53 For commercial speech to be
protected under the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful
activity and may not be misleading.54 If the speech is concerning lawful
activity and is not misleading, the speech falls within First Amendment
protection. 55 The Court determined that in order to restrict commercial
speech, the asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on
commercial speech must be substantial. 56 If the asserted governmental
interest to be served is substantial, it must be “determine[d] whether the
46.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–72.
47.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761, 770.
48.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 363; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
51.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52.
Id. at 558; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
54.
Id. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
56.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
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regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
[the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.”57 Taken together, this analysis is known as the Central Hudson
test. 58 Based on the Central Hudson test, in determining whether
commercial speech is guaranteed First Amendment protection and whether
the government or state has the ability to restrict the commercial speech, the
protection of the speech looks at the nature of the expression and nature of
the governmental interest served by the regulation imposed.59 Regulations of
commercial speech are measured under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.60
A state’s restrictions on commercial speech “must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important [state] objective.”61
The Court in Central Hudson held that in order to determine whether
the restriction on commercial speech is in proportion to the government or
state interest, the restriction must directly advance the government or state
interest involved, and if the government or state interest could be served by a
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restriction will
not meet First Amendment muster.62 In other words, the restriction imposed
may only extend as far as the interest that it serves.63 Similar to Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy and Bates, the Court in Central Hudson held that a
ban on advertising could not survive if the ban is imposed to protect ethical
or professional standards of a profession.64 The Court concluded, as stated in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, “‘[t]he advertising ban does not directly
affect [the] professional standards [of a profession] one way or the other.’”65

57.
58.

Id.
Id.

In commercial speech cases, then, a fourpart analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.

Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 563; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at

564.
63.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564.
64.
Id.; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378, 383 (1977); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
65.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 (quoting Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769) (alteration in original).
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The Court found that the state’s interest in upholding professionalism is not a
substantial interest in regulating commercial speech.66
In 1982, the Court took the Central Hudson test and analyzed it from
the perspective of attorney advertisements in the case of In re R.M.J. 67
Comparing this Supreme Court decision to Bates, In re R.M.J. was the first
case subsequent to Central Hudson to apply the four-prong analysis of what
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of regulation permitted on
attorney advertisements.68 The Court in In re R.M.J. emphasized the holding
of Bates, where the Court held that commercial speech protection under the
First Amendment extended to attorney advertisements and “‘advertising by
attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.’”69 The Court found
in Bates that the advertising of prices for legal services offered was neither
advertising unlawful activity nor a misleading advertisement, preventing the
speech from being prohibited on that basis. 70 The Court in Bates also
rejected suppression of an attorney advertisement based on the state interest
that attorney advertisements had negative effects on the profession.71
The Court in In re R.M.J. found that although Bates was a critical
case in analyzing the extent of protection of attorney advertisements under
the First Amendment, the decision in Bates was a narrow decision in holding
that attorney advertisements could still be regulated by states.72 The Court
found that “[f]alse, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to
restraint, and . . . advertising by the professions poses special risks of
deception, ‘because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services,
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’” 73 In
regards to attorney advertisements, the Court in Bates did not set any
standards or regulations “on potentially or demonstrably misleading
advertis[ements].” 74 However, in circumstances subsequent to Bates, the
Court reasoned that regulation and prohibition of advertisements are
permissible where the advertisements are likely to be misleading. 75 The
66.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571–72.
67.
455 U.S. 191, 203, 206 (1982).
68.
Id.; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Bates, 433 U.S. at
383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 382–83.
71.
Id. at 368–69, 371.
72.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433
U.S. at 383.
73.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383).
74.
Id. at 202.
75.
Id.
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Court in In re R.M.J. set the official standard for the commercial speech
doctrine in the context of advertising for professional services as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the [s]tate[] may impose
appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited
entirely. But the [s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on
certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.76

Even though a state holds the ability to regulate non-misleading
commercial speech, “the [s]tate must [still] assert a substantial interest, and
the interference with the speech must be in proportion to the interest
served.”77 Regulations on commercial speech and professional advertising
“must be narrowly drawn, and the [s]tate lawfully may regulate only to the
extent regulation furthers the [s]tate’s substantial interest.”78
While Central Hudson established a four-pronged analysis as to
what constitutes commercial speech and the extent that the government may
regulate commercial speech, the Central Hudson test focused on commercial
speech in a general context. 79 The Court in In re R.M.J. took the fourpronged analysis of Central Hudson and applied it to professional
advertising.80 The four-pronged analysis of Central Hudson is used by the
Supreme Court of the United States in determining whether certain contexts
of commercial speech are protected under the First Amendment, and the
extent to which such speech may be regulated by the states.81
C.

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The ABA is a professional organization of lawyers and law students
from all over the nation.82 The ABA was founded in 1878 and has since
expanded to four hundred thousand members, committed to: “[S]erving . . .
76.
Id. at 203.
77.
Id.
78.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
79.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564–66 (1980).
80.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203–04; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447
U.S. at 566.
81.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
82.
See
About
the
American
Bar
Association,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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members, improving the legal profession, eliminating bias . . . and advancing
the rule of law throughout the United States and around the world.”83 The
ABA aims to uphold the legal profession and provide practical tools and
resources for lawyers.84
One of the roles of the ABA is to establish model ethical codes,
which the majority of states in the nation have adopted as a part of their own
ethical standards.85 The current ethical rules established by the ABA are the
ABA Model Rules.86 The ABA Model Rules “were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1983 [and] [s]erve as models for the ethical rules of
most states.”87 California is the only state that does not model their ethical
and professional rules for lawyers after the ABA Model Rules.88 The current
ABA Model Rules set ethical and professional standards for lawyers across
the nation in regard to the client-lawyer relationship, acting as a counselor,
acting as an advocate, transactions with persons other than clients, law firms
and associations, public service, information about legal services, and
maintaining the integrity of the profession.89
The ABA standards regarding attorney advertising and solicitation
are found in Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules.90 The general
rule of attorney advertising is found in Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules and
reads “[s]ubject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may
advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication,
including public media.” 91 The ABA and ABA Model Rules follow the
precedent by Bates, recognizing that attorney advertisements serve a
fundamental benefit to the consumers in need of legal services.92 The ABA
states:
To assist the public in learning and obtaining legal services,
lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only
through reputation but also through organized information
campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an
active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.; About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html
(last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
86.
See About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
87.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
88.
About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (2015).
89.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013).
90.
Id. r. 7.2–.3.
91.
Id. r. 7.2.
92.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977).
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should not seek clientele. However, the public’s need to know
about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising . . .
. The interest in expanding public information about legal services
ought to prevail over considerations of tradition. Nevertheless,
advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are
misleading or overreaching.93

The modern ABA Model Rules completely overturned the ABA’s
1969 ABA Model Code and the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethicsboth
of which defined the traditional view of attorney advertising as
unprofessional and placed complete bans on attorney advertisements.94 After
the ABA Model Rules were adopted in 1983, attorney advertisements were
recognized as protected commercial speech under the First Amendment, and
ethical attorney advertisements came as a result of the Supreme Court of the
United States decisions in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Bates, and In
re R.M.J.95
The ABA Model Rules discuss the rules of attorney solicitation in
Rule 7.3:
A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time
electronic contact solicit professional employment when a
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s
pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted: (1) is a lawyer; or (2)
has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with
the lawyer. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by
written, recorded, or electronic communication or by in-person,
telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise
prohibited by paragraph (a), if: (1) the target of the solicitation has
[been] made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the
lawyer; or (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or
harassment.96

The distinction that the ABA Model Rules make between the rules
regarding attorney advertising and attorney solicitation involves the use of
real-time or live communications to a specific audience.97 The ABA defines
93.
94.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. (2013).
About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1975); CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (Am.
Bar Ass’n 1908).
95.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199–200 (1982); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383–84;
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770, 773
(1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013).
97.
See id. r. 7.2 (ABA professional rules of attorney advertisements); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013) (ABA professional rules of attorney solicitations).
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solicitation as “a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is
directed to a specific person and . . . offers to provide, or can reasonably be
understood as offering to provide, legal services.”98 A communication to the
general public is not considered solicitation by the ABA.99 The ABA Model
Rules express concern for potential abuse through solicitation of direct inperson or live communication by a lawyer to a potential client.100 According
to the ABA Model Rules, “[the] potential for abuse inherent in direct inperson, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation justifies its
prohibition, particularly since lawyers have alternative means of conveying
necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services.”101 The
ABA Model Rules explain that communications with potential clients can be
sent through other electronic modes of communication that are not
considered to be real-time or live communications, such as e-mail or other
electronic modes of communication.102 The ABA’s goal in prohibiting direct
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is to prevent a potential client
from hiring an attorney based on undue influence, intimidation, or pressure
under the circumstances.103
The ABA has a substantial interest in prohibiting direct, in-person
solicitation to protect the consumer of legal services; however, targeted or
direct solicitation may benefit the consumer or potential client, as well as the
attorney.104 In an article published by the ABA Journal in 2013, Stephanie
Francis Ward discussed how consistently targeting advertisements to a
specific audience may benefit a legal practice. 105 Ward countered the
traditional belief that lawyers should attract their business clientele through
good work and not through advertisements,106 by stating, “[s]ome lawyers
believe that if you do good work, people will automatically come to you.
They are wrong. People need reminders.” 107 Ward stressed the ABA’s
promotion of direct advertisements by referring to the fact that personal
injury lawyers often send targeted advertisements and letters to accident
98.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 cmt. (2013).
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3. cmt (2013).
104.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
7.3 cmt (2013).
105.
Stephanie Francis Ward, 50 Simple Ways You Can Market Your Practice,
A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/50_simple_
ways_you_can_market_your_practice.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
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victims, and criminal defense lawyers often refer to arrest reports in hopes of
targeting and obtaining potential clients. 108 This practice of targeted
advertisements benefits both the consumers who are in need of legal services
and who may not know how to go about obtaining legal representation and
the attorneys who are in need of business and clientele.109
III.

PROTECTED FORMS OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS

Looking at the ABA Model Rules and at the ethical and professional
rules of the states that are modeled after the ABA Model Rules, there are
many permissible forms of attorney advertisements and solicitation through
written or electronic communications. 110
Two forms of attorney
advertisements that result in a gap between the standards for attorney
advertisements of the ABA and state ethical and professional rules are
indirect and direct solicitation, specifically targeted letters to potential
clients.111
A.

Direct Solicitation v. Indirect Solicitation

In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 112 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “the [s]tate—or the Bar acting with state
authorization—constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients
in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that
the [s]tate has a right to prevent.”113 In this case, the appellant, a practicing
lawyer, learned of a young girl who was a driver in a recent car accident.114
The appellant visited the young accident victim in the hospital, where he told
the accident victim that he would represent her, and subsequently, the
accident victim signed an agreement retaining the appellant’s legal
representation and agreed that the appellant would receive one-third of the
victim’s recovery.115
After obtaining the signed retainer agreement with the accident
victim, the appellant contacted the passenger of the vehicle that the victim
was driving and informed the passenger that she had a chance of recovery
108.
Id.
109.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376–77 (1977).
110.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a), 7.3(a)–(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013); About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
111.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a)–(b) (2013).
112.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
113.
Id. at 449.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 450.
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against the driver and persuaded her to sign a contingent fee agreement.116
When the passenger of the vehicle decided she did not want to sue the driver
and attempted to revoke her agreement with the appellant, the appellant
claimed that the agreement was binding and could not be revoked.117 The
driver of the vehicle also attempted to revoke her agreement with the
appellant.118 Both the driver and passenger of the vehicle brought complaints
against the appellant with the Grievance Committee of the Geauga County
Bar Association. 119 These complaints were later referred to the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio,
who determined that the appellant violated the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility, and appellant argued that it was his First Amendment right to
solicit his legal services to potential clients.120
In Ohralik, the Court stated that “[t]he solicitation of business by a
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with [a] prospective client
has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession’s ideal of the
attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to
the prospective client.”121 The Court determined that a state has a stronger
interest in heavily regulating direct in-person solicitation than in regulating
indirect attorney advertisements made towards the public.122 In-person direct
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is still considered to be
commercial speech and thus protected under the First Amendment; however,
in-person direct solicitation receives a lower level of judicial scrutiny.123 The
Court distinguished the in-person solicitation used by the appellant in
Ohralik from the indirect advertising at issue in Bates, in that in-person
solicitation may discourage potential clients in need of legal representation
and “may disservice the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates,
in facilitating ‘informed and reliable decision-making.’”124 The Court also
recognized a significant difference between in-person direct solicitation and
indirect advertisements in that “[u]nlike a public advertisement, which
simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or
not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
350, 364 (1974).
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Id. at 449, 451.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452–53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 457; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
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reflection.”125 In-person solicitation—because of the intimidation and undue
influence that it has the potential to cause—does not stand up to the
precedent set forth by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates, in
holding that commercial speech, specifically attorney advertisements, serve
the fundamental function of informing the public of the availability and
nature of goods and services and promote rational decision-making.126
The Court in Ohralik, held that a state has a substantial interest in
regulating in-person direct solicitation by attorneys to potential clients,
because “the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an
unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”127 It was decided by the
Court that a state has reason to believe that in-person solicitation may be
harmful to the person who is solicited, and thus, the state has an interest in
protecting its people from this harm.128 The Court held that being officers of
the courts, attorneys serve the role of administering justice and a state has an
interest in regulating attorneys and the standards of the legal profession,
including setting forth standards regarding attorney advertisements.129
The Supreme Court of the United States set fundamental precedent
regarding direct and indirect solicitation and attorney advertisements in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.130
In this case the appellant was a practicing attorney who in hopes of
expanding his practice, ran advertisements for his law firm in a local
newspaper.131 The appellant targeted defendants of drunk driving cases.132
When the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel saw the appellant’s
newspaper advertisement, the appellant was informed that his advertisement
violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited
offering representation to criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis. 133
Appellant then withdrew the advertisement.134 One year later, the appellant
ran another newspaper advertisement targeting women who had suffered
injuries from the use of a particular contraceptive device. 135 As with the
125.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
126.
See id. at 457, 466–67; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976).
127.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464–65.
128.
Id. at 466.
129.
Id. at 460.
130.
471 U.S. 626, 641–42, 645–47 (1985).
131.
Id. at 629–30.
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 630; see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C)
(1970).
134.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630.
135.
Id. at 630–31.
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targeted drunk driving advertisements previously posted by the appellant,
this advertisement attracted the attention of the Ohio Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. 136 The appellant was charged with violating several disciplinary
rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, including that the
targeted drunk driving advertisement was “‘false, fraudulent, . . . and
deceptive to the public’ because it offered representation on a contingent-fee
basis in a criminal case” and the advertisement targeted toward injured
women was not dignified and violated the state rule that “[a] lawyer who has
given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice.”137 In its
opinion, the Court stressed that because the appellant was proposing a
commercial transaction, the appellant’s speech was commercial and fell
within the boundaries of First Amendment protection.138 The question for
the Court then was the extent that the use of direct advertisements may be
regulated.139 Throughout its holding, the Court kept in mind that complete
prohibition or “blanket bans on price advertising by attorneys and rules
preventing attorneys from using non-deceptive terminology to describe their
fields of practice are impermissible.” 140 The Court also kept in mind
throughout its holding, that in regards to rules prohibiting in-person
solicitation, there are some circumstances where rules prohibiting in-person
solicitation of potential clients by attorneys may be permissible. 141
Differentiating the use of in-person solicitation by the appellant in Ohralik,
with the use of newspaper advertisements by the appellant in Zauderer, the
Court determined that the use of newspaper advertisements, though directed
toward a specific audience, did not invade the privacy of those individuals
who read the newspaper and saw the advertisement for legal services.142 The
Court further discussed that print advertisements do not have the same high
risk of overreaching or undue influence that in-person solicitation has. 143
The Court stated:
Print advertising may convey information and ideas more or less
effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the
136.
137.

Id. at 631.
Id. at 631–33 (footnote omitted); see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1), 104(A), 106(C) (1970).
138.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–38; see also Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (holding that commercial speech includes
any speech that proposes a commercial transaction).
139.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629.
140.
Id. at 638.
141.
Id.; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58.
142.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
143.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
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personal presence of a trained advocate. In addition, a printed
advertisement, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney,
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.144

An indirect advertisement, although aimed toward a specific
audience, allows a potential client to reflect on the need and ability of hiring
a particular lawyer and to freely make the choice of hiring a particular
attorney, without undue influence or added pressure of in-person
solicitation.145 In the case of Ohralik, the state had a substantial interest in
regulating in-person solicitation of potential clients by attorneys in order to
protect its citizens from undue influence or intimidation. 146 The Court
determined that this substantial state interest could not stand to regulate the
use of indirect solicitation of potential clients by attorneys, because indirect
advertisements do not carry the same risk of undue influence that in-person
solicitations carry.147
B.

Targeted Letters to Potential Clients

In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 148 the Supreme Court of the
United States was faced with the issue of “whether a [s]tate may . . . prohibit
lawyers from soliciting [and advertising] legal business for pecuniary gain by
sending truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face
particular legal problems.”149 The petitioner was a practicing attorney who
filed for approval by the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission of a
letter that he had hopes of sending “‘to potential clients who . . . had a
foreclosure suit filed against them.’”150 “The Commission did not find the
letter [to be] false or misleading,” however, the Commission did find that the
letter violated a “Kentucky Supreme Court Rule [that] prohibited the mailing
or delivery of written advertisements ‘precipitated by a specific event or
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct
from the general public.’”151 The Commission then urged the Supreme Court
of Kentucky to amend its rules after finding that the rule “ban[ning] . . .
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 462, 466 (holding that a state has reason to
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the
person who is solicited).
147.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
148.
486 U.S. 466 (1988).
149.
Id. at 468.
150.
Id. at 469.
151.
Id. at 469–70.
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targeted, direct mail advertise[ments] violated the First Amendment.”152 The
petitioner then petitioned the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on
Legal Ethics for an advisory opinion on the validity of the rule, which
resulted in the Committee on Legal Ethics’ adoption of the ABA’s Rule 7.3
on attorney solicitation.153
In analyzing targeted direct solicitation by attorneys to potential
clients, the Court reiterated its fundamental holding in Zauderer that “[t]he
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a
prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for
pecuniary gain,’ . . . are not present in the context of written
advertisements.”154 The Court pointed out that previous precedent set by the
Court in regards to attorney advertisements never distinguished between the
constitutionality and protection of various modes of written advertisements
to the general public.155 The Court made the analysis based upon the four
prong analysis of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.156 The Court here
distinguishes between advertisements that target specific individuals and
read “[i]t has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on”
and advertisements that more broadly read “[i]s your home being foreclosed
on?” 157 The Court determined that the advertisement not targeting specific
individuals is commercial speech that can be regulated or prohibited. 158
Whereas, the more broad advertisement could not be prohibited without
violating the First Amendment as long as the advertisement was not false,
misleading, or advertising unlawful activity.159
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the preceding court below the
Supreme Court of the United States, had relied on the holding of Ohralik and
found that the state’s complete prohibition on all targeted, direct mail
solicitation was permissible under the First Amendment, because of the
“serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of
potential clients known to need specific legal services.” 160 The Supreme
Court of the United States in its holding did not agree that the precedent set
152.
Id. at 470; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
154.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)).
155.
Id. at 473.
156.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
157.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473.
158.
Id. at 472–73.
159.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473, 479.
160.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
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by Ohralikthat direct in-person solicitation by attorneys of potential
clientswas present in the case of Shapero regarding targeted, direct mail
solicitation.161 The Court made a fundamental distinction between direct and
indirect solicitation.162 The Court stated:
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally
overwhelmed by his legal troubles and will have the same
impaired capacity for good judgment regardless of whether a
lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a
newspaper advertisement—concededly constitutionally protected
activities—or instead mails a targeted letter. The relevant inquiry
is not whether there exist potential clients whose condition makes
them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit
any such susceptibility.163

The Court found that it is not to whom the targeted solicitation is
sent that makes the solicitation prone to regulation, but the mode of
communication in which the solicitation is sent that makes the solicitation
prone to regulation.164 The mode of communication is a fundamental factor
in determining whether direct solicitation is overreaching or cause for undue
influence.165
Compared to print advertising, targeted direct mail solicitation
“‘poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence’ than does inperson solicitation.”166 The Court held that written communications, either
targeted or made toward the general public do not “involve[] ‘the coercive
force of the personal presence of a trained advocate’ or the ‘pressure on the
potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of
representation.’”167 People receiving a written communication has the ability
to draw their attention either towards or away from the solicitation.168 A
targeted letter also does not have the ability to invade the privacy of a
recipient any more than an attorney solicitation directed to the public at large
can invade on a recipient’s privacy. 169 The Court ultimately held that “a
truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it
161.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 467–68.
162.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474–75.
163.
Id. at 474.
164.
See id. at 475.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)).
167.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642).
168.
Id. at 475–76.
169.
Id. at 476.
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speculates, can never shout at the recipient or grasp him by the lapels, . . . as
can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation.” 170 Because attorney
advertisements are commercial speech and thus, protected under the First
Amendment, a state may not raise a substantial interest in restricting truthful
and non-deceptive lawyer solicitations, including targeted direct mail
solicitations.171
IV.
A.

FLORIDA’S REGULATIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS
Recognizing Commercial Speech Protection in Florida

The State of Florida has long been known for its strict standards in
regulating attorney advertisements. 172 Florida first recognized attorney
advertisements as commercial speech and protected under the First
Amendment in the year 1989. 173 Following the precedents set by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Florida Bar took the initiative of conducting a survey of the public opinion
on attorney advertising, and “[a]fter conducting hearings, . . . surveys, and
reviewing extensive public commentary, the [Florida] Bar determined that
several changes to its advertising rules were in order.”174 As a result of these
findings, “[i]n late 1990 the [Supreme Court of Florida] adopted the [Florida]
Bar’s proposed amendments with some modifications.” 175 The Supreme
Court of Florida took the initiative to pass the amended rules to attorney
advertisements because of the precedents set by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates. 176 The
Supreme Court of Florida cited Bates stating that the Supreme Court upheld
“‘reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.’”177
The Supreme Court of Florida explained “[s]ince lawyers render professional
170.
Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
171.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
172.
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-Specific
Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 260 (2007).
173.
Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); Fla. Bar: Petition
to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1990);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
174.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
175.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend
the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452.
176.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 456–57; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
177.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 458 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
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services [that] vary from attorney to attorney, case to case, and client to
client, the potential for deception . . . in advertising is great.” 178 The
amended rules to attorney advertisements in Florida supported “reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising” and reduced
deception of potential clients caused by advertisements.179 These amended
Florida Bar Rules were the first amendments to the Florida Bar Rules
subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy and Bates, upholding commercial speech as protected under the
First Amendment and extending this protection to attorney advertisements.180
Maintaining its strict regulations on attorney advertisements, Florida has
proceeded to “push[] the First Amendment envelope that safeguards the right
of attorneys to inform potential clients about the [legal] services they
offer.”181
The Florida Bar, even after the Supreme Court of Florida passed the
amended rules allowing Florida to be a more permissive state towards
attorney advertisement, continued to reveal its beliefs about the negative
effects that attorney advertisements place on the legal profession.182 In 1994,
after the attorney advertising rules were recently amended to allow attorney
advertisements, former Florida Bar President, Patricia A. Seitz, expressed to
the ABA that “‘[a]ggressive ads have caused the public to see the legal
system as a lottery of fictitious claims in which lawyers make out like
bandits in fees.’” 183 Patricia A. Seitz also expressed that attorney
advertisements were to blame for “‘increas[ing] the public’s cynicism about
the legal system, which undermines the system that lawyers take an oath to
uphold.’”184 In the year 2000, as advertisements became more popular and
used amongst attorneys, the Florida Bar decided that it was time to take a
stronger stance against attorneys who violated any Florida rules regarding
attorney advertisements.185 The Florida Bar subsequently passed a motion to
178.
Id.
179.
Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384).
180.
Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert.
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 457–58; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770.
181.
Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 261.
182.
See Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—
Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452, 455; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260 n.1.
183.
James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by a Fall in Public Favor, the
Organized Bar Turns Up the Heat on Lawyer Advertising, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 68; see
also Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So.
2d at 452, 455.
184.
Podgers, supra note 183, at 68.
185.
Gary Blankenship, Bar to Take a Harder Line Toward Lawyer Ad
Violations, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 2000, at 13.
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initiate grievances against any Florida Bar attorney who violated the Bar
rules in regard to attorney advertisements.186 The Bar’s motive for initiating
grievances against violators of the Florida Bar rules of attorney
advertisements was due to appeals. 187 The Bar was frustrated that since
advertisement appeals take several months, attorneys may still run their
advertisements, and by the time the appeal has been decided, the
advertisement could have already been exposed through various media and
communications.188
The Florida Bar maintained its strong grip on regulating attorney
advertisements in 2004, when it was announced that the Florida Bar was
forming an Advertising Task Force. 189 The purpose of creating the
Advertising Task Force was to review Florida’s attorney advertisement
regulations and determine when changes or amendments to the rules would
be necessary. 190 The Florida Bar President at the time, Kelly Overstreet
Johnson, expressed that “many lawyers still dislike or oppose lawyer
advertising, believing [it is] the [strongest] cause of public discontent with
the profession.”191 Johnson also explained that because Supreme Court of
the United States precedent prohibits complete bans on attorney
advertisements, it is important to make sure that the Florida Bar’s rules
remain “as consistent . . . as possible and enforced.”192
In 2013, the Florida Bar petitioned to the Supreme Court of Florida
to consider proposed amendments to Subchapter 4-7 of the Rules Regulating
the Florida Bar. 193 The Florida Bar proposed to the Supreme Court of
Florida that they strike all current rules regarding attorney advertisements
and adopt entirely new rules, which ultimately the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted. 194 The adoption of entirely new rules regarding attorney
advertisements was due to a “contemporary study of lawyer advertising,
which . . . include[d] public evaluation and comments about lawyer
advertising.”195 After analyzing the findings, the Florida Bar came to the
186.
Id.
187.
See id.
188.
Id.
189.
See New Bar Panel to Review Attorney Advertising Rules, FLA. B. NEWS,
Dec. 15, 2003, at 1.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7,
Lawyer Advert. Rules, 108 So. 3d 609, 609 (Fla. 2013); see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4-7.11 (2014).
194.
In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7,
108 So. 3d at 609, 611.
195.
Id. at 609–10.
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conclusion that entirely new rules, which prevent the “dissemination of
misleading and unduly manipulative information,” should be adopted. 196
The new advertising rules were “designed to make the advertising rules more
cohesive, easier for lawyers who advertise to understand, and less
cumbersome for the [Florida] Bar to apply and enforce.”197
B.
Distinguishing Standards of the Florida Bar and the American Bar
Association
Florida is a state that has modeled its ethical and professional rules
of conduct after the ABA Model Rules.198 Florida’s Rules of Professional
Conduct regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations are found in
Rule 4-7.18, which reads:
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer may
not: (1) solicit, or permit employees or agents of the lawyer to
solicit on the lawyer’s behalf, professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s
pecuniary gain. The term solicit includes contact in person, by
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication
directed to a specific recipient and includes any written form of
communication, including any electronic mail communication,
directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of
subdivision (b) of this rule and rules 4-7.11 through 4-7.17 of these
rules; [and] (2) enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee
for professional employment obtained in violation of this rule.199

The Florida Bar Standing Committee on Advertising’s Handbook on
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation also contains regulations that lawyers in
the State of Florida must comply with, in addition to the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct. 200 The Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation cites Rule 4-7.11(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional
Conduct: “Florida’s lawyer advertising rules apply to all forms of
communication seeking legal employment in any print or electronic forum,
including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, brochures, flyers,
television, radio, direct mail, electronic mail, and Internet, including banners,
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 610.
Id.
See About the Model Rules, supra note 85.
FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014).
See FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON ADVERTISING, HANDBOOK ON LAWYER
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (10th ed. 2013, rev. 2014).
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pop-ups, websites, social networking, and video sharing media.”201 In regard
to Rule 4-7.18 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and prohibited
forms of attorney solicitation, the Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and
Solicitation states:
A lawyer may not contact a prospective client in person, by
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or through other means of direct
contact, unless the prospective client is a family member, current
client, or former client. This prohibition does not extend to
unsolicited direct mail or email communications made in
compliance with Rule 4-7.18(b).202

Attorneys who advertise through direct mail and email
communications must not use “‘coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching,
harassment, intimidation, or undue influence’” in order to obtain clientele.203
According to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is not
permitted to send potential clients advertisements through direct mail or
email communications if the lawyer has been informed that the potential
client does not wish to receive the communications from the lawyer.204
On a national perspective, Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model
Rules set the standards for attorney advertisements and solicitations.205 In
contrast to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct that specifically list the
modes of communications in which a lawyer may not advertise to a potential
client, Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules states that “a lawyer may advertise
services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including
public media.”206 Some of the communications in which Florida prohibits
lawyers from advertising through are permitted by the ABA Model Rules.207
For example, it can be argued that telephone communications classify as
electronic communications and are thus permissible under the ABA Model
Rules, but not permissible under the Florida Rules of Professional

201.
Id. at 2.
202.
Id. at 4.
203.
HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200,
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014).
204.
HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200,
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014).
205.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2, 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see
also supra Section II.C.
206.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a)–(b) (2014); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013).
207.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11 (2014); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 (2013).
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Conduct. 208 Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules specifically discusses
solicitation of clients by attorneys and distinguishes that a lawyer may not
solicit through any live or real-time communications; whereas the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct define solicit as in-person communications.209
V.

EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO ATTORNEY
ADVERTISEMENTS VIA TEXT MESSAGES

A.
Classifying Attorney Advertisements Via Text Messages as Protected
Commercial Speech
A Florida law firm has recently challenged the Florida Bar for
denying the law firm’s proposal of sending automated text messages to
potential clients advertising the firm’s legal services. 210 The Florida Bar
classified automated text messages to potential clients as direct solicitation
by telephone prohibited by the Florida Advertising Rules and Florida Rules
of Professional Conduct.211 The law firm has argued that text messages may
be classified as direct mail or email, which are permitted by the Florida
Advertising Rules and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.212 Based
on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in regards to
direct and indirect attorney advertisements, text messages more closely
resemble the indirect communications in Shapero than the direct solicitation
analyzed in Ohralik.213
When analyzing attorney advertisements through the use of text
messages, direct text messages to potential clients by attorneys reflect the
same communications that the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed
in Shapero.214 Similar to the issue in the case of the Florida law firm sending
direct text messages to potential clients, the Supreme Court of the United
States was left with the question of whether a state may prohibit direct letters
to targeted potential clients in Shapero. 215 As the Court pointed out in
208.

See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a) (2014); MODEL RULES
r. 7.2(a) (2013).
209.
See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a) (2013).
210.
Hale, supra note 15.
211.
FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); HANDBOOK ON
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, at 4; Hale, supra note 15.
212.
Hale, supra note 15; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18
(2014).
213.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
214.
See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479.
215.
Id. at 468; Hale, supra note 15.

OF PROF’L CONDUCT
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Shapero, a recipient of written communications has the ability to read the
communication or avert their attention away from the communication. 216
Text messages, like letters, have the ability to be read, ignored and looked at
later, or if the recipient chooses, not even seen at all.217 In this respect, text
messages are similar to written communications, such as emails or letters.218
In the context of direct solicitation, text messages do not reflect the
same in-person solicitation that the Court analyzed in Ohralik.219 In-person
solicitation, or live communications such as soliciting through the telephone,
are distinguished from text messages in that text messages do not have the
same high risk of intimidation or undue influence that live or in-person
solicitation may have.220 Recipients of text messages are not pressured to
accept legal representation immediately and are not pressured by the
presence of an attorney.221 Advertisements sent via text message also allow
the recipient to reflect on the message, compare the nature and availability of
goods and services, and allow for rational decision-making.222 Unlike direct
in-person solicitations, text messages are not immediate communications that
urge an immediate response. 223 Attorney advertisements via text message
are classified as commercial speech and are thus deserving of First
Amendment protection because they are direct communications that propose
a transaction and serve the public interest of informing the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of services.224
216.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76 (“A letter, like a printed advertisement—but
unlike a lawyer—can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or
discarded.”).
217.
See id.
218.
See id.; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985).
219.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
220.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
221.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“Print advertising may convey information and
ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal
presence of a trained advocate.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he potential for overreaching
is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion,
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”).
222.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364
(1977) (holding that “commercial speech . . . inform[s] the public of the availability, nature,
and prices of products and services, and . . . serves individual and societal interests in assuring
informed and reliable decision-making.”).
223.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a
personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the potential
client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
457 (“The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation
and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision-making.”).
224.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Text Messages Applied to the Central Hudson test

If attorney advertisements via text messages are classified as
commercial speech, in order to determine whether such commercial speech
may be restricted or prohibited by a state, the Central Hudson test must be
applied.225 The first prong of the four-part analysis asks whether the speech
is protected under the First Amendment. 226 Bates extended commercial
speech protection to attorney advertisements, allowing attorney
advertisements to be considered protected First Amendment speech. 227
Attorney advertisements via text messages propose a transaction and inform
the public of the availability of goods and services, qualifying as commercial
speech. 228 Attorney advertisements via text messages, which do not
advertise unlawful activity and are not misleading or deceptive, meet the
conditions for First Amendment protection.229
The second part of the Central Hudson test requires that the asserted
governmental interest be substantial.230 In regard to the Florida Bar denying
a Florida law firm’s proposal to send automated text messages to potential
clients, the Florida Bar can argue that its asserted interest in restricting the
automated text messages would be to protect Florida citizens in need of legal
services.231 As the Court found in the case of Ohralik, a state has reason to
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney may be
harmful to the person who is solicited.232 However, text messages, like other
written communications, do not have the ability to intimidate or cause undue
influence like other forms of in-person solicitation. 233
Attorney
advertisements also serve the important function of informing consumers of
goods, which is fundamental to the freedom of speech of both attorneys and
consumers.234 This asserted state interest of protecting consumers in Florida
would fail in the case of attorney advertisements via text messages.235 The
225.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
226.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
227.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
228.
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56.
229.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
230.
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 568–69.
231.
See Hale, supra note 15.
232.
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
233.
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (holding that print advertisements generally
pose a much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than in-person solicitation).
234.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Bates, 433 U.S. at
364.
235.
See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (holding the State has reason to assume inperson solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the person who is
solicited).
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Florida Bar may also argue that direct solicitation should be prohibited in
order to maintain the nobleness of the legal profession.236 As the Court held
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a state interest in upholding
professionalism of a field may not be a sufficient interest in restricting
commercial speech.237 The asserted state interest in upholding the dignity of
the legal profession would also fail under the Central Hudson test in
analyzing attorney advertisements via text messages to potential clients.238
If the asserted state interests were determined to be substantial, it
must then be determined whether the restrictions directly advance the
asserted state interest.239 If the Florida Bar were to assert the interests of
protecting consumers or upholding the legal profession, then restricting text
messages by attorneys to potential clients would have to carry out these
interests. 240 The restrictions also may not be more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.241 If the Florida Bar were able to carry out
its asserted interests without restricting or prohibiting attorney
advertisements via text messages, then the restriction or prohibition of the
commercial speech would violate the First Amendment.242
C.

Keeping up with Modern Modes of Communication

In the year 2000, the Florida Bar noted that a “member of the Florida
Bar might feel lost without a cell phone.”243 Fifteen years later, that opinion
should not have changed considering that technology has only grown more
popular and become more useful.244 The opinion of the Florida Bar in 2000
was that technology must be “utilize[d] . . . to become more efficient and [to]
provide the public with a better justice system.”245 At the time, technology
was seen as “giving the decision-maker more information to make . . .

236.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976).
237.
See id. at 766, 770.
238.
Id. at 766 (holding an asserted state interest in upholding professionalism
of a field may not be sufficient); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
239.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
240.
See id.
241.
See id.
242.
See id. (holding that a state’s asserted interest in restricting commercial
speech must be narrowly drawn and may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest).
243.
Gary Blankenship, The Florida Bar: Changing Through Technology,
FLA. B. J., Apr. 2000, at 37, 37.
244.
See Hale, supra note 15.
245.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 39–40.
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decision[s].” 246 Relating to commercial speech, attorneys who choose to
advertise must ensure that their advertisements are able to keep up with
evolving technology in order to provide consumers with the knowledge of
the nature and availability of goods and services.247 If in the year 2000, the
Florida Bar was noting how extensive the use of cell phones were, this
number has only expanded, and attorneys today must also utilize these
communications.248
In 2000, evolving technology was already a major concern for the
practice of law, as stated, “[t]echnology—and how lawyers use it—will be an
important factor in determining what the practice of law looks like in the
next [ten] years, let alone the next [fifty].”249 It is important for lawyers to
recognize where the profession is headed and be able to keep up with the
profession. 250 Society and technology is something that is constantly and
rapidly changing that lawyers, along with state bar associations, must be able
to recognize. 251
Rules regarding commercial speech and attorney
advertisements should also be flexible and able to keep up with society and
technology. 252 It will be “[t]he lawyers who are able to stay on top of
changing times [that will be] the ones who are going to be successful.”253
There will be even more expansive growth and changes in technology, and it
is essential that the legal profession, including commercial speech and
attorney advertisements, be able to keep up with these changes.254
VI.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of the legal profession, advertising by
attorneys has consistently been looked down upon and considered
unprofessional. 255
These consistent negative views of attorney
advertisements have influenced the ethical and professional standards of the

246.
Id. at 40.
247.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“And commercial
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and
services, and thus performs an indispensible role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system.”).
248.
See Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40; Hale, supra note 15.
249.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40.
250.
Id.
251.
See id.
252.
Id.; DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212.
253.
Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40.
254.
See id.
255.
See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra
Part I.
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ABA, as well as a majority of state bar ethical and professional standards.256
It was not until 1977 in the case of Bates, where the Supreme Court of the
United States determined attorney advertisements to be commercial speech
and thus protected under the First Amendment, that the ABA standards and
state bar ethical and professional rules began to permit attorneys to freely
advertise their legal services and fees.257 Even after the Court extended First
Amendment protections to attorney advertisements, ethical and professional
rules have still maintained strict standards and regulations on attorney
advertisements. 258 These strict regulations consist of the delicate balance
between maintaining the honor and dignity of the legal profession and
upholding the First Amendment rights of attorneys to freely advertise their
legal services and fees.259 Florida is a state that has consistently placed some
of the strictest regulations on attorney advertisements.260
Attorney advertisements that directly solicit potential clients are a
great concern for the ABA, as well as state bar associations, including the
Florida Bar.261 One of the modes of communication that is currently at issue
in the State of Florida, is targeted automated text messages to potential
clients. 262 The Florida Bar has struck down a firm’s proposed plan of
sending automated text messages to potential clients, as direct solicitation via
telephone in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.263 Upon
a closer analysis of the use of text messages by attorneys to potential clients,
these communications more closely resemble the direct solicitation that was
held to be constitutionally protected commercial speech in Zauderer and
Shapero. 264 Text messages sustain the fundamental public interest of
informing consumers of the nature, availability, and prices of available
services and promote rational decision-making by the consumer.265
In conclusion, the Florida Bar should allow attorney advertisements
via text messages because these communications are considered protected
256.
See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra
Section I.C.
257.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977); Brace, supra note 3,
at 111, 113; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 263–64, 272–73.
258.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (2013).
259.
See supra Part I.
260.
Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260–61; see also supra Part IV.
261.
See supra Section III.B.
262.
See supra Parts I, V.
263.
See supra Part I.
264.
See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475–76, 478 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641–42
(1985); Hale, supra note 15; supra Section V.A.
265.
See supra Part V.
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forms of commercial speech under the First Amendment.266 Text messages
do not invade the privacy of the recipient, nor demand an immediate
response, proving to not violate the ABA Model Rules or Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct.267 Florida must also consider allowing attorneys to
advertise legal services through targeted text messages in order to keep up
with evolving modern communications.268

266.
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also supra Part V.
267.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3, 7.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 (2014); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642;
supra Part V.
268.
See supra Section V.C.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

With the high increased costs of insurance premiums and advances
in medicine, tort reform has become a rising area of conflict in the law.1
States are found in conflict with the high costs of insurance while at the same
time protecting an individual’s rights to seek just compensation in the law.2
Many legislators have adopted distinct standards in order to respond
effectively to the needs of their state. 3 States, such as Georgia, Arizona,
North Carolina, and others, are revolutionizing medical malpractice reform
by increasing the burden of proof required in emergency physicians’ medical
malpractice cases from the standard torts preponderance of the evidence to a
clear and convincing standard.4
Increasing the standard of proof to a clear and convincing standard
makes it close to impossible for a plaintiff to raise a successful claim against
a doctor who committed malpractice.5 Nevertheless, tort reform is rapidly
occurring across the United States; many lobbyists of these reforms promise
that the restrictions on a plaintiff will bring lower insurance costs for
everyone.6 Statistical evidence contradicts that promise, with a showing of
four hundred thousand dollars as the average amount that a jury awards in
medical malpractice cases.7
Following the wave of tort reform, Florida has passed caps on the
amount of damages that can be awarded to a plaintiff and has made the
distinction between cases of emergency physicians and general
practitioners.8 With recent cases, such as Estate of McCall v. United States,9
the constitutionality of tort reform has been called into question when caps
1.
See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform”
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457, 517 (2006); Steve Cohen, On Tort Reform, It’s
Time to Declare Victory and Withdraw, FORBES (Mar. 02, 2015, 9:59 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecohen/2015/03/02/on-tort-reform-its-time-to-declarevictory-and-withdraw.
2.
See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438, 441, 446; Cohen, supra note 1.
3.
Sample
Legislation,
AM.
C.
EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS,
http://www.acep.org/Content.aspx?id=33178 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
4.
Id.
5.
See Cohen, supra note 1.
6.
Cohen, supra note 1; Sample Legislation, supra note 3.
7.
Cohen, supra note 1.
8.
FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2), (4) (2014).
9.
134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014).
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are applied in wrongful deaths cases but not personal injury.10 If Florida
chooses to continue tort reform and creates a distinction between medical
practices, like its sister state Georgia, it would encounter many hurdles in
establishing a rational basis for the distinct treatment.11 The biggest hurdle
for tort reformers to overcome is the Florida Constitution because it is unique
from other states, as it provides equal protection and guarantees its citizens
access to the courts.12
Setting aside the issue of whether caps on damages in malpractice
cases are constitutional under equal protection, this Comment will discuss
the following question: Will Florida be able to follow Georgia in its tort
reform and increase the burden of proof in emergency care cases?13 Part II
will introduce a brief history of modern tort reform that leads to the issue
today of targeting tort reforms towards medical malpractice.14 Part III will
analyze the national modern attempts to encourage tort reform in medical
malpractice.15 Part IV will discuss Georgia’s reasoning behind an increased
burden of proof.16 Part V will discuss the individuality of Florida law and
the change after Estate of McCall.17 Finally, Part VI will conclude with how
Florida is unable to follow Georgia in its path towards reform.18
II.
A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN TORT REFORM

What Is Tort Reform?

The area of tort law in civil litigation was created to provide justice
and to compensate those who have been injured due to negligence or with
purposeful intent. 19 The purpose of tort law is to place the victim, who
suffered a loss, in the same position before the breach of duty.20 Tort law,
majorly based on common law, imposes legal liability on an individual who
deviates from the norm and compensates the victim with monetary awards.21
10.
Id. at 899.
11.
See id. at 914; Greg Roslund, The Medical Malpractice Rundown: A
State-by-State Report Card, EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS MONTHLY (July 21, 2014),
http://www.epmonthly.com/departments/subspecialties/medico-legal/the-medical-malpracticerundown-a-state-by-state-report-card.
12.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 933.
13.
See infra Part V.
14.
See infra Part II.
15.
See infra Part III.
16.
See infra Part IV.
17.
See infra Part V.
18.
See infra Part VI.
19.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (2000).
20.
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 440.
21.
DOBBS, supra note 19, at 2.
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Tort law’s quick adaptation to legislative enactments due to various interests
from insurance companies, corporations, and legal practitioners makes it a
dynamic area of law open to criticism.22 Tort reform is often defined as a
movement that limits the ability and award that a plaintiff can attain when
pursuing a civil tort lawsuit in order to address a series of crises. 23 Tort
reform often involves distinct actors, such as the American Medical
Association or State Farm Insurance, with multiple interests but who share a
common goal for efficiency.24 Other times tort reform is part of a political
movement, which is subject to economic needs.25
Critics often debate whether some of these reforms violate
constitutional principles, such as those of due process, and whether this
constant adaption to social policies opens the floodgates for courthouses over
the country with frivolous lawsuits. 26 Supporters of tort reform propose
changes to the judicial system to decrease costs in the economy, as insurance
premiums rise and medical innovation expands.27 It is frequently deemed as
a controversial area of law because tort reform often aims at limiting the
amount of recovery a victim can receive for his or her injury. 28 The
reasoning behind such limitations is the increase in high insurances, but often
the effect goes beyond limiting the compensation system and is done at the
cost of guaranteed constitutional rights.29
B.

Modern Tort Reform in the 1970s

In order to understand whether states, such as Florida, can adopt
other states’ standards in medical malpractice cases, it is essential to give a
brief historical introduction to important tort reforms that have lead to the
common practice today.30 While tort law is considered common law and was
introduced in the United States as early as the 1800s, the true identity of
reform began in the 1970s when the insurance market quickly rose.31 As a
result, physicians petitioned legislators to make changes in personal injury
cases.32 In 1975, California enacted its famous medical malpractice statute
22.
See Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438–39, 471.
23.
Id. at 438, 472.
24.
Id. at 472.
25.
See id. at 475–76.
26.
Id. at 474, 523.
27.
See Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants:
The Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 543, 549 (2014).
28.
See id. at 544.
29.
See id. at 543–44, 596.
30.
See id. at 543, 546, 549.
31.
Id. at 551; see also Hubbard, supra note 1, at 439.
32.
DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551.
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that placed a cap on non-monetary awards on pain and suffering, therefore,
slowing the price increase of medical malpractice premiums.33
The movement of tort reform in the 1970s focused on placing an
economical focus on civil litigation and limited the amount of damages that
could be awarded.34 A decrease in the number of carriers and increase in the
number of claims caused premiums to rise and created an air of distrust
towards the court system.35 Subsequently, the medical community blamed
the judicial system and lobbied the legislature to place limitations on
recoveries for plaintiffs.36 Nevertheless, many insurers were slow to increase
and adjust their rates because of the uncertainty of the constitutionality of
these limits.37
C.

The 1980s and the Reagan Administration

In the 1980s, the increased tort reform in the United States boosted
the demand for insurance coverage, and many critics claim that this is a
cause of the tort reform itself. 38 The Reagan Administration blamed the
insurance crisis of the 1980s on tort reform.39 Groups were formed, such as
the Tort Policy Working Group, who believed that a doubling in the 1970s of
lawsuits and an increase in award damages in medical malpractice suits
would cause individuals to experience a high increase in insurance
premiums. 40 The group recommended for the first time placing caps on
damage awards and increasing the burden of proof.41
The Reagan Administration’s Republican platform consisted of
preventing insurance from rising and blamed the civil suits for the high costs
of insurance and lack of healthcare available.42 The movement to limit civil
trials in the courtroom and to decrease costs began to increase momentum
when many states in the 1980s began a reform to adopt legislation to limit
recovery on claims. 43 As well, many states focused on the abolition or
33.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 333.2(a)–(b) (West 2015); FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY
M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 117 (2008).
34.
See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 216 (expanded ed. 2003).
35.
DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 549–50.
36.
Id. at 550.
37.
SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 33, at 97.
38.
See DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551; Hubbard, supra note 1, at 438.
39.
DeVito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988:
AN AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR FUTURE (1988), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846.
43.
See Devito & Jurs, supra note 27, at 551–53.
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limitation of joint and several liability.44 In joint and several liability, each
tortfeasor is held liable for damages, and each defendant must then prove that
they were not the sole proximate cause of the injury.45 The plaintiff may
elect from the group of defendants which one to seek payment from, but joint
and several liability is often critiqued in that it entices plaintiffs to seek
judgment from the wealthiest defendant.46
Between 1986 and 1987, thirty-five states quickly adapted to tort
reforms, within them abolishing the common law theory of joint and several
liability. 47 However, some states, such as Arizona, adopted a slower
approach by merely limiting joint and several liability.48 Other states, such
as Florida, moved towards completely abolishing it and received popular
opposition in its tort reform movements.49 The Supreme Court of Florida
held that the complete abolition of joint and several liability did not violate
the U.S. Constitution nor the Florida Constitution under equal protection, due
process, and access to the courts.50 However, the court ruled that caps on
non-economic damages violated the Florida Constitution because they deny
the plaintiff’s access to the courts.51
III.

MODERN ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE TORT REFORM IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE

Tort reform is often looked at as an answer for the insurance crisis.52
Therefore, because of the connection between insurance companies and
medical malpractice, this then becomes an area of law often targeted by
legislators and companies. 53 A second Republican attempt to limit tort
reform occurred in 2000 with the Bush Administration after a repeated
insurance crisis.54 The Bush Administration proposed further tort reform by
imposing a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice

44.
See Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and
Several Liability, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 482, 485 (1987).
45.
See James J. Scheske, Comment, The Reform of Joint and Several
Liability Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627, 635 (1988).
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 642.
48.
Id.
49.
See id. at 642–43.
50.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9, 21; Smith v. Dep’t.
of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987); Scheske, supra note 45, at 643.
51.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1095.
52.
See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for
the Medical Malpractice “Crisis”, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 478 (2012).
53.
Id. at 480–81.
54.
Id. at 482–83.
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suits, in response to premium increases in insurance rates.55 However, the
rise in insurance premiums was due to the rise in medical costs, recovery
attempts for lost profits, and insurer’s lack of ability to reserve profits for
down periods.56 None of the factors that caused the higher premiums were
due to an increase in medical malpractice cases. 57 Often politicians have
mistakenly looked towards tort reform as a solution to resolve the crisis in
making insurance available to the public; however, repeatedly, this method
has not worked.58
A.

National Movement for Medical Tort Reform

Distinct states are each slowly continuing their independent tort
reform in limiting the ability for plaintiffs to pursue litigation in exchange for
lower insurance premiums. 59 In 2003, Texas enacted an emergency care
provision requiring a showing of willful and wanton negligence for an
emergency care provider to be held liable for malpractice. 60 In the same
year, Florida created a strict cap on non-economic damages, making the
distinction between a cap of $150,000 for emergency care providers versus
$500,000 for general practitioners. 61 Subsequently, Georgia followed the
distinction in the standard of evidence for malpractice claims between
emergency physicians and general practitioners. 62 Georgia changed the
required standard of proof from preponderance of the evidence to a higher
clear and convincing standard but only when a practitioner has shown a
standard of gross negligence. 63 Utah, Arizona, and North Carolina
subsequently followed but with only a heightened clear and convincing
standard of proof.64
Increasing the burden of proof and placing caps on the claim amount
questions whether these methods are constitutional and whether lower
premiums are paid at the expense of patients who suffer injuries that can be

55.
Id.
56.
Alec Shelby Bayer, Comment, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving
into the Roots of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 111,
118 (2005).
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 115–16.
59.
See Sample Legislation, supra note 3.
60.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.153 (West 2003).
61.
Sample Legislation, supra note 3.
62.
See id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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avoided.65 Protection to insurers and health care providers is justified by the
fear that practitioners will leave the state due to malpractice suits and a
common objective to reduce defensive medicine. 66 However, with the
relatively small number of malpractice claims that make it to court, the
effectiveness of these restrictions becomes questionable. 67 Are patients
being limited their rights in order to achieve affordable care?68 Will other
states, such as Florida, with their unique state constitutions be able to follow
political tort reform to increase efficiency and diminish costs by restricting
fundamental rights?69
IV.
A.

INCREASING THE BURDEN OF PROOF RATIONALE

Introduction to the Emergency Room Malpractice

Generally, in civil actions, including medical malpractice, the
plaintiff has the duty to prove every element of the case by a preponderance
of evidence.70 Preponderance of evidence means that the plaintiff, in a more
than probable standard, can establish a persuasive chain of causation between
the injury and the defendant. 71 The evidence must show that it is more
probable that the practitioner caused the plaintiff’s injury; however,
causation can often be difficult to prove.72 Defendants in medical claims
have the ability to blame the injury on many external factors and on the
plaintiff’s previous medical history. 73 In medical cases, the breach is
determined in accordance to what the physician should have done
differently; however, it is not conclusive. 74 Emergency claims are made
even more difficult for a plaintiff when emergency practitioners are not
required to follow the same standard as the general profession and are
allowed to use their best judgment.75

65.
Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1201, 1253–54 (2012); Jason R. Graves, Note, State of Emergency: Why Georgia’s Standard
of Care in Emergency Rooms is Harmful to Your Health, 45 GA. L. REV. 275, 293 (2010); see
also Bayer, supra note 56, at 131.
66.
Graves, supra note 65, at 280.
67.
See id. at 291.
68.
See id. at 280.
69.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Graves, supra note 65, at 281.
70.
Stein, supra note 65, at 1217.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
See id. at 1215–17.
75.
See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol40/iss1/1

208

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

2015]

EMERGENCY MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM

193

Emergency care, unlike general care, focuses on the immediate care
provided to a patient in times of emergency.76 Unlike general practitioners,
emergency doctors do not have extensive knowledge of the patient’s medical
history or any prior relationship to the patient, and they must rely on splitsecond decisions. 77 An emergency physician is responsible for providing
diagnosis and care to episodic illness. 78 Emergency physicians are often
liable for a broad area of medical expertise unlike other practitioners who are
able to specialize in a specific area.79 Some states have even allowed other
medical specialists to serve as expert witnesses against an emergency
physician.80
Part of the reasoning behind why many states have taken the
approach to make a distinction with emergency room practitioners involves
the fast pace they encounter daily and the distinct regulation from general
practitioners.81 A greater portion of the population is relying significantly
more on emergency room services than a clinic with a general practitioner,
even in situations where an emergency is not warranted.82 As a result, a
conflict arises in determining what is a true emergency and to what standard
an emergency practitioner will be held liable. 83 Emergency practitioners
often treat conditions that are not critical but that patients seek because of
lack of health care based on their financial situation.84
B.

Georgia and Its Reform to Heightened Burden of Proof

In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly, in Senate Bill 3, reasoned
that liability insurance caused the state at the time to suffer a crisis that
affected the quality of health.85 Therefore, the assembly believed that the
regulation of civil action in the healthcare would resolve the crisis and result
in stability and predictability in the economy.86 As a result of healthcare
problems and the individuality of emergency physician malpractice, the State
of Georgia enacted section 51-1-29.5 of the Georgia Code, establishing that
no emergency physicians shall be held liable for negligence unless it is
76.

RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY’S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 569 (5th ed.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Graves, supra note 65, at 279.
PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569.
Id.
Id.
See Stein, supra note 65, at 1212.
Graves, supra note 65, at 298.
PATTERSON, supra note 76, at 569–70.
See Graves, supra note 65, at 298.
Id. at 284; S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ga. 2005).
See Graves, supra note 65, at 284; Ga. S. 3 § 1.

2011).
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proven with a higher clear and convincing standard and with a showing of
gross negligence.87
Georgia’s healthcare is unique because most physicians are covered
by one insurer, MAG Mutual Insurance Company, and therefore, the high
premium insurance crisis is more evident when there is not much diversity in
the insurance market for physicians. 88 Besides lacking competition in
insurance, another cause of the health care crisis was affirmative duty
statutes that required public hospitals to treat all patients who seek care in
emergency rooms.89 Georgia’s affirmative duty to treat all patients often led
to hospitals being over-occupied with higher traffic, forcing emergency
physicians to work at a faster pace. 90 While Georgia blamed medical
malpractice cases for the lack of affordability in insurance, distinct factors
accelerated the insurance crisis in Georgia.91 For example, competition with
one of the greatest health insurance companies, St. Paul Insurance Company,
ultimately caused competition to rise to the point where premium rates
dropped rapidly until insurance companies were no longer capable of
providing coverage at such low rates.92
The Georgia General Assembly introduced Senate Bill 3 with the
purpose to lower healthcare costs and make healthcare more accessible. 93
However, Senate Bill 3 raised much opposition from individuals, such as
Senator David Adelman, who commented that by raising the burden of proof,
it would, as a result, become difficult for those patients who suffer from
injury or even death to seek justice in the law.94 When the legislators raised
the standard of proof to clear and convincing, they made it nearly
impossible—or at least almost to the criminal standard of a beyond a
reasonable doubt—for a plaintiff to bring a successful claim against an
emergency physician.95 Not only has the legislature raised the standard, but
it has also changed the negligence norm to a gross negligence standard,
which is almost a “mission impossible for plaintiffs.”96

87.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015).
88.
Graves, supra note 65, at 284, 301.
89.
See Williams v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall Cty., 168 S.E.2d 336, 337 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1969); Graves, supra note 65, at 301.
90.
See Williams, 168 S.E.2d at 337; Jade Hindmon, E.R. Overcrowding,
WTVM, http://www.wtvm.com/story/4710750/er-overcrowding (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
91.
See Graves, supra note 65, at 299–300.
92.
Id. at 301.
93.
Id. at 284; see also S. 3, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 1(a), 8(c) (Ga.
2005).
94.
See Ga. S. 3 § 8(c); Graves, supra note 65, at 287.
95.
See Graves, supra note 65, at 287, 289.
96.
Graves, supra note 65, at 287.
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Georgia’s Conflict with Clear and Convincing

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s ruling in Gliemmo v. Cousineau,97
faced public backlash after the passing of Senate Bill 3, when a medical
malpractice action was filed questioning the constitutionality of Georgia’s
heightened burden of proof and the raised standard of gross negligence.98
Plaintiffs in this case alleged that the distinction between emergency room
and general medical malpractice cases violated Georgia’s Constitution
because it provided a special laws clause, which made any law that is not
applied uniformly, unconstitutional.99 Due to the uniqueness in the Georgia
Constitution, the court held that a gross negligence and heightened burden of
proof was constitutional because it was not a special law, and it did not deny
equal protection and due process.100
The plaintiffs in Gliemmo alleged that because section 51-1-29.5(c)
only applies to some emergency physicians, it is considered a special law
that discriminates against practitioners outside the emergency room and thus,
is in violation of the Georgia Constitution.101 The court reasoned that the
statute is not a special law because it is applied uniformly to all claims in
emergency care and without a specific time frame. 102 The General
Assembly’s legislative intent behind the distinct treatment showed that both
emergency and general practitioners are having great difficulty affording
insurance, and because emergency care is distinct from general care, it is
sufficient to heighten the burden of proof to reach those goals.103 However,
the court and the legislature do not discuss doctors who are not emergency
physicians but who undergo similar emergency situations, and patients with
severe injuries and yet do not qualify for a heightened burden of proof.104
This argument will be discussed further in depth later in this Comment.105
Subsequently, the court then cites to State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.

97.
694 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. 2010).
98.
Id. at 77; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015); S. 3, 148th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005).
99.
Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77 (emphasis added).
100.
Id. at 79–80; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV(c).
101.
Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 77; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV;
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c).
102.
Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 78–79; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para.
IV(c); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c).
103.
Gliemmo, 694 S.E. 2d at 79.
104.
See id.
105.
See infra Section V.A.2.
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v. Five Transportation Co.,106 which held that treatment that is not uniformly
identically applied does not necessarily offend the Georgia Constitution.107
V.
A.

IN FLORIDA’S CASE

Florida’s Tort Reform Direction
1.

Introduction

Tort reform is becoming a popular new movement, which all states
are taking part in but that many face conflict with because of the
individuality of each state’s constitution.108 In order to understand whether
Florida can continue its tort reform path, it is essential to understand the case
law and special constitutional provisions that do not allow Florida to
continue tort reform like its sister state, Georgia. 109 In Georgia, the
legislature has successfully enacted statutes that increase the standard of the
proof that makes it close to impossible for a victim to successfully bring a
case to court.110 Contrastingly, the effectiveness of tort reform in states such
as Florida becomes questionable when Florida still has some of the highest
insurance premiums in the country even when it has different cap amounts in
place and expert witness reform.111
a.

1986 Florida Reform

The Medical Malpractice Reform Act, one of Florida’s earliest
reforms in 1975, was enacted in order to diminish the cost of medical
insurance to patients at a time when the state began to suffer through a health
care crisis, and the cost of insurance was excessively gross.112 In Florida, the
tort reform movement did not become recognized until a move from the
contributory negligence standard to the comparative negligence norm
occurred in Hoffman v. Jones, 113 to adopt a more equitable system of
106.
271 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1980).
107.
Gliemmo, 694 S.E.2d at 79; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 271 S.E.2d at
848; see also GA. CONST. art. III, § VI, para. IV.
108.
See Roslund, supra note 11.
109.
See supra Section IV.B; infra Sections V.A.1.a–c, V.A.2.
110.
See Roslund, supra note 11.
111.
See id.; Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 934 (Fla.
2014).
112.
Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75–79, 1975 Fla. Laws 13;
see also Thomas Horenkamp, Comment, The New Florida Medical Malpractice Legislation
and Its Likely Constitutional Challenges, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2004).
113.
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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relief.114 Notably, the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 demonstrated
that Florida’s aim to move towards comparative fault in negligence cases.115
This would be the first attempt to slowly abolish the doctrine of joint and
several liability in Florida.116 Subsequent reforms followed the passage of
section 768.81, such as allocating fault to the plaintiff and removing joint
and several liability to a defendant who has a less percentage of fault, which
changed medical malpractice law. 117 The 1986 reform was based on the
legislature’s attempt to decrease insurance premiums and as a result,
implemented insurance profit laws and insurance rate rollbacks.118
b.

Republicans Make the Change

In 1996, Florida gained a Republican majority controlling the
Florida House and Senate, which caused the legislators to aim their focus on
improving business relations in Florida.119 The changes in office began a
movement to change the civil court system in order to increase prosperity for
insurance companies. 120 The legislators gained wide support for the
limitation of litigation; they claimed that the floodgate of civil cases in the
courthouses was causing insurance companies and the market to fail in
Florida.121 Despite the fact that in 1996 Florida’s economy was strong as the
gross state product rose by 19.5%, the unemployment rate fell by 4.9%, and
Florida ranked third in greatest number of new businesses, legislators still
blamed the small percentage of civil cases in Florida for a non-existent
decline.122 Further statistics in the 1990s show that medical claims were not
the culprit because when the 1986 reform was passed negligence cases only
consisted of 8.9% of civil cases, and they have been in decline since 1990.123

114.
Id. at 438.
115.
Michael S. Hooker & Guy P. McConnell, Joint and Several Liability in
Florida: Are Reports of Its Demise Greatly Exaggerated?, FLA. B. J., Dec. 2006, at 10, 12;
see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (2014).
116.
Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. §
768.81.
117.
Hooker & McConnell, supra note 115, at 12; see also FLA. STAT. §
768.81.
118.
Kenneth D. Kranz, Tort Reform 1997–98: Profits v. People?, 25 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 161, 163–64 (1998).
119.
Id. at 165.
120.
See id.
121.
See id.
122.
See id.; Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a
Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 433 (2000).
123.
Kranz, supra note 118, at 176–77.
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The only increase that has occurred in civil cases is due to the standard
population increase of Floridians.124
c.

House Bill 775

In 1999, Florida once again made changes to tort law with the
passage of House Bill 775 that reformed joint and several liability, punitive
damages, statute of repose, and vicarious liability in motor vehicle cases.125
The doctrine of joint and several liability was further limited in the 1999
reform when a plaintiff’s economic losses were limited to a total of a one
million dollar cap, but it only applied when the defendant was more than
fifty percent at fault. 126 Significantly, under the new reform, multiple
defendants could not be held to be joint and severally liable for more than
one million dollars.127
A common method used by tort reformists in order to gain public
support for the limitation of the civil litigation system was the reference to a
fictitious tort tax to the public.128 Reference to the tort law system as a tax
on civilians was used to quickly gain negative opposition against individuals
who brought claims to court. 129 Vice President Dan Quayle made a
statement to a group of business leaders that the tort litigation system costs
Americans three hundred billion dollars, a figure that has no statistical
support but that quickly gained momentum. 130 Fictitious information,
negative terminology, such as tort tax, and company lobbyists have falsely
led the tort reform in Florida when no accurate information demonstrates that
civil litigation burdens Florida’s economy in any manner. 131 Other costs,
such as natural disasters—specifically hurricanes—have caused a decline in
Florida’s economy, but are not accounted for when the legislature looks for a
culprit in the downfall of the economy.132

124.
Id. at 177.
125.
H.B. 775, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1999) (Act effective Oct. 1, 1999,
ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400); Peck et al., supra note 122, at 406.
126.
Peck et al., supra note 122, at 409.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. at 421.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at 421–22.
131.
See Peck et al., supra note 122, at 422.
132.
Id. at 426.
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Medical Malpractice Reform Gains Momentum

In 2003, the legislature focused its attempts on medical malpractice
cases by placing statutory caps on non-economic damages.133 The medical
malpractice reform also enacted provisionary steps to protect consumers
from medical negligence, such as allowing insurance companies to avoid suit
by tendering the limit of the defendant’s policy in two hundred ten days.134
The 2003 legislature also expressed that the new cap on non-economic
damages would be on an aggregate basis, and in cases where there were
several plaintiffs, the cap would be even lower. 135 As a result, section
766.118 of the Florida Statutes was enacted to limit the amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff could receive to five hundred dollars per
claimant.136 The statute aimed at limiting frivolous lawsuits and enforcing
mediation before trial in order to protect insurance companies from excessive
claims. 137 In order to pass the Statute, Senate Bill 2-D provided several
legislative findings, many are no longer presently applicable.138
Overall, the 2003 Florida Legislature for Senate Bill 2-D found that
Florida was in the middle of a medical malpractice crisis and that it caused
decreased availability of healthcare for Floridians.139 The legislature claimed
that Florida is one of the states with the highest medical malpractice
insurance and therefore reasoned that this was why medical practitioners
were leaving Florida.140 The legislature reasoned that it could not provide its
citizens with access to proper healthcare when doctors were leaving the state
to practice somewhere else with lower insurance premiums.141 As a result,
the legislature publicized a correlation between the numbers of doctors
leaving the state; nonetheless it was only anecdotal data that was merely
implied.142
Organizations, such as the American Medical Association, have
blamed the American jury system for the increase in insurance premium
133.
Tracy S. Carlin, Medical Malpractice Caps Move from the Legislature to
the Courts: Will They Survive?, FLA. B. J., May 2004, at 10, 10.
134.
See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290–91.
135.
See S.B. 2-D, 2003 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2003); Horenkamp, supra note
112, at 1289.
136.
FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a) (2014); Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1290.
137.
See FLA. STAT. § 766.118; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1289, 1291.
138.
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 913 (Fla. 2014)
(discussing that in Florida there no longer exists a healthcare crisis to provide a rational basis
for caps); Fla. S.B. 2-D; infra Part V.C.
139.
See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1299–1300.
140.
Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298.
141.
See Fla. S.B. 2-D; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1298–99.
142.
Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1302.
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costs and the limitation of accessibility to healthcare.143 Tactics to support
the allegation of excessive jury awards include placing emphasis on
individual high jury awards and claiming that the award system is the true
culprit.144 Insurance companies repeatedly claim that litigation and excessive
awards are responsible for the national crisis and high costs of healthcare,
however, significant data shows otherwise.145 In 2001, a total of 1303 claims
were made against doctors in Florida that totaled to $361.1 million.146 If
insurance companies claim that medical malpractice suits are driving doctors
out of Florida and are excessive, the numbers of the amount of cases that
actually make it to court do not match the allegations.147
Other arguments made by tort reformers are that jurors are often
sympathetic to plaintiffs because they only see the injuries caused and that
often the medical standard is too complex for them to understand, even with
expert testimony.148 Tort reformers argue that medical malpractice is too
complex for jurors because it involves multiple parties, difficult medical
issues, and a complex method to award appropriate damages.149 However,
all these legislative findings on the need for tort reform in the medical
malpractice area do not discuss how insurance premium costs have increased
due to the losses in the reserve amount of negligent doctors and the lack of
proper management of healthcare companies in the industry.150
In 2004, further reforms continued as Florida passed the Three
Strikes Rule, also referred to as Amendment 8, which became section 456.50
of the Florida Statute. 151 The Act focused on preventing physicians who
have repeatedly committed malpractice from maintaining or obtaining a
physician’s license. 152 While the Act may at first seem to benefit the
plaintiff, the Act also heightens the standard of proof required to deny a
license to a physician to a clear and convincing standard if the act or acts are
not part of the Amendment 8 list.153 This standard is the same standard of
proof required in Georgia against emergency physicians, with the exception
143.
Id. at 1305.
144.
Id. at 1306–07.
145.
See id. at 1305–07.
146.
Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1307.
147.
See id. at 1306–07.
148.
Edward L. Holloran, III, Comment, Medical Malpractice Litigation in
Florida: Discussion of Problems and Recommendations, 26 NOVA L. REV. 331, 335–36
(2001).
149.
Id.
150.
Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1312.
151.
FLA. STAT. § 456.50 (2014); Dinah Stein, Florida’s “Three Strikes”
Legislation: A Defense Perspective, 29 TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2010, at 22, 22.
152.
FLA. STAT. § 456.50(2); Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23.
153.
See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23.
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that in Florida, physicians must have committed three malpractice acts or
their license will be removed.154 This heightened standard makes imposing
strikes almost impossible and a finding of ordinary negligence would not be
sufficient to impose a strike on a practitioner under section 456.50.155 A
greater standard of evidence required to remove a physician’s license is
argued because the right to practice medicine is seen as valuable property,
and removal of a license limits a basic right, which would deprive doctors of
due process. 156 The right to practice medicine is recognized as a federal
constitutional property right that the Florida Legislature cannot limit under
the Supremacy Clause.157 However, a plaintiff’s right to access the courts
and be able to seek redress for their injury is an equally protected right under
the Florida Constitution.158
B.

Access to the Courts

In accordance with the Florida Constitution, “[t]he courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.” 159 Although the U.S.
Constitution does not expressly provide access to the courts, it is implied
through the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.160 Often
Florida’s access to courts is one of the main criticisms of tort reform, but it
raises the main question of who should bear the responsibility to compensate:
the aggrieved individual, the tortfeasor or the taxpayers?161 Further, conflict
arises when society is forced to pay for the wrongdoers’ actions. 162
Therefore, because of the access to courts provision, Florida is more
susceptible to challenge any new tort reform that may deny citizens their
right to redress.163

154.

Compare FLA. STAT. § 456.50(1)(h), with GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c)

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See FLA. STAT. § 456.50; Stein, supra note 151, at 23.
Stein, supra note 151, at 23, 26.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Stein, supra note 151, at 26.
See FLA. CONST. art. I § 21.
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292.
Id.
See id.

(2015).
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Kluger v. White

As established by Kluger v. White,164 access to the courts is given to
Floridians as a fundamental right in their constitution and can only be
removed in two circumstances: (1) when there is a reasonable alternative to
protect the right to redress for injuries or (2) “an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of [the] right, and [that] no alternative method
of meeting [the] public necessity can be shown.” 165 However, protection
under access to the courts is only extended to rights that existed at common
law, such as personal injury claims.166 The holding of Kluger was essential
to bring awareness into Florida on whether the tort reform was violating an
individual’s access to the courts by increasing the difficulty for a plaintiff to
seek relief.167 The Supreme Court of Florida addressed that the legislation
cannot abolish the right to access the courts without providing an alternative
to guarantee an individual a way to redress.168
2.

Mitchell v. Moore and Defining an Overpowering Public Necessity

Denial of an individual’s access to the courts includes burdening or
restricting an individual’s access right to redress.169 In Mitchell v. Moore,170
a prisoner sought his petition to be reviewed by the appellate court; however,
his petition was denied unless he filed various copies of the pleadings.171
The petitioner stated that this was a violation of his access to courts
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution because it was unduly burdensome in
his condition as a prisoner to provide additional copies. 172 The Supreme
Court of Florida agreed that the statute requiring him to provide extensive
copies only provided difficulty and delay with no possible alternative to
access the courts for the prisoners.173 Therefore, if a fundamental interest is
being taken, then the statute must meet the rational basis test and strict
scrutiny test.174 The court in Mitchell held that the compelling government
interest is equivalent to the overpowering public necessity and, therefore, the
statute was to be held under a strict scrutiny analysis instead of a lower
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 4 (emphasis added); see also FLA CONST. art. I § 21.
See Fla. Const. art. I § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 10; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1292–93.
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001).
786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 523–24.
See id. at 524; FLA CONST. art. I § 21.
Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 525.
Id. at 527.
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rational basis standard. 175 However, this all applies if the legislature’s
finding to limit access to the courts is current, and in cases where legislative
findings do not parallel the present findings, the court has the ability to
correct them.176
C.

Estate of McCall Changes Florida’s Justification for Tort Reform

One of the most recent Supreme Court of Florida cases, Estate of
McCall, directly addresses the alleged medical malpractice crisis in
Florida.177 In Estate of McCall, a woman named “Michelle McCall received
prenatal medical care [from] a United States Air Force clinic” when she was
diagnosed with severe preeclampsia.178 The patient was treated by the family
practice department instead of the required obstetrics-gynecology.179 Since
the Air Force hospital was unavailable, the patient was transferred to the Fort
Walton Beach Medical Center where she delivered the baby. 180 Dr.
Archibald, the obstetrician in charge of the procedures, left after the delivery,
but he was called after the family practitioner could not remove the placenta,
and the patient had already lost a great amount of blood.181 The practitioners
informed Dr. Archibald of the blood loss; however, forty minutes thereafter,
a nurse attempted to draw blood from Ms. McCall. 182 As a result, Ms.
McCall underwent cardiac arrest and never regained consciousness.183 The
district court awarded a total of $2,000,000—$500,000 for her son and
$750,000 for each of her parents.184 However, with the application of section
766.118(2), the cap on wrongful death cases, the case was limited to
$1,000,000.185 The petitioners then appealed the case on the basis that the
cap violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, was an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment,
and was a violation of Florida’s right of access to the courts, the right to jury
trial, and equal protection under the Florida Constitution.186

175.
Id. at 528, 531.
176.
See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1294.
177.
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 897 (Fla. 2014).
178.
Id.
179.
Id. at 898.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 898–99.
182.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 898–99.
183.
Id. at 899.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014); Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899.
186.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899.
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Why Estate of McCall Matters

Although Estate of McCall is a wrongful death case that discusses
the constitutionality of caps on medical malpractice claims, for the purposes
of this Comment we will only discuss the effect Estate of McCall has on
medical malpractice claims in Florida, and the continuation of further tort
reform. 187 The court in Estate of McCall ruled that the statutory cap on
wrongful death cases violates the Equal Protection Clause under the Florida
Constitution because there is no longer a rational basis reasoning for a
legitimate state objective behind it.188 Where the importance of the recent
case is the court’s explanation and reasoning behind why the caps are
unconstitutional; the court analyzes the present day situation in Florida with
the alleged medical malpractice case.189
In Estate of McCall, the court addressed the responsibility given
under Warren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.190 to assure
that the statute that was passed serves a legitimate government purpose and
therefore, obligates itself to analyze the alleged insurance crisis.191 The court
discussed the reasoning that the Florida Legislature has utilized in order to
enact statutes limiting malpractice liability; the Florida Legislature Task
Force has alleged that Florida has such a high cost of insurance premiums
that it has forced medical practitioners to leave the state. 192 The court
dismissed this finding and asserts that in 2003, “the United States General
Accounting Office [(“GAO”)] found that from 1991 to 2001, [the amount of
physicians] grew from 214 to 237 in metropolitan areas.”193 This is contrary
to the Task Force’s findings that malpractice litigation was driving
practitioners out and limiting the availability of health care to
practitioners.194 As well, the alleged increase of jury verdicts statement by
the Task Force has been exaggerated—a study revealed that only 7.5% of
malpractice cases actually involve a jury trial verdict, and most of the cases
were resolved in settlements. 195 Therefore, as the court stated, the Task

187.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2, 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 899.
188.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905, 914–15.
189.
Id.
190.
899 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2005).
191.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 905–06; Warren, 899 So. 2d at 1095.
192.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; JOHN C. HITT ET AL., GOVERNOR’S
SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE LIABILITY INSURANCE XVII (2003).
193.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906.
194.
See id.; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at XVII.
195.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; Hitt et al., supra note 192, at 64.
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Force’s findings that jury awards in medical malpractice cases were the
culprits for the increased costs of insurance are deemed most questionable.196
The court quotes the opinion of Joanne Doroshow, Executive
Director of the Center for Justice and Democracy, who claims that:
[T]his so-called crisis is nothing more than the underwriting cycle
of the insurance industry, and driven by the same factors that
caused the crises in the 1970s and 1980s . . . . [W]ith each crisis,
there has been a severe drop in the investment income for insurers,
which has been compounded by sever[e] under-pricing of
insurance premiums . . . . [D]uring years of high interest rates or
excellent insur[ance] profits that are invested for maximum return,
the insurance companies engage in fierce competition . . . .
[W]hen investment income drops . . . the insurance industry
responds by sharply increasing premiums and reducing coverage.
[T]ort reform changes in the 1980s . . . was caused instead by [the]
modulations in the insurance cycle throughout the country.197

The court acknowledged that the reason for the insurance crisis in
Florida was due to the increases in the amount of money that insurance
companies place for reserve. 198 The allegation that insurance is driving
practitioners out of Florida is not supported because the practitioners are
leaving to other states, such as North Carolina, that have the same crisis with
high malpractice insurance rates.199 The alleged statement that the number of
frivolous lawsuits has allegedly increased in Florida is contradicted by the
deputy director of Florida Office of Insurance Regulations who confirmed
that there is no evidence of an increase in the number of frivolous lawsuits or
excessive jury verdicts.200
In accordance with the GAO, some providers have even purported
that because of the medical malpractice suits, physicians are forced to cut
back on services that are seen as high risk.201 However, the GAO debunked
that allegation as unrepresentative of the physician population as the surveys
only had a twenty percent response rate. 202 The American Medical
Association claimed that twenty-four percent of physicians stopped
performing these procedures but failed to mention that responses for the
196.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 906; HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64.
197.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 907–08 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added); see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64.
198.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 908.
199.
Id. at 909.
200.
Id. at 908.
201.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 20 (2003).
202.
Id.
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survey were only ten percent.203 States with caps on non-economic damages
claim that they have lower premium rates because of this; however, they
exclude many factors such as hospitals and nursing homes.204 Other factors,
such as the manner in which plaintiffs are permitted to collect damages, alter
the award amount depending on whether the plaintiff files claims for
multiple defendants together or individually.205
Today, even if Florida was in the same medical crisis as it was in the
1980s, a crisis is not a permanent condition.206 The court emphasizes that,
“even if section 766.118 may have been rational when it was enacted . . . it
will no longer be rational where the factual premise upon which the statute
was based has changed.”207 Florida courts have a duty to evaluate both data
before a statute is passed and its constitutionality after. 208 Further data
contradicts any allegations of lack of access to healthcare when there are
more active physicians in Florida than in the past, while, at the same time,
the Office of State Courts Administrator reports that medical malpractice
cases in Florida have decreased from 5829 to only 2491 in 2012.209 In 2003,
the 5829 medical malpractice cases only constituted 3% of civil actions, and
later the actions filed for medical malpractice decreased by more than 60% in
2012.210
As a result of the court’s findings, the Supreme Court of Florida
established that there is no current medical malpractice crisis in Florida and
that if there was in the past, it was no longer practical.211 The lack of a
present medical malpractice crisis denies any rational basis reasoning to
impose caps by section 766.118 and any legitimate state purpose to limit
litigation, equal protection, and access to the courts. 212 Nonetheless, the
court decided not to answer any of the remaining questions regarding access
to the courts because Estate of McCall was a wrongful death case, which is
not considered common law or a statute protected by the Florida
Constitution.213

203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 30.
205.
Id. at 37.
206.
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 907, 913 (Fla. 2014);
see also HITT ET AL., supra note 192, at 64.
207.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913.
208.
See id.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21;
FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2014).
213.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915.
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No Alternative Method

With Estate of McCall proving that there no longer exists a rational
basis for medical malpractice reform, it is even more prevalent that any new
reform in Florida would violate the Florida Constitution’s right of access to
the courts and equal protection.214 In University of Miami v. Echarte,215 the
court held that mandatory arbitration and monetary caps on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice claims are not unconstitutional because they
“are necessary to meet the medical malpractice crisis” even when they limit
an individual’s access to the courts. 216 In Echarte, the court states that
monetary caps on non-economic damages, known as the Medical
Malpractice Reform Act, satisfies both the overpowering necessity and no
alternative method of the Kluger test when a party is forced to request
arbitration first.217 Nonetheless, Echarte denies a plaintiff the right to access
when they force a plaintiff to receive a lower amount of damages if they
deny arbitration.218
The arbitration option enforced in Echarte is no longer constitutional
because under the new findings, it does not pass the Kluger test. 219 The
legislature can no longer show an overpowering public necessity for
abolishment of a right and no reasonable alternative without limiting access
to the courts. 220 In this situation, the plaintiff is undercompensated both
when they choose arbitration and decide to go to trial, even though it is at the
benefit of the defendant.221 Not only is the plaintiff limited from being able
to bring their claim to court as guaranteed under the Florida Constitution, but
they are also denied full compensation with no legitimate rational reasoning
behind it.222 Florida’s Malpractice Act allows jurors to use the caps of noneconomic damages and leave a plaintiff undercompensated when they

214.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913.
215.
618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
216.
Id. at 197–98.
217.
Id. at 194–97; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); see also FLA.
STAT. § 766.207(7)(b).
218.
Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; FLA. STAT. §
766.207; Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Comment, Florida’s Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act: Is It Time for a Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 565–66 (1996).
219.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197;
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565–66.
220.
Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563; see also Estate of McCall, 134 So.
3d at 914; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at 197.
221.
Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 558.
222.
Id. at 561–62; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Echarte, 618 So. 2d at
194.
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suffered an incredible loss. 223 The arbitration option and other medical
malpractice reforms punish the plaintiff when they do not seek arbitration
because they wish to take their case to court.224 Further medical tort reform,
such as increasing the burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard
when treated by emergency physicians, would further punish and delay the
plaintiff’s right to redress.225
3.

North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan

Estate of McCall opens the door to future litigation when it questions
the constitutionality of non-economic caps and when it completely exposes a
no longer present need for limitations on plaintiffs based on their injuries.226
In the recent Fourth District Court of Appeal case North Broward Hospital
District v. Kalitan, 227 a patient brought an action against a hospital for
medical malpractice when she suffered a catastrophic injury. 228 The
plaintiff’s injuries consisted of an induced coma for several weeks, upper
body pain, mental disorders, and loss of independence.229 The jury found in
favor of the plaintiff and determined that the plaintiff had suffered a
catastrophic injury and awarded a total of $4,718,011 in total damages as
well as a total of $4,000,000 in non-economic damages.230 The trial court
then moved to limit the amount of non-economic damages to $2,000,000
under section 766.118(2) of the Florida Statutes and was furthered capped
under sovereign entity to $1,300,000.231
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then moved to reference Estate
of McCall to analyze whether section 766.118 of the Florida Statutes applies
to both personal injury and wrongful death cases.232 The court determined
that, as established under Estate of McCall, if there is no longer an objective
for the statute, then there is no longer a legitimate state objective to which
the caps can rationally relate. 233 Although Estate of McCall specifically
refers to wrongful death cases, when the statute’s objective as a whole is
223.

Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 564; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)

(2014).
224.
Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 565.
225.
See Stein, supra note 151, at 22–23.
226.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913.
227.
174 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
228.
Id. at 405.
229.
Id.
230.
Id. at 406.
231.
Id. at 407; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2) (2014).
232.
Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411; see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118(2)(a); Estate of
McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 915 (Fla. 2014).
233.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411.
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discredited then reference to personal injury cases applies as well.234 It is a
violation of equal protection when non-economic caps discriminate and
allow claimants with little non-economic damages to claim all the damages,
while claimants with serious injuries are capped. 235 In Kalitan, the court
demonstrates the intention to limit tort reform after Estate of McCall brought
to light the lack of rational basis for distinction among medical malpractice
plaintiffs.236 The Kalitan court decided not to address the statute’s violation
to access to courts or jury trials because Estate of McCall rationale applies to
medical malpractice actions in general.237
4.

Florida Cannot Continue in Its Tort Reform

What makes Estate of McCall so essential to today’s tort reform in
Florida is the assertion that Florida is no longer in a medical malpractice
insurance crisis; therefore, the court’s findings question the constitutionality
of past reforms and any future attempts.238 Estate of McCall sets a distinct
precedent for future cases and legislative actions; it limits any possibility of
Florida continuing tort reform.239 Unlike the state of Georgia that overcame
the equal protection hurdle in order to enact a heightened burden of proof
when the legislature increased the standard, a similar reform would not pass
Florida’s scrutiny.240 Florida’s case law, such as Kluger, Estate of McCall,
and now Kalitan, note that there is no longer an overpowering public
necessity and rational basis to place any more limitations on a plaintiff.241
There no longer exists a compelling reason for unequal treatment towards
plaintiffs with different injuries—whether wrongful death or personal
injury.242 Florida no longer has legislative findings to prove that it is still in a
medical crisis.243
Nevertheless, because Florida under Kluger requires a test of
overpowering necessity, it will be unsuccessful in enacting and justifying any
further tort reform. 244 The legislature is now unable to provide rational
234.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 897; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411.
235.
Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411.
236.
See id. at 409, 10; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901.
237.
FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 21–22; Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901;
Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411.
238.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 913.
239.
See id. at 931.
240.
Id. at 916; Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 694 S.E.2d 75, 80 (Ga. 2010).
241.
See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4–5 (Fla. 1973); Estate of McCall, 134
So. 3d at 901, 936; Kalitan, 174 So. 3d at 411.
242.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 901, 916.
243.
Id. at 906.
244.
See Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4 (emphasis added).
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reasons for the different treatment for those individuals who suffer serious
near death injuries caused by negligence, but who are forced to cap their
damages.245 In contrast, plaintiffs in wrongful death cases have unlimited
damages.246 The legislature also cannot pass the first part of Kluger with a
reasonable alternative when the alternative is to go to arbitration.247 Even if
arbitration is no longer mandatory, rather voluntary, it becomes mandatory
when the plaintiff’s non-economic damages are capped even further.248 The
alternative arbitration creates a greater burden on the plaintiff, and it
discourages the parties from settling.249
Florida already places caps on emergency practitioners and limits the
award of non-economic damages available to plaintiffs who underwent
medical care by an emergency physician to $150,000. 250 Increasing the
burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard and gross negligence, like
Georgia, would potentially deny an individual the right to access the courts,
equal protection, and a full recovery.251 If Florida attempts to continue tort
reform by increasing the standard of proof, the plaintiff in an emergency
practitioner claim would have to undergo arbitration, show negligence by a
clear and convincing standard, and then be forced to limit the amount of
damages.252 The plaintiff will also have to prove by a clear and convincing
standard to a lay jury who may have trouble with medical terminology
comprehension.253
A plaintiff can no longer be labeled in accordance to the injury he or
she suffered.254 A clear and convincing standard proposal in Florida will be
subject to strict scrutiny because a justification for limitations would no
longer exist, as malpractice claims are not the cause of high cost of
insurance.255 As established by the court in Estate of McCall, “[h]ealth care
policy that relies upon discrimination against Florida families is not rational
245.
Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 563–64.
246.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915.
247.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4; Fonseca-Nader,
supra note 218, at 560–61, 565.
248.
See Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 560–61, 564–65.
249.
See id. at 560–62.
250.
FLA. STAT. § 766.118(4)(a) (2014).
251.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; GA. CODE ANN. §
51-1-29.5(c) (2015); Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001) (denying or
burdening an individual’s access to the courts violates the Florida Constitution).
252.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 766.118(4)(a), .207(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c)
(2015).
253.
Holloran, III, supra note 148, at 343–44.
254.
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914–15 (Fla.
2014).
255.
Id. at 914; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c); Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at
527; Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
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or reasonable when it attempts . . . to create unreasonable classifications.”256
Making a distinction between patients who were treated in an emergency
room, in contrast from those who were treated in a clinic, makes the same
unreasonable classification.257 Forcing a plaintiff to demonstrate a showing
of the clear and convincing standard of gross negligence based on which
hospital door they entered would substantially burden and restrict a
plaintiff’s right to redress.258
VI.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Florida can no longer justify any new tort reforms,
especially in the area of medical malpractice. 259 There no longer exists
legislative reasoning to limit the right of access to the courts and equal
protection; the legislature can no longer enact statutes that limit the
plaintiff’s right to sue malpractice doctors.260 A statute like Georgia’s statute
that increases the burden of proof would violate Florida’s unique right of
access to the courts clause because it would almost make it impossible for a
plaintiff to bring a claim to court against an emergency physician when there
is no source of rational reasoning or need for such limitation.261 Historically,
Florida has always been a state leading in tort reform; nonetheless, the new
findings force the courts to reevaluate the constitutionality of statutes that
reflect the needs of the state at the time they were enacted.262 Doctors are not
leaving the State of Florida anymore and so ensuring access to medical care
is not reasoning behind further reform.263 Moreover, the arbitration option as
an alternative to limit access to the courts works towards the detriment of the
plaintiff by capping them at an even lower rate when they already have caps
in place at court. 264 Arbitration is not a good alternative; it penalizes a
plaintiff for seeking justice in the law and it does not penalize a party who
does not want to settle.265
Florida healthcare is at a high rate, and many individuals seek care
from emergency rooms because of their financial situation.266 However, the
256.
Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 915.
257.
See id.; Graves, supra note 65, at 293.
258.
See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527; Graves, supra note 65, at 293.
259.
See Estate of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914.
260.
See id.; Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 527.
261.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-29.5(c) (2015); Estate
of McCall, 134 So. 3d at 914.
262.
See Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287, 1292.
263.
See id. at 1302.
264.
See Fonseca-Nader, supra note 218, at 568.
265.
Id.
266.
See Graves, supra note 65, at 298.
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number of medical claims is not the cause of the healthcare problem. 267
Florida needs to note that it is not in the same medical crisis as it was in the
1980s, and it must address all the limitations it has placed on plaintiffs who
are denied their access to the courts and equal protection when they suffer an
injury from medical practitioners.268 The Equal Protection Clause is violated
when patients with different injuries are treated differently with no rational
basis for discrimination.269 In the case of emergency practitioners, it is noted
that they undergo distinct exposure from those practitioners in the normal
practice, and it may seem logical that other malpractice suits may arise from
this.270 However, the type of environment that emergency practitioners are
involved and trained in does not give rational reasoning to limit basic Florida
constitutional rights.271 The right of access to the courts in article I, section
21 of the Florida Constitution cannot be expressed any more clearly; it is not
a right dependent on the practice or the environment that a tortfeasor may
encounter.272 The right to access the courts is unique and absolute, and any
form of further reform in the area of medical malpractice will not survive
Florida scrutiny. 273 As expressed in Mitchell, “[t]he right to access is
specifically mentioned in Florida’s Constitution. Therefore, it deserves more
protection than those rights found only by implication.”274

267.
See Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914 (Fla. 2014).
268.
See id.; Horenkamp, supra note 112, at 1287.
269.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 174
So. 3d 403, 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
270.
See Graves, supra note 65, at 279.
271.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Graves, supra note 65, at 279.
272.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
273.
See id.; Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 913 (Fla.
2014).
274.
Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So. 2d 521, 527 (Fla. 2001); see also FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 21.
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